Oriental Series

JAPAN AND CHINA

LIBRARY EDITION

Limited to One Thousand Numbered and Registered
Copies, of which this is

NUMBER 738

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2008 with funding from
Microsoft Corporation

http://www.archive.org/details/chinaitshistorya04brinuoft

Oriental Series

CHINA

Its History Arts and Literature

BY

CAPTAIN F. BRINKLEY

ILLUSTRATED

VOLUME XII

University of Toronto Library

62128
16/6/04

J. B. MILLET COMPANY
BOSTON AND TOKYO

Copyright, 1902
BY J. B. MILLET CO.

Entered at Stationers' Hall, London, England

DS
735
B85
1902
v.4

UNIVERSITY PRESS · JOHN WILSON
AND SON · CAMBRIDGE, U. S. A.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

Page

Canton and Peking at Last 1

CHAPTER II

The Treaty and the Taipings 51

CHAPTER III

The Sequel of Conquest 91

CHAPTER IV

China's Education 134

CHAPTER V

The Closing Episodes 168

CHAPTER VI

To-Day 209

Appendix 239

Index 265

ILLUSTRATIONS

Page

View of the East Gate, Peking, from the Outside *Frontispiece*

Street in Peking Leading to the Ha Ta Gate 16

A Portion of William Barclay Parson's Retinue Crossing Rice Fields 24

Footbridge in the Grounds of the Empress's Palace . . 32

A Frequent Sight on Any of the Large Rivers 48

Old Tombs in the Interior 64

A Chinese Fruit Seller 80

A Popular Tea-House in the Old Part of Shanghai . . 96

A Chinese Carpenter 112

A Picturesque Farm 128

A Chinese Hand Loom 144

The Imperial Ancestral Temple 160

A Chinese Tea-House 176

Type of Wheelbarrow Used for Travelling 192

A Chinese Country House 208

A Group of Chinese Officials 224

CHINA

ITS HISTORY, ARTS, AND LITERATURE

Chapter I

CANTON AND PEKING AT LAST

FEW, if any, events in modern history have created more controversy than England's second war with China. It has been denounced and vindicated, attacked and defended, with very remarkable vigour. When the British House of Commons was invited to pass judgment upon the justice or injustice of the proceedings growing out of the *Arrow* outrage, a majority of the members, after exhaustive debate, voted that the action taken by British officials in China had been rash and unwarranted. When the British constituencies were asked to pass judgment on the same question in turn, they reversed the verdict of the House of Commons. The divergence of views thus indicated has never been corrected. Yet there is certain evidence which, when collected, seems to render a decision easy. It is evidence of incontrovertible character, being furnished partly by a comparison of dates and partly by official despatches.

On learning what had happened on the deck of the *Arrow*, Mr. Consul Parkes required that the men taken from the lorcha by the Chinese should be returned. That was the sum total of the demand made by him on October 8, 1856. "I begged them to remedy the mistake by bringing the men in their own custody to the Consulate."

Sir John Bowring, on October 11th, added two other demands: first, that an apology be made by the Viceroy; secondly, that an assurance be given to respect the British flag thereafter. The Viceroy promptly replied. He promised that "hereafter Chinese officers will on no account, without reason, seize or take into custody people belonging to foreign lorchas;" and he accompanied this engagement with a suggestion that, to avoid mistakes of identity, registers should no longer be sold to ships owned by Chinese subjects. A few days later, and before the commencement of hostilities, he sent back all the *Arrow's* men to the British Consulate.

There the matter certainly might have ended. The Viceroy had done more than Consul Parkes originally demanded: he had not only given up the men he had, but he had also tendered the assurance required by the Governor of Peking.

The one thing he had not done was to apologise. Is it conceivable that a war would have been undertaken solely with the object of exacting from a Chinese Viceroy an expression of regret for a mistake which he had remedied and which he had promised to avoid in future? Evidently some other motive must have urged the British authorities to push matters to extremities. Sir John Bowring placed on record the sentiment by which he was himself animated at that moment: "Of course the magnitude of our demands grows with the growth of our success. All diplomacy is the exemplification of the Sibyl's story — all wise diplomacy." In other words, the more the Chinese gave, the more the British Commissioner would demand. In the presence of such a mood war must have been inevitable. But Sir John Bowring often allowed his pedantry to disfigure his policy. His aims were not really so insatiate as his language suggests. Their scope and limitation may be clearly gathered from official despatches.

It has been already shown that Her Majesty's officers in China were anxiously watching for an opportunity to procure free ingress to the city of Canton.

On the 16th of October — that is to say, four days after the receipt of Viceroy Yeh's assurance that there should not be any repetition of such a mistake as that of the *Arrow* — Sir John Bowring wrote to Mr. Consul Parkes: "Can not we use this opportunity to carry the City Question? If so, I will come up with the whole fleet. I think we have now a stepping-stone from which, with good management, we may move on to important sequences." At that time, then, although the *Arrow's* crew had not yet been returned nor the required apology made, Sir John Bowring's idea of using force on an extended scale was connected with the City Question only. There was a difficulty however: his Excellency could not count on the co-operation of the British Admiral in the prosecution of his large scheme. On the 19th of October he wrote: "It will be necessary to be very cautious or we shall not obtain the aid of the naval authorities beyond a certain point. I do not think the Admiral will *make war*, and we must consider not what we *might* but what we *can* do." The italics are Sir John's. At that time, then, according to his own showing, he was deliberately bent upon war if it could be contrived, unless, of course, the City Question could be solved without an appeal to arms. The Admiral was to be carefully manipulated with the view of bringing him to a sufficiently pitiless mood. During the next two days the process of manipulation was carried out, and on October 21st Sir John found himself in a position to write: "The Admiral has left me in excellent disposition, and we must write a bright page in our history. . . . I hope you will not lose sight of the City Question. You will not demand it, of course, but you will have an opportunity of saying what may help its settlement . . . I trust to your sagacity to get all that is to be got out of the movement." It is not often that a high official of a civilised power is found exulting in the prospect of battle and murder, and describing it as "a bright page in our history." On the following day his Excellency wrote: "I wish we could carry the City Question. That would be the crowning affair as regards local matters." Yet again, two days later (October 24), that is to say, the day after hostilities had commenced and two days after Viceroy Yeh had returned the whole crew of the *Arrow*, Sir John wrote: "I recommend that the present opportunity — we may never have one so auspicious — be used for settling the City Question;" and later on the same day: "I shall be anxious to ascertain how far the Admiral and you concur in the opinion that the City Question may now becomingly be pressed. Of course entrance must not be *asked* unless it is insisted on."

The Admiral did concur. Having, on the twenty-third and twenty-fourth of October, dismantled various forts near Canton without resistance, on the twenty-fifth he preferred, "on behalf of the representatives of all the Powers" — not that there was any kind of co-operation, but simply that the Admiral wisely wished to give weight to his words — he preferred a demand for free access to the city. To Consul Parkes, the medium for conveying this demand, Yeh replied: "I know full well what you have in view. Unquestionably it is nothing less than a desire to imitate the course taken by Envoy Davis in the spring of 1847. Little indeed you know that in China the people form the basis of the nation, and that the people of Kwangtung are very different from those of other places." Yeh, therefore, fathomed the British design accurately. Even the English Foreign Secretary, even Lord Palmerston himself, had distinctly deprecated the idea of forcing open the gates of Canton at the point of the bayonet. Yet that is exactly what Admiral Seymour, acting at the instance of Sir John Bowring, now proceeded to do. He bombarded the city, breached the wall, marched to Yeh's *yamên* on October the twenty-ninth, and marched out again the same day. It is on official record that, prior to this bombardment, the acts of hostility already performed by the British and the destruction of the Barrier Forts "might be considered to have inflicted humiliation fully equal to the apologies and promises originally required."[1] But there remained always the City Question, which had formed no part of the proximate cause of trouble, except in so far as the impossibility of gaining access to the Viceroy and discussing matters face to face with him might have facilitated an understanding. Much has been made of that point, indeed. Several writers have contended that the whole responsibility for the war rested on Yeh's shoulders, since his refusal to hold personal communication with British officials placed insuperable difficulties in the way of an amicable interchange of views. That, also, is disposed of by an official statement made by Mr. Consul Wade (afterwards Sir Thomas Wade) to Sir John Bowring on October 25th, and indorsed by the latter: "The original demand on our side was one that might have been satisfied by a simple act of correspondence." In truth, from the despatches that passed, it is quite clear that Yeh comprehended the whole case thoroughly. If cannon balls could not make him apologise, a personal interview with Consul Parkes could scarcely have overcome his reluctance. Nor was his failure to apologise the real *casus belli.* The campaign was undertaken really for the purpose of forcing open the city.

---

[1] See Appendix, note 1.

It is notable that defenders of the policy pursued towards China in 1856 have never attempted to construe the *Arrow* case as a sufficient justification for warlike operations. Boulger, in his "History of China," a standard work, declares that "no one who seeks the truth and reads all the evidence will doubt that if there had been no *Arrow* case there would still have been a rupture between the two countries;" and the most recent annalist says that "to isolate the Lorcha *Arrow* incident would be wholly to miss the significance of it: it would be to mistake the match for the mine." Not less notable is it that no historian has attempted to make a clear analysis of the sequence of events in which the *Arrow* affair is thus alleged to have held a merely culminating place. There was presented to Parliament in 1857 a document showing that twenty-eight outrages had been committed by Chinese upon foreigners of all nationalities between 1842 and 1856, an average of nearly two outrages annually. But the document said nothing of the incomparably more terrible and numerous outrages committed by foreigners upon Chinese, — outrages reaching their climax in the exploits of the Portuguese pirate fleet and in the kidnapping of Chinese subjects for the purpose of the coolie traffic at Macao. If these flagrant crimes could not be restrained by foreign Powers, there was no semblance of justice in holding China to such stern account for the minor offences of which her people were guilty. Apart from that aspect of the question, however, history does not bear out the assertion that the *Arrow* affair was the culminating point of a series of incidents whose cumulative force rendered the preservation of peace impossible. As to that, there is conclusive evidence. In a despatch addressed to Viceroy Yeh by Sir John Bowring on April 25, 1854, that is to say, some two years before the *Arrow* incident, the writer spoke of "an accumulation of grievances remaining wholly unredressed, and then proceeded to state categorically "the most important subjects of grievance." They were two: first, "non-admission into Canton city," and secondly, the absence of "personal intercourse between the officials of the two countries." In short, in 1854 the Governor of Hongkong did not advance any ground of complaint except the City Question. He did not even hint the occurrence of any series of incidents likely to endanger the preservation of peace. There were no such occurrences. It was recorded in 1856 that "Canton had been singularly quiet during the past few years." Just three months before the *Arrow* incident, an inflammatory handbill had been circulated in Canton, and, simultaneously, some stones had been thrown at two Englishmen as they rode past one of the city gates. But with the exception of these events foreigners had for several years enjoyed immunity from assault. The British officials charged with the conduct of the *Arrow* business never pretended for an instant that the problem was aggravated by anterior offences on the part of the Chinese. No such offences were responsible for the war; neither was the *Arrow* incident really responsible; neither can the City Question be called ultimately responsible. The truth is, that the war had its origin in a miscalculation. Everything goes to show that Sir John Bowring and Mr. Consul Parkes never expected war. Their confident forecast was that Viceroy Yeh, seeing his outer defences destroyed and the city itself menaced, would immediately capitulate and grant ingress as desired, so that, at the cost of some virtually bloodless operations by the British squadron, the perennial question would have been solved. But Yeh's obduracy upset all calculations. Even after the city had been bombarded, the wall breached, his own *yamên* shelled and entered, and the complete command of the river acquired by the British, he showed no sign of yielding. Thus events belied expectation; and as the British forces available on the spot did not suffice to capture and hold the city, Sir John Bowring saw himself compelled to apply to London for five thousand men. In short, the two countries were embroiled owing to an erroneous estimate of Yeh's character. Menace with a little wholesome display of force had been fully relied on to accomplish all ends, and as they accomplished nothing the national sword had to be drawn.[1]

The subsequent military operations were marked by features similar to those that distinguished the first war. The Chinese showed no fighting capacity, either strategically or tactically, though of individual courage examples were not wanting. A year's delay had occurred, owing to the Indian mutiny, which demanded the services of all troops within reach. Therefore, not until the last days of 1857 did the final attack upon Canton take place. The English and French were now allies. An occurrence, destined to be repeated again and again in later years, had provoked France to take up arms against China: one of her missionaries, Père Chapdelaine, had been tortured and beheaded in Kwangsi.

---

[1] See Appendix, note 2.

Canton offered practically no resistance. Its capture was preceded by an ultimatum to Yeh, and by the distribution of handbills among the citizens warning them that hostilities were about to commence. The ultimatum did not shake the steadfast old mandarin in the least, and the handbills were received with perfect good humour by the people. Lord Elgin and Baron Gros now represented England and France respectively. The former was a typical Englishman, astute, humane, practical, and generous. New to the Far East, he found himself shocked by the mood of his nationals in China, "all for blood and massacre on a great scale." For the first time he had an opportunity of estimating the local pressure to which British officials are habitually subjected in China; and he seems to have rebelled against it strongly, though there was evidence that in fixing the main lines of his policy he did not undervalue the experience and insight of British local merchants. That policy took the form of capturing Canton by way of preliminary to negotiating at Peking a treaty such as should remove all sources of friction. Canton, as already stated, fell easily, and Viceroy Yeh, taken prisoner, was transported to Calcutta, where he passed the remaining two years of his life in ease and luxury. Lord Elgin, then having intrusted to three commissioners the duty of administering the city's affairs, pushed on northward to complete his mission. His advent had been heralded by four despatches, one from himself and one each from the representatives of France, the United States, and Russia. Diplomacy had not yet invented for its Oriental uses the *note identique*, destined to become subsequently a favourite and efficient weapon for winning concessions which must otherwise have been obtained at the point of the sword. Still the simultaneous reception of letters from the four greatest Powers of the Occident, all demanding the same thing though in different terms, must have been a startling event to the Peking Government, especially since the thing demanded was a wider field of contact with persons who had proved themselves the most objectionable neighbours conceivable. Is it possible to imagine for a moment that any body of moderately intelligent statesmen, guided by experiences such as those recorded in Peking at the time of Lord Elgin's coming, could have welcomed an extension of intercourse with nations which seemed to obey the instinct of gain only and to draw the sword on the smallest provocation? Had China been supremely wise, had she been gifted with intelligence and foresight far above the limits of human endowment, she would have taken these pugnacious, masterful, and, from her point of view, altogether unreasonable strangers to her bosom, and would have sought to win their friendship by imitating their unlovely ways. But being a very tyro in interstate politics, with a mind somewhat dazed by long seclusion, she did what any other country would have done under the circumstances — declined the proposal for closer acquaintance. Her way of doing it was "Chinese," if by "Chinese" is to be understood an effort to convey refusals in terms not exasperatingly rough or downright. The meaning, however, could not be misunderstood. Therefore Lord Elgin and Baron Gros repaired to the mouth of the Peiho in the Gulf of Pechili, and having captured the forts guarding the entrance of the river, sailed up to Tientsin. There they obtained everything they asked for, though not without some trouble. A curious feature of the situation was that the negotiations were watched by the Representatives of Russia and the United States, which nations, though not inclined to join in applying warlike pressure to China, would nevertheless enjoy an equal share with England and France in all the advantages gained by these two Powers' arms. Lord Elgin felt this incongruity, and showed his sense of it by excluding the American and Russian envoys from his counsels, thus creating a line of least resistance along which the Chinese Plenipotentiaries sought to find an exit from their greatest trouble. They persuaded the two non-combatant Ministers to approach Lord Elgin through his French colleague with a suggestion that he should forego two of his demands, since to insist on them would cost the Chinese Plenipotentiaries their heads. Those demands were, first that Great Britain, and therefore the other treaty Powers, should have the right to accredit to the Chinese Court Ministers who would reside in Peking; and secondly, that British subjects should have the right to visit the interior of the country for purposes of trade, carrying passports obtained through their consuls from the Chinese. Lord Elgin peremptorily refused to listen to such a suggestion, and the treaty was signed the same day.

Russia thus made her first appearance in a rôle which she has played without variation at the crisis of every complication between China and foreign Powers. She walks hand in hand with Europe and America up to a certain point, and she then assumes the part of a "friend in need" to China.

It is an astute programme, for to the advantages which she shares equally with her Western allies as the result of union, she adds the special advantages which fall to her own share alone as the result of individual benevolence. Some may call such procedure disloyal or even immoral. But what is the standard of loyalty or morality in international dealings of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries?

The desire shown by the Chinese to segregate their imperial capital from the disturbances that foreign intercourse had brought under the conventions, and to confine the operations of foreign merchants to the treaty ports, was quoted at the time, and is still quoted, as evidence of political blindness and conservative stupidity. Yet they had Canton for object lesson; Canton, where acts of war were virtually normal incidents; where the city had been twice bombarded during the past two years, and where the Viceroy had just been seized and carried into exile by a foreign Power. They had Macao for object lesson; Macao, where foreign pirates took refuge, and where barracoons yearly received twenty-five thousand Chinese subjects kidnapped, or decoyed by false pretences to sell themselves into a life of exile and hardship. They had their own inland waters for object lesson, where sanguinary outrages were constantly committed by European and American adventurers. And they had Hongkong for object lesson, where pirates and smugglers had their centre of organization and where territorial aggression on the mainland had commenced simultaneously with the capture of Canton by the Anglo-French forces. There was also another consideration. At the time of these events the Manchu dynasty was in great straits. The Taipings had overrun one-half of the empire and might at any moment move upon the capital. There could be no assurance that foreigners would not espouse the cause of the insurgents. Already, indeed, the latter had received friendly visits and assurances of neutrality from the former — had, in short, been recognised as belligerents. Was it an unreasonable apprehension that the admission of foreigners to Peking might prelude troubles such as Canton had witnessed and such as would paralyse the strength of the Manchus to make further head against the rebels.

Lord Elgin was severely criticised by his countrymen in China for leaving Tientsin without audience with the Emperor. Certainly that would have crowned his mission, and might have averted subsequent calamities. It was, as the Chinese proverb says, the last basketful of earth needed to complete the mountain. His later action with regard to the question of a resident British Minister in Peking was still more singular. Three days after signing the Tientsin Treaty (June 26, 1858), his lordship wrote: "The resident Minister at Peking I consider by far the most important matter gained by the Treaty. Yet, four months afterwards, he agreed to suspend the operation of this very condition. He made this concession to Chinese commissioners who had repaired to Shanghai for the purpose of negotiating a revised tariff. They showed consummate tact in their manner of approaching him. It would seem that they had acquired sufficient appreciation of his character

foreigners would not espouse the cause of the insurgents. Already, indeed, the latter had received friendly visits and assurances of neutrality from the former — had, in short, been recognised as belligerents. Was it an unreasonable apprehension that the admission of foreigners to Peking might prelude troubles such as Canton had witnessed and such as would paralyse the strength of the Manchus to make further head against the rebels.

Lord Elgin was severely criticised by his countrymen in China for leaving Tientsin without audience with the Emperor. Certainly that would have crowned his mission, and might have averted subsequent calamities. It was, as the Chinese proverb says, the last basketful of earth which completes the mountain. His later action with regard to the question of a resident British Minister in Peking was still more singular. Three days after signing the Tientsin Treaty (June 26, 1858), his lordship wrote: "The resident Minister at Peking I consider by far the most important matter gained by the Treaty. Yet, four months afterwards, he agreed to suspend the operation of this very condition. He made this concession to Chinese commissioners who had repaired to Shanghai for the purpose of negotiating a revised tariff. They showed consummate tact in their manner of approaching him. It would seem that they had acquired sufficient appreciation of his character

STREET IN PEKING LEADING TO THE HA TA GATE.

to understand that whereas nothing could be obtained from him by menace or insistence, much might be obtained by an appeal to his generosity. Therefore they frankly told him that they had signed the treaty at Tientsin under such a sense of duresse that intelligent scrutiny had been impossible. Learning subsequently, however, that the residence of foreign Ministers in Peking would be extremely embarrassing to the Court at present, they entreated Lord Elgin to postpone the operation of the clause. He agreed to move his Government in that sense, and the result was that the Chinese believed themselves relieved from the necessity of admitting a foreign envoy to Peking for an unlimited time. What had happened at Canton, they probably hoped, might be repeated at Peking with the exception of the finale. Canton had succeeded in keeping its gates closed for a period of seven years after the date (1849) fixed for opening them. Peking might be at least equally fortunate.

But though the question of a foreign Minister's residence was thus temporarily disposed of, there remained another provision which the Chinese negotiators did not attempt to query ; it was contained in the treaty's last clause, which stated clearly that ratifications should be exchanged in the capital within a year from the date of signature. Perhaps the Chinese imagined that having obtained a postponement in the matter of Ministerial residence, they would find the foreigners placable with regard to the smaller question of ratifications. But it must be frankly confessed that, in spite of the event to be presently related, there is no valid reason to suppose that the Chinese contemplated forceful opposition to exchange of ratifications in Peking. They might have been glad to prevent it peacefully, but nothing shows that they thought of making it a *casus belli*. Having been taught, however, the worthlessness of their defences at the mouth of the Peiho, which were now dismantled and in ruins, they determined to renew the fortifications without delay. Some knowledge of European military science had now been acquired by their officers, and they used it with such intelligence that Taku became a formidable position. Forts were built with traces designed so as to expose the approaches to direct and flank fire, and obstacles were placed in the river in such a manner as not merely to check the progress of vessels, but also to expose them, while attempting the passage, to the concentrated fire of over fifty pieces of artillery.

Judged by the light of subsequent events, the Chinese were accused of unpardonable treachery in thus acting. Such a verdict must be protested against in the interests of historical accuracy. Not a tittle of proof exists to show that the preparations at Taku were designed for other than purely general purposes. The Chinese certainly did not project a treacherous act on the occasion of the exchange of ratifications. It was not with that object that they fortified the Peiho; for, in the first place, they tried to induce the British and French envoys not to proceed to the river at all, but to perform the ceremony of exchange in Shanghai; and, in the second place, when Sir Frederick Bruce and M. Bourboulon, refusing to be turned from the route indicated in the treaty, pushed on to the Peiho, accompanied by a large naval force, they were invited to land at Peh-tang, a place some miles farther north, whence preparations had been made for their journey to the capital, and they were further warned that any attempt to force the passage of the Peiho would be resisted. In this matter the Chinese were strictly within their rights. They had unquestionable competence to declare the Peiho route closed for military reasons, and on the other hand, the French and the English envoys, since they came on a peaceful mission, had no right to force an interdicted route at the point of bayonet. It is mere hysteria to talk of perfidy under such circumstances, or to assert, as a recent historian[1] has asserted, that the Chinese were animated by "a settled determination never to see the face of any foreign minister." The plain object of the Chinese was to save the approaches to Peking from again passing under the control of a foreign military and naval force. Peace having been restored, and a treaty of amity and commerce signed, they saw no reason why the exchange of ratifications should lake place in the presence of a powerful Anglo-French squadron. Therefore they desired that Sir Frederick Bruce and M. Bourboulon, landing at Peh-tang, should proceed to Peking with a moderate escort, leaving their large following of war-ships in the offing. But the envoys conceived that their honor was concerned in not turning aside from a formidable obstacle which they possessed, as they thought, the means of reducing without difficulty. If the source of error is to be honestly sought, it will be found in the policy which perverted an essentially amicable act into a naval demonstration. Considering the theories that filled the atmosphere of the foreign settlements in China, theories of Chinese proud exclusiveness and unscrupulous deceit, it is easy to understand why the pride of the foreign envoys rebelled against going round by a back-door when the front was barricaded in their face; but to that pride, not to Chinese "perfidy," the consequent catastrophe must be attributed.

---

[1] See Appendix, note 3.

Owing to the existence of a bar, vessels of small draught alone could approach within range of the Peiho forts. Nine gun-boats, each having one gun serviceable for such a purpose, attempted, first to silence batteries mounting ninety heavy pieces of ordnance, and secondly to remove obstructions on which a moiety of these guns were carefully trained.

Three of the vessels were sunk and nearly all the rest disabled as well as their smaller consorts. Then the British admiral sought to retrieve the day by a direct frontal attack. For that purpose he sent out 1,300 men — English and French. Ignorant of the nature of the coast, they landed on a mud bank, and within a very brief interval 478 were shot down, drowned, or smothered. According to the rules of modern strategy such a method of assault was inexcusable, but, judging by the military experiences hitherto garnered in China, it should have been crowned with success. Of course after this reverse the discomfited Powers deemed it a point of honor as well as of policy to take up arms again. Thus the war entered its second phase. In the first, the objective had been the capture of Canton and the conclusion of a treaty with Peking. In the second, Peking itself had to be invaded.

Shortly after the Taku disaster, the United States Representative, Mr. Ward, proceeded on a mission analogous to that of the British and French plenipotentiaries. No clause in the United States treaty indicated Peking as the place for exchanging ratifications; but the Chinese invited Mr. Ward to visit the capital, whither the Russian Minister, M. Ignatieff, had already proceeded. So true is the assertion quoted above, that "it was the settled determination of the Chinese never to see the face of any foreign minister in Peking!" The story of this journey to Peking and of the incidents connected with it deserves a moment's attention, for it furnishes a striking illustration of the singularly deceptive accounts often placed before the British nation by historians of events in China. In "The Life of Sir Henry Parkes," — that most honorable and chivalrous gentleman,— published in 1894, the following account of Mr. Ward's visit to Peking is given by the author: —

> "The American mission was treated exactly like 'tribute-bearers' from Lewchew; compelled to journey to the Peiho in rough springless country carts, which tortured every nerve in the body; shut up in a *yamên* at Peking and forbidden to stir a step outside, or to see a soul beyond their prison house. The Chinese ministers appointed to negotiate disdained to sit at the same table with the unfortunate Americans; and when they spoke of an audience with the Emperor, the *kowtow*, or prostration as before a deity, was declared to be absolutely indispensable. Though they had eaten a fair amount of dirt, their sturdy republican knees would not bend to this; and so they returned without an audience to Peh-tang, where they finally consented to exchange the ratifications of their treaty."

This tale professes to be based on information contained in the "Life and Letters of Dr. S. Wells Williams," and to facilitate verification the very page of that impartial and accurate work is indicated. But on consulting the "Life and Letters," the student will be profoundly astonished to discover that the story told there does not bear the remotest resemblance to Mr. Stanley Lane-Pool's version. He will there learn that on landing at Peh-tang, "the Chinese officials exerted themselves to give *éclat* and parade to the reception;" that although the party did ride to the Peiho in springless carts, the Chinese high officials rode in exactly similar vehicles; that in Peking they were lodged in a "summer palace," one of the residences of a former prime minister; that Mr. Ward thanked his escort "for the unaffected kindness and care they had shown during the week of his journey;" that they did not ask for an audience, but were informed by the Prime Minister that "his Majesty personally desired to see them;" that in consequence of that wish the Emperor had "consented to waive all but the semblance of a prostration, the *kowtow* being turned into a bow which should be ostensibly interrupted by the attendant official;" that they nevertheless declined to bend one knee to his Majesty, since, although such a mark of reverence would be required by many European sovereigns, they learned that an idea of worship attached to it in China; that the Chinese commissioners did not refuse to sit at the same table with Mr. Ward, but that they merely set a limit to the number of foreigners who should dine at their board; that the Prime Minister, who was "unfeignedly disappointed" by Mr. Ward's decision about the audience, finally wrote to him: "As an audience is necessarily involved in the visit of an envoy to the capital, and as he refuses to see the Emperor, why, then, has Mr. Ward come?" and that the expedition ended with this incident:—

> "The ceremony (of exchange of ratifications) over, the Chinese proposed to deliver to the Minister one of the two prisoners taken in the recent battle, who had declared himself to be an American, and brought him forward for that purpose. He proved to be a Canadian by birth, and confessed to us that he had lied in hopes of getting free. It required some time to explain to the Chinese the political difference between Canada and the United States, the more so as no maps were accessible. After a full elucidation of all the points of the case, they concluded to surrender the man to Mr. Ward entirely on grounds of humanity, and he was thus received."

It must always remain a mystery how out of such a narrative as the above, the author of the "Life of Sir Henry Parkes" evolved the account given by him. There would be no difficulty, however, in adducing many other examples of writings by which a false public opinion is created in England, so that a nation, essentially disposed by nature to justice and generosity, has often been led to dispense with both of those qualities in its judgments of China and its dealings with her. A large majority of the local English journals published in the Far East are conspicuous educators of such a false opinion. Dr. Wells Wil-

the audience, finally wrote to him: "As an audience is necessarily involved in the visit of an envoy to the capital, and as he refuses to see the Emperor, why, then, has Mr. Ward come?" and that the expedition ended with this incident: —

> "The ceremony (of exchange of ratifications) over, the Chinese proposed to deliver to the Minister one of the two prisoners taken in the recent battle, who had declared himself to be an American, and brought him forward for that purpose. He proved to be a Canadian by birth, and confessed to us that he had fled in hopes of getting free. It required some time to explain to the Chinese the political difference between Canada and the United States, the more so as no maps were accessible. After a full elucidation of all the points of the case, they concluded to surrender the man to Mr. Ward [illegible] grounds of humanity, and he was thus released."

A PORTION OF WILLIAM BARCLAY PARSONS' RETINUE CROSSING RICE FIELDS WHILE SURVEYING THE LINE FOR THE RAILROAD FROM HAN KOW TO CANTON.

It must always remain a mystery how out of such a narrative as the above, the author of the "Life of Sir Henry Parkes" evolved the account given by him. There would be no difficulty, however, in adducing many other examples of writings by which a false public opinion is created in England, so that a nation, essentially disposed by nature to justice and generosity, has often been led to dispense with both of those qualities in its judgments of China and its dealings with her. A large majority of the local English journals published in the Far East are conspicuous educators of such a false opinion. Dr. Wells Wil-

liams, referring to this very visit of Mr. Ward to Peking, says: —

> "The newspapers at Hongkong have generally thrown discredit on the visit of the American Minister to Peking, ridiculing some things, doubting what they pleased, and showing their proficiency in vituperation. It is sad to see the bitterness of these papers against the Chinese. The *Hongkong Register* goes on in a strain of imprecation upon the Chinese, denouncing their treachery, and hoping that they will ere long get such a thrashing as they never had before."

The Taku repulse occurred in June, 1859, two years and eight months after the Lorcha *Arrow* complication. That long delay had been largely due, as already stated, to the Indian Mutiny which absorbed the troops *en route* for China, and thus postponed the final operations against Canton. Another delay now became necessary pending the despatch of an army corps from Europe. But by July, 1860, twelve thousand British troops had been carried to the entrance of the Gulf of Pechili where Talien Bay, on the eastern coast of Liotung Peninsula, served them for basis; and seven thousand French were assembled at Chefoo on the opposite promontory of Shantung, while war-ships and transports, aggregating two hundred, — one hundred sixty-seven English and thirty-five French, — collected at the same place. When this formidable armament began to arrive, Sir Frederick Bruce forwarded to Peking a statement of the demands of his Government, namely, an apology for the Taku affair, ratification and execution of the treaty, and payment of an indemnity. The Chinese, though evidently somewhat intimidated, did not abandon their position. So far from acknowledging any guilt in connection with the Taku business, they expressed themselves willing to overlook it, provided that the British Minister came to Peh-tang with a moderate retinue for the purpose of exchanging the ratifications; but if he persisted in moving up the Peiho with a large force, his act must be interpreted as a declaration of war. The allied squadrons, carrying the French and English military division, now steamed up the Gulf of Pechili, steering for the bar at Taku. Every one was animated by a conviction that the Chinese had added insult to perfidy. Yet there is incontrovertible evidence that the Chinese believed themselves to be the aggrieved parties.

No serious measures had been taken to defend the Peh-tang route; it was left open for the passage of the embassadors, should they choose to take it peacefully. On the contrary, the generals took it for the purpose of attacking the river-forts from the rear. If the Chinese commander had been so minded, he might have repeated the Taku tragedy on a different stage, for the allies had only one line of advance, a narrow causeway across a deeply inundated country, and the most rudimentary exercise of strategical sagacity would have rendered their passage impossible. But this overwhelming advantage was sacrificed by the Chinese. Apparently their idea was to crush the invaders in the open by a cavalry dash. Several thousands of Mongol horsemen swept in an angry wave against the front of the allies, but their light ponies went down like puppets under the weight of Sikh horses and dragoon chargers. That was the first and the last serious cavalry encounter that ever took place between British troopers and Mongol irregulars on Chinese soil. The pursuit continued for five miles.

Nine days later the forts on the Peiho were attacked. Four thousand men marched to the assault. The Chinese fought gallantly. Many of them were chained to the guns, but many others served their pieces with dogged determination, and died at their posts. Even the explosion of a magazine did not intimidate them. Yet they succeeded in inflicting only 330 casualties on their assailants, while 2000 of their own number perished.

After that the road to Peking lay open. A diplomatic attempt on the part of the Chinese having failed to arrest the advance of the allies beyond Tientsin, it was subsequently agreed that a convention should be signed at Tungchow. Tungchow is the point where the river Peiho flows nearest to Peking. The allies marched on either bank, the French on the south, the English on the north, each using the stream for transport purposes. But in the interval between

Tungchow and Peking, a distance of sixteen miles, the Peiho ceases to be available. Therefore the British and French commanders would gladly have ended their march at Tungchow; for it being now the month of September, the heat on the plains of Chili had become scarcely supportable, while, further, only three months remained before the advent of winter. The Chinese, however, were not yet really convinced of their inability to check the allies' advance by force of arms. Their array, twenty thousand strong, took up an advantageous position, and awaited the coming of the Anglo-French forces. On this occasion also charges of treachery were preferred against the Chinese. They were accused of preparing an ambush for the allies as the latter advanced in expectation of a peaceful conference. The evidence supports this accusation. It would seem that the Chinese civil officials, overborne by their military colleagues, consented to another appeal to arms, and were willing enough that every possible advantage should be taken of the allies' unpreparedness. But the ruse failed signally. Under any circumstances the English and French, moving with due provision of videttes and advanced guards in a hostile country, could not have fallen into a disastrous ambush. As it happened, however, warning reached them; and the manner of its reaching them constituted one of the most dramatic, as well as the most momentous, incidents of the campaign. Mr. Consul Parkes was the central figure in the drama. Sent forward with several companions and a guard of Sikh cavalry to inspect the place where the allied troops were to encamp that night by agreement with the Chinese, he found that the demeanour of the latter had suddenly changed, and that, on the plea of Lord Elgin's insistence to be received in audience by the Emperor who was seriously ill, they were not disposed to implement their former pacific promises. Already, indeed, the Chinese army was threatening the British flanks. Mr. Parkes and his party, who were then deeply involved in the enemy's lines, attempted to extricate themselves under a flag of truce. They were all taken prisoners. The Chinese understood the meaning of a flag of truce, had themselves used it, and had always hitherto respected it. But their contact with Parkes had impressed them with such a profound sense of his ability and energy that they regarded him as the head and front of British policy. His capture, they thought, would at once place a trump card in their hands, and under the pressure of that conviction their scruples vanished. The story of what Parkes and his comrades suffered, and his grand courage in steadily refusing to save his life by pretending to exercise the power with the possession of which his captors erroneously credited him, has been told by more than one able writer. He himself described the incidents in simple, unaffected terms well becoming the heroism of his nature. During the first eleven days of his captivity, he was heavily manacled and kept in the common jail, where his sole consolation was the kindness of his fellow-prisoners. These unhappy Chinese, many of them criminals of the worst type, and many nearly worn out with long hardship and pain, showed merciful sympathy towards the foreigner. Thereafter, a change in the personnel of Chinese high officials brought a radical change in the treatment of Parkes and his fellow-prisoners. By that time, however, twenty-two out of thirty-seven had succumbed or been killed. The release of the survivors preceded by only a few minutes the arrival of an order for their execution.

This affair had naturally accentuated the resolve of the allied commanders to inflict summary punishment on China. Two battles cleared the path to Peking, and on the 8th of October the capital lay under the guns of the invaders. Forty-eight days had been required to carry the army from Taku to Peking, a distance of a hundred and twenty miles. Some of the delay was ascribed to unreadiness on the part of the French, some to transport difficulties, and some to prudence on the part of the officers in command. They had not yet learned the lesson which, in later years, Japanese strategists were the first to teach plainly, that a defeated Chinese army never rallies in the face of a persistent enemy.

A few days after the release of Parkes and his surviving comrades, coffins containing the bodies of those that had perished were carried into the allied camp. The corpses, packed in quicklime, told no distinguishable story. But there was sufficient evidence to indicate the barbarous treatment these unhappy men had undergone. They were buried in the cemetery of the Russian Mission near Peking, and, two days later, Lord Elgin ordered the destruction of the Emperor's detached palaces at Yuen-ming Yuen (park of perfect brightness). These buildings, generally known as the Summer Palace, lay at a distance of seven miles from Peking, within an enclosure of twelve square miles. The main edifices numbered thirty, and around them were disposed minor residences so numerous as to constitute a little town. All the resources of Chinese taste had been expended in laying out the park, which was incomparably the most beautiful thing of its kind in the Orient, and one of the most striking landscape gardens in the world. Its yearly upkeep involved an outlay of some sixty thousand pounds sterling. Judged by European standards of architecture the buildings could not be called imposing, but they were the best type of Chinese architecture in existence, and scarcely a remote probability offered of their reconstruction. In setting the torch to them Lord Elgin, a man of refined taste and most humane instincts, acted under an overwhelming conviction that the Emperor of China must be made to suffer directly for the act of his Generals in abusing a flag of truce, and the act of his high officials in endorsing and accentuating that abuse. It is in the last degree improbable, however, that the Emperor ever learned anything of Lord Elgin's reasons; and it is morally certain that, had they been explained to him, his Majesty would have regarded them merely as a superfluous extenuation of what to him must have seemed a normal incident of war. Even in the eyes of Lord Elgin's countrymen, fully as they may sympathise with his difficult position, it is plain that whatever character of stern, pure justice he desired to impart to the burning of the palaces, the act was fatally marred by its antecedents. Had the allies committed no excesses on their march from Peh-tang to Peking, had they abstained from pillage, rapine, and wanton destruction, their motive in making a bonfire of the Yuen-ming Yuen buildings would have become intelligible from its context. But they did not so abstain. At Peh-tang, where the landing was effected, the citizens showed unqualified friendliness. They not only conducted the allies to the forts, and warned them that mines had been laid, but also received them hospitably and supplied them with provisions. Yet the British and French soldiers, especially the latter, sacked the town, pillaging everything they could carry away, and destroying everything immovable. Mr. Swinhoe, in his "North China

peror of China must be made to suffer directly for the act of his Generals in abusing a flag of truce, and the act of his high officials in endorsing and accentuating that abuse. It is in the last degree improbable, however, that the Emperor ever learned anything of Lord Elgin's reasons; and it is morally certain that, had they been explained to him, his Majesty would have regarded them merely as a superfluous extenuation of what to him must have seemed a normal incident of war. Even in the eyes of Lord Elgin's countrymen, fully as they may sympathise with his difficult position, it is plain that whatever character of stern, pure justice he desired to impart to the burning of the palaces, the act was fatally marred by its antecedents. Had the allies committed no excesses on their march from Pehtang to Peking, had they abstained from pillage, rapine, and wanton destruction, their motive in making a bonfire of the Yuen-ming Yuen buildings would have become intelligible from its context. But they did not so abstain. At Pehtang, where the landing was effected, the citizens showed unqualified friendliness. They not only conducted the allies to the forts, and warned them that mines had been laid, but also received them hospitably and supplied them with provisions. Yet the British and French soldiers, especially the latter, sacked the town, pillaging everything they could carry away, and destroying everything immovable. Mr. Swinhoe, in his "North China

FOOTBRIDGE IN THE GROUNDS OF THE EMPRESS'S PALACE.

Campaign," speaks of "the few natives that still lingered by their unusurped domiciles quietly watching with eyes of despair the destruction of all the property they possessed in the world"; and Mr. Consul Parkes describes how, although the allied commanders proclaimed promises of protection when they entered the town, the promise was not observed, the place was "thoroughly pillaged," and a number of people, principally women, committed suicide to escape the indignities with which they were threatened. The village of Sinho suffered similarly; and, though some measure of discipline was maintained on the subsequent march to Peking, the French, when they reached the Summer Palace, abandoned themselves to a mania of looting and destruction. These buildings contained a vast collection of China's choicest objects of art — jades, porcelains, bronzes, *cloissonné* enamels, crystal vessels, wood and ivory carvings, lacquers, embroideries, cameo glass, pictures, corals, and silks. The plunderers broke everything they had no mind to remove or no education to appreciate. For years afterwards bric-à-brac dealers in Paris and London were able to offer for sale unique "curios from the Summer Palace." The French also set fire to the Emperor's private apartments in the sequel of their looting. After such doings it could scarcely be possible to differentiate Lord Elgin's judicial burning from the sack of Peh-tang and Sinho and the looting, wanton destruction, and incendiarism at the Yuen-ming Yuen. The whole series of doings doubtless arranged themselves under the same heading in the Chinese mind.

The season being now far advanced, immediate return to the sea-board became imperative, or the embarkation of the troops would be prevented by ice on the Peiho. One important point, however, remained to be settled — foreign ministerial residence in Peking. The days of grace formerly granted by Lord Elgin in this matter had been peremptorily cut short by events, and the British and French envoys were now of one mind as to the inexpediency of paltering with the question any longer. But should the ministers go into residence at once, or should they postpone until the following spring the establishment of their legations? While this matter was under animated discussion, Sir Frederick Bruce arrived in Peking. He came to stay. Nothing short of force should drive him out, he said; and, as a concrete evidence of his resolve, he brought with him fifty boxes of glass to replace the paper in the windows of any Chinese building selected for his legation. Baron Gros, French envoy, took a different view; and it is interesting to find that in 1860 this diplomatist entertained precisely the same apprehensions as those that prevailed forty years later under analogous circumstances. The Emperor had fled to Jehō; and M. Gros feared that the permanent floating of foreign flags over legations in Peking would not attract his Majesty to return, but would rather drive him to transfer the imperial capital to some city in the interior. This seemed a fine fear in the bosom of one who had been a consenting party, three weeks previously, to the destruction of the Summer Palace. However, M. Ignatieff joined his voice to that of Baron Gros, and their counsels prevailed. It was decided to leave in Peking petty officials who should "hold the fort," while the Ministers themselves wintered in Tientsin. Mr. Consul Parkes advocated, if he did not suggest, the device of an insignificant *locum tenens*. With his habitual distrust of the Chinese he feared to leave an important personage in their power. So the Chinese were told that "the minister had to postpone taking up his residence until the residence was fit to receive him." "A truly Chinese manœuvre," it may be commented, but in this instance it happened to be British.

There were displayed on this occasion very palpable evidences of the policy of rival spoliation thenceforth steadily pursued by all the great powers, except the United States of America, in their dealings with China. So far as their treaties of friendship and commerce were concerned, a compensating balance was furnished by the "most-favoured nation clause," which provided that privileges or concessions granted by China to any foreign state at any future date must be at once extended to each and all of the other treaty States. Moreover, the extension must be gratuitous. It did not matter what price had been paid by the original state for the privileges or concessions in question. Nor did it matter under what conditions they had been granted. They must accrue to all the other States gratuitously and unconditionally. Thus the Powers, by an arrangement of their own, deprived themselves of opportunity to get the better of one another by obtaining conventional advantages of a selfish or exclusive nature. But this antidote to the fever of spoliation was held to be applicable solely to matters falling within the normal scope of commercial treaties — matters of trade, of industry, or of jurisdiction. It did not affect any other kind of concession. If, for example, one European power should happen to secure a grant or lease of territory from China, the most-favoured-nation clause would not entitle other Powers to receive a similar lease or grant. Special negotiation would be necessary for that purpose. The great states of Europe showed, from the very outset, a jealous determination to preserve what they called "the balance of power" in such affairs. It was preserved at China's expense. England, France, and Russia were the only competing states at the beginning — for America need not be mentioned in such a context. Their manner of procedure is worth a moment's attention, being typical of a long series of subsequent dealings.

England, when she began her preparations for the Peking campaign of 1860, found at once that the island of Victoria (Hongkong) had not sufficient accommodation for the troops arriving there. But opposite to the colony on the mainland a peninsula, called Kowloon, offered good facilities for that purpose. Therefore the colonial authorities began to land troops there, not thinking of consulting China, with which England was at war. It occurred to Consul Parkes, however, that a good opportunity now presented itself for securing the peninsula in perpetuity to the British crown. He understood, as did all skilled observers, that the possession of the place was strategically essential, for if it fell into the hands of a hostile Power, Hongkong would become untenable. So he suggested the advisability of seeking a perpetual lease of the promontory. His biographer makes this remark about the incident: "Nothing could be odder than that the local Chinese authorities should lend the peninsula for such a purpose. It needed an intimate knowledge of their notions to conceive such a scheme, and the commanders from England would never have dreamed of it; but to Parkes it was the most natural and practicable thing in the world, and far preferable to exciting animosity by forcibly taking possession of the land." That is an example of the extremely shallow criticism constantly placed before the British public by historians of Far-Eastern affairs. The writer, for the sake of lauding the astuteness of the subject of his biography, represents the Chinese as strange and enigmatical people whom Mr. Parkes alone could fathom. To no one could such comments seem more objectionable than they would have seemed to that noble-minded, truth-loving official himself. The simple fact is, that the Chinese had no choice in the matter. Canton was in British military occupation, and it was to the Viceroy of Kwangtung that the application for a lease had to be made. He had, in fact, no choice; and that he granted a lease of Kowloon under such circumstances was not at all as "odd" as the farcical pretence that he had any option, and the still more farcical eulogy pronounced by Her Britannic Majesty's Government on the "tact and skill shown by Mr. Parkes in conducting the negotiations."

The Kowloon lease fell into the category of extra-most-favoured-nation-clause concessions referred to above; and when, after the confirmation of the new treaties in Peking, France and Russia took an inventory of the spoils, they found England that much "to the good." She, it is true, had borne the brunt and heat of the day. By her China had been opened to the trade and intercourse of the world, and without her neither France nor Russia could have seriously entertained the idea of a triumphal march to Peking in the year 1860. It might have satisfied them that they shared equally with her in all the privileges and advantages of the treaty which, bound in blue silk-velvet, tied with cords and tassels of gold, and enclosed in a richly lacquered box, had been carried by four officers in full uniform to the Board of Rites, on the 25th of October, 1860, for signature by Prince Kung and the French Ambassador. But there is no sentiment in diplomacy. Baron Gros would doubtless have counted his mission a partial failure unless he had obtained for France something to balance Great Britain's Kowloon lease. He had already reason to congratulate himself. France, which had contributed less than one-half of the troops collected by England for the Peking expedition and a very much smaller fraction of the flotilla, was to receive exactly the same amount of war indemnity as England, eight millions of *taels;* and for every one of the French subjects taken prisoner by the Chinese in the white-flag incident, a solatium of £6060 was paid by China, whereas for every British subject seized on the same occasion, the payment was only £3850. These things, however, did not satisfy the French Ambassador. He contemplated another method of asserting his country's dignity; a method clearly indicated by the *Moniteur* when, on January 11, 1861, it wrote of "the solicitude of the Government of the Emperor for the religious interests placed under the traditional protection of France in the Far East." This "traditional protection" has been the keynote of French policy in China for the past forty years. The French do not succeed as colonists. The romance of colonisation appeals to their artistic nature more than its practical side; and the life of a French colonist in the Far East suggests that, having taken up his abode in what to him is a semi-civilised land, he aims at displaying his independence of the conventions of civilised society, rather than at developing the resources of the place where he has settled, or at building up a trade between China and France. Indeed, there is virtually no such thing as French commerce with China. The amount of business annually conducted under the guardianship of the tricolour is a mere bagatelle, and the special settlements that France insists upon acquiring at the treaty ports are an almost mirth-provoking illustration of the "equal-privilege" doctrine. Her inclinations do not tend to territorial aggrandisement or tradal expansion as means of self-assertion: she has chosen in preference to be the "protector of the faithful." To that title she has some claims. It is true that Matteo Ricci founded the Christian missions in mediæval China, and that the great Jesuits Schaal and Verbiest had made the Peking Mission celebrated before French fathers appeared upon the scene. But the first temporal sovereign to recognise the efforts of religious propagandists in China was Louis XIV., by whom were sent (1685) Fontaney, Bouvet, Gerbillon, Visdelou, and Le Comte; and after the suppression of the

Jesuits in 1773, the Papal decree substituting the Lazarists for them was approved by Louis XVI. Accordingly, when Baron Gros had to obtain some "set off" for the cession of the Kowloon Peninsula to Great Britain, his demand took a form which had better be stated in his own words:—

> "If the Chinese Government has conceded to England, in full possession, a territory, not of thirty square miles, nor of thirty miles in circuit, on the mainland opposite Hongkong, but a piece of land which, according to the Admiralty Chart, measures only a fifth or a sixth part of a square mile, a little tongue of land named Kowloon, so indispensable to the safety of Hongkong that England already had the exclusive use of it under an indefinite lease, and had long previously erected forts there, the Chinese Government has engaged to restore to the Minister of France all the Catholic churches with their cemeteries, their lands and their dependencies, which were confiscated in the provinces and in the capital of the empire from the Christians who formerly possessed them."

It will be observed that the principle of competitive exaction is here frankly admitted by the French ambassador. England had obtained a fraction of a square mile of land, admitted by Baron Gros himself to be indispensable to the safety of Hongkong; therefore France had acquired the restitution, without compensation, of all the churches and lands ever held by Catholics in China. It will be observed, also, that the restitution was to be made, not to the Catholic priests, but to the French Minister. In short, the French Government constituted itself officially the protector of Catholic interests in China, and has remained so ever since, insisting, with strange indifference to the dictates of justice, that a system which France condemns in her own case shall be forced upon China by France at the cannon's mouth.

It may be noted in parenthesis, with reference to this matter, that a mischievous error has been published, and is widely believed, among foreign communities in the Far East. The latest statement of it occurs in Mr. A. Michie's "The Englishmen in China," a book which for the sake of its author's high reputation, the attractive style of his writing, and the date (1900) of the publication, cannot fail to command credence. Mr. Michie says: —

> "An astute missionary, acting as interpreter to Baron Gros, managed to interpolate in the Chinese text (of the treaty) a clause of his own which had no place in the French — the ruling version — and was quite unknown to the French Envoy. By that clause full permission was accorded to French missionaries to purchase land and erect buildings thereon throughout the empire; and further, all churches, schools, cemeteries, lands, and buildings which had been owned by persecuted Christians (Chinese) in previous centuries were to be paid for, and the money handed to the French Representative in Peking for transmission to the Christians in the localities concerned."

The quotation given above from a despatch written by Baron Gros himself, shows conclusively how erroneous is the allegation that he had no cognisance of any clause providing for the restitution of "churches, cemeteries, lands, and dependencies" confiscated in previous centuries. In point of fact, the negotiation of that clause was a chief ground of the credit he claimed for himself. It is equally erroneous to say that payment on account of confiscated property was to be made to the French Representative in Peking for transmission to the native Christians. In order to dispose of this question finally, it will be well to quote the Article as it appears in the French Treaty side by side with the translation inserted in the Chinese version:—

Art. VI. (French Treaty).—In conformity with the Imperial Edict issued the 28th March, 1846, by the August Emperor Taoukwang, the religious and charitable establishments which were confiscated from the Christians during the persecution of which they were the victims, shall be restored to their proprietors by the instrumentality of his Excellency the Minister of France in China, to whom the Imperial Government will cause them to be delivered, with the cemeteries and the other edifices appertaining to them.

Art. VI. (Chinese Version).—*Every Chinese, of whatsoever condition, is free to embrace the Catholic religion and to propagate it. It is permitted to Christians to meet in assembly and to build churches for offering up prayers. Anyone daring unjustly to pursue Christians and to take them shall undergo the punishment he merits.* Catholic temples, colleges, cemeteries, houses, fields, and all other possessions formerly confiscated during the persecution, shall be restored to the French Ambassador residing in Peking who will make restitution of them to the proper persons. *French missionaries shall have liberty to rent land in all the provinces of the empire, to buy and to construct houses as they find good.*

The italicised portions were interpolated by the French missionary who made the translation. The fraud they represent is bad enough. Had such a piece of chicanery been practised by Chinese, its denunciation by Western nations would have been couched in unmeasured terms. But the title to recover churches, cemeteries, and charitable buildings confiscated during the persecutions, did not rest on this forgery, neither did the forgers insert anything whatever about payment for confiscated property. There is no reason to magnify the disgrace.

If the Representative of France took care that his country should not be distanced by England in extorting concessions from China, and if, while nominally acting as an ally of Great Britain, he nevertheless directed his energies to preventing the development of her interests,[1] the Representative of Russia, on his part, naturally sought to win a trick in the game of spoliation.

It was not until 1849 that the geography of South-eastern Siberia became known in Russia. Up to that time the supposition had been that the only maritime communication between the

---

[1] See Appendix, note 4.

Sea of Japan and the Sea of Okhotsk was by the strait of La Pérouse. Captain Nevelskoy in the *Baikal,* a vessel of the Russo-American Company, undertook, in 1849, a voyage of exploration at the instance of Muravioff, Governor-General of Eastern Siberia. Sailing round the north of Saghalien, he entered the mouth of the Amur, and found, at the same time, that it was possible to pass between Saghalien and the Asiatic Continent to the Sea of Japan. Here, then, Russia saw an opportunity of acquiring one of her long coveted points of access to open seas. By the Treaty of Nertchinsk, concluded in 1689, she had been excluded from the navigation of the Amur. In that arrangement she had quietly acquiesced until the time of Nevelskoy's discovery. But now the Amur assumed new importance in her eyes; for instead of entering the sea at a point whence a ship, desiring to go southward, must coast round Saghalien on the east, and enter the Sea of Japan through a narrow strait touched on either side by the territories of a foreign Power (Japan), the mouth of the river was found to be at a point whence a southward route was immediately accessible between the island of Saghalien and the continent. To utilise this discovery fully, two things were necessary for Russia: first, that the Amur should become the southern boundary of her Siberian territory and should be navigable by her subjects; secondly, that Saghalien and the opposite portion of the Asiatic Continent should become Muscovite territory. To achieve the former of these objects, Muravioff set to work in a practical manner. England's war with China in 1842 had shown the world how helpless the Middle Kingdom was as a belligerent. Muravioff, therefore, deeming that accomplished facts would be much more eloquent than diplomatic representations, ignored the treaty of Nertchinsk, and sailed down the Amur from Transbaikalia at the head of a large flotilla. That was in 1854, just when the Taipings were shaking the throne of China and the "City Question" was becoming acute at Canton. Muravioff chose his time well. Four years later he organised another expedition; and, on this occasion, he founded the town of Blagovietchensk, at the point where the Zeya enters the Amur, — a site indicated more than two hundred years previously by the great Cossack Captain, Khabaroff. Muravioff's despatches show that, in planning these bold movements, he had in view not merely the development of Siberia, whose interests were his immediate care, but also the opposing of England's increasing power in the Pacific and the protection of China by Russia; for he apprehended that the now-clearly-demonstrated weakness of the Middle Kingdom would make it fall an easy prey to the British Lion. The course of subsequent history shows that Russia's method of protecting the Chinese empire is to add to her own possessions any portion of the Middle Kingdom that might possibly fall into other hands — protection by absorption. Muravioff may be said to have inaugurated that method, for he prepared to protect China by robbing her of the Amur region. But it would be unjust to the memory of a great man to say that Muravioff ever contemplated territorial aggression merely for the sake of aggrandisement. The regions along the Amur did not present themselves to him as places to be idly annexed for the purpose of adding so many square miles to the Russian realm. What he saw in the Amur was the one means of preserving Russia's Siberian possessions, since the big river constituted the sole line of communications between Siberia and its base of supplies, Transbaikalia. Seldom has genius been justified in its fruits so quickly and so signally as it was in Muravioff's case. He made his first expedition down the Amur at the time when his country was at war with England and France in Europe. The immediate result was, that he succeeded in strengthening the garrison and arming the forts of Petropavlofsk just in time to repel the Anglo-French attack of August, 1854. Had not the Amur route been opened, Petropavlofsk must have fallen, and Kamchatka would probably have been lost to Russia.[1] If any series of apparently aggressive operations be justifiable, that description applies to Muravioff's opening of the Amur, for it was accomplished by absolutely peaceful means and it saved his country from disaster. Meanwhile, desultory negotiations for frontier delimitation had been in progress between St. Petersburg and Peking. They impeded rather than advanced the aims of Muravioff; and finally he induced the Tsar to remove the whole matter from the purview of the Foreign Office, and to place it in his hands. This was not a negotiation for the purpose of opening China to foreign intercourse. No necessity existed to force a way to Peking or to administer a rebuke to Chinese haughtiness. The essentially practical Muravioff was quite content that some out-of-the-way spot should be chosen as the scene of discussion, so that China's grimaces in swallowing a bitter pill might not be visible throughout the length and breadth of the Middle Kingdom. The plenipotentiaries met at Aigun, a Chinese fortified town in Manchuria, near the junction of the Zeya and the Amur. Six days sufficed to regulate the points in dispute. The treaty was signed on May 16, 1858, just four months after the seizure and occupation of Canton by the English and French. It made Russia mistress of the whole northern bank of the Amur; and, on the south of the river, it secured to her, pending final delimitation, equal proprietary rights with China in the maritime region facing Saghalien, Yezo, and the north-west coast of the main island of Japan — in other words, the region bounded by the Amur and the Ussuri on the west, and the Gulf of

---

[1] See Appendix, note 5.

country from disaster. Meanwhile, desultory negotiations for frontier delimitation had been in progress between St. Petersburg and Peking. They impeded rather than advanced the aims of Muravioff; and finally he induced the Tsar to remove the whole matter from the purview of the Foreign Office, and to place it in his hands. This was not a negotiation for the purpose of opening China to foreign intercourse. No necessity existed to force a way to Peking or to administer a rebuke to Chinese haughtiness. The essentially practical Muravioff was quite content that some out-of-the-way spot should be chosen as the scene of discussion, so that China's grimaces in swallowing a bitter pill might not be visible throughout the length and breadth of the Middle Kingdom. The plenipotentiaries met at Aigun, a Chinese fortified town in Manchuria, near the junction of the Zeya and the Amur. Six days sufficed to regulate the points in dispute. The treaty was signed on May 16, 1858, just four months after the seizure and occupation of Canton by the English and French. It made Russia mistress of the whole northern bank of the Amur; and, on the south of the river, it secured to her, pending final delimitation, equal proprietary rights with China in the maritime region facing Saghalien, Yezo, and the north-west coast of the main island of Japan — in other words, the region bounded by the Amur and the Ussuri on the west, and the Gulf of

A FREQUENT SIGHT ON ANY OF THE LARGE RIVERS.

Tartary and the Sea of Japan on the east and south. This treaty has often been condemned as an aggressive exaction. Such criticism seems unjust. The negotiators of the Nertchinsk Treaty, which deprived Russia of the privilege of navigating the Amur, had been prevented by geographical ignorance from attempting any accurate delimitation of the regions along the lower course of the river, and China had never made any attempt to occupy those regions effectively. They were noman's land. Their inhabitants did not lose liberty, since the term had no meaning for them; and their material condition was vastly improved by passing under Russian rule.

It will be observed that while Russia had thus secured extension of her territory to the northern bank of the Amur, she had not yet obtained any exclusive title to the region extending along the sea-coast south of the river's mouth; a title essential to the consummation of her plans. That defect was remedied on the 14th of November, 1860, when General Ignatieff concluded in Peking a treaty conceding to Russia the right of sole ownership throughout the region in question. Muravioff had not waited for the conclusion of the convention. Four months previously he had surveyed the coast of the coveted region, had chosen, on the extreme south, a position for a new settlement, which he called Vladivostok (master of the Orient), and had taken military possession of the place.

The negotiations of the Ignatieff treaty has afforded to some English historians an opportunity of telling a good story at Russia's expense. They say that General Ignatieff skilfully played the game of running with the hare and hunting with the hounds. Outside Peking he gave to the British and French envoys useful information furnished by the Russian mission ; inside Peking he persuaded the Chinese that his intervention alone had saved the empire from permanent occupation by foreign troops. Thus, in his capacity of "honest broker," he obtained from China a reward in the shape of the region lying along the sea-shore south of the Amur. This tale rests on the statement of an anonymous diplomat, who had it from a Chinese statesman during a friendly exchange of reminiscences at afternoon tea. It may be true, for it does not conflict with the character assigned to Ignatieff by his own countrymen. But as a matter of fact, the first draft of the Peking Treaty presented by the British and French Envoys provided distinctly for the withdrawal of the foreign forces on payment of the promised indemnity ; and it is therefore difficult to see how Ignatieff could have found the opportunity he is said to have utilised so cleverly.

The manner in which Saghalien passed into Russian possession, thus achieving the large programme of Muravioff, does not belong to this narrative.

Chapter II

THE TREATY AND THE TAIPINGS

CANTON remained in foreign military occupation for three years and ten months. It had been conspicuous among Chinese cities for exclusiveness, and it paid an equally conspicuous penalty. In the early days of the occupation things went well enough. The people did not immediately return to their homes or resume their occupations, being naturally uncertain of the treatment they might receive at the hands of the English and French soldiers — uncertainty accentuated by the disorderly conduct of many of the men. But the organisation of a strong force of Anglo-French police soon corrected that fault, and trade relations were resumed on a large scale. An ominous feature presented itself, however ; the upper classes of Chinese left their urban residences untenanted, and the former local officials absented themselves resolutely. To Chinese eyes the situation must have offered some phases difficult to understand. Neither experience nor history made them familiar with any similar conjuncture, — a great and wealthy city seized by an armed enemy, who not only refrained from wholesale excesses, but even employed native officials to discharge administrative functions. But it was not the novelty of the situation that deterred the gentry and the former officials from resuming residence in the city; it was reluctance to acknowledge the accomplished fact of foreign occupation. They formed co-operative corps with the object of recovering the place, and they actually made a futile attempt to carry it by surprise one midsummer night after the occupation had lasted seven months. Other efforts took the form of enterprises against isolated detachments of foreign troops or even against individuals; and the participators in these affairs were condemned by foreign onlookers as "ruffians," "rascals," and "savages," epithets which would have been more justly applicable to them had they tamely acquiesced in the occupation of their city by an European army. What is chiefly interesting about the story is, that whereas the advocates of a force regimen for the Chinese point to the experiences of these four years in Canton as demonstrating their doctrine, the advocates of a regimen of reason claim the same experiences as eloquent on their behalf. One fact is obvious, namely, that Canton would have remained an arena of anti-foreign feeling for an indefinite time had it not been brought into forcible contact with the hated alien. But, for the rest, recorded events seem to support the latter of the above two views. Nothing caused more poignant regret to the force-policy party than the defensive attitude prescribed for the garrison by Lord Elgin's orders. Consul Parkes, the head and front of that party, writing of the midnight attack made on the city by the Chinese in 1858, lamented bitterly that the troops were limited to repelling assaults instead of themselves assuming the offensive, and "dealing these wretches some hard blows a little distance off." Six months later this irksome abstention from bloodshed was relieved by an expedition of 1500 men against a place called Shektsing, some seven miles from Canton. The origin and result of the incident were thus described by Mr. Parkes: "We have had a little 'Brave Expedition' to stir us up lately, and you will be glad to hear that we have at last succeeded in giving these pests a sharp blow. . . . Some two or three hundred of these dirty vagabonds had the temerity to attack nearly the whole Marine Brigade, about 700 men, when out in the country taking a little walking exercise. That is to say, the dastards took ground along the road they knew our men would have to return, and fired on these from behind copses and villages as they passed. A few skirmishers kept them at a distance, and the brigade reached the city without hurt. General Straubenzee determined to punish the fellows; even he could not stand such a gratuitous piece of impertinence." Then follows an account of the march of 1500 men against Sharktsing, the outflanking of the enemy by the Naval Brigade, the capture of the place with its three batteries mounting twenty guns, and the casualties of the attacking force — five men slightly wounded. "Dirty vagabonds" and "dastards" were the epithets that seemed good to Consul Parkes for describing men who, had the scene been laid in an Occidental country, would have been called "heroes" and "patriots;" and in the eyes of the same official an attempt on the part of the Chinese to defend their own hearths and homes against a foreign invader became "a gratuitous piece of impertinence." So singularly perverted do the acts of Orientals appear to many Europeans, otherwise just and benevolent men.

This expedition to Shektsing was the first and last offensive operation undertaken by the allies during their four years' occupation of Canton. They subsequently learned that the Shektsing "braves" were the remnant of a force of several thousands collected and maintained at a cost of about £170,000 by the gentry of the province for the purpose of driving back the foreign invaders. But it was not because of any action taken by the Anglo-French garrison that these "braves" had dispersed: it was because the provincial authorities had learned of the conclusion of peace at Tientsin. So long as their country was at war with the foreigners, they made efforts to protect Kwangtung against invasion, and even to recover Canton; but on the conclusion of peace they accepted the situation quietly, with the exception of the little band of "dirty vagabonds" at Shektsing, who were so "gratuitously impertinent" as to want to strike a blow for their country. Elsewhere the Anglo-French troops, in the various excursions subsequently made by them, met with only civility and friendliness. Just before the evacuation of the city in October, 1861, Mr. Lockhart was able to write: "It is a great thing to wander in the city of Canton without let or hindrance. The people do not call names, but are civil, and, as far as can be seen, do not seem malicious. After all that has been said of the Canton people, they are as quiet and well-behaved as the people of Shanghai."

Some attention is merited by these details, for it will be found on examining the text-books of Anglo-Chinese relations that the improved temper of the Canton people is ascribed mainly to military chastisement inflicted by the Anglo-French garrison. That theory is unsupported by the evidence of facts. Nothing can be confidently asserted except that from the moment of forcing the gates the middle and lower orders accepted the situation readily, and from the moment of concluding the Tientsin Treaty the educated classes bowed to the inevitable.

The Treaty of 1858, concluded by Lord Elgin at Tientsin, and confirmed in the sequel of the military operations of 1860, was an elaborate document, consisting of fifty-six articles. Less than a fourth of these numerous stipulations had sufficed to comprise the demands preferred by Sir Henry Pottinger under the walls of Nanking in 1842. Naturally the question of representation at the Chinese Court received final settlement. Great Britain acquired the right to post a diplomatic agent in the Chinese capital. She further stipulated that he should receive the treatment due to the representative of the Sovereign of an independent nation, and that the form of ceremony observed by him towards the Emperor of China should be neither more nor less than the form customarily employed in Europe. Of greater practical importance were clauses providing that British subjects — and therefore the subjects and citizens of all treaty Powers — should be free to travel in every part of the Chinese Empire for purposes of pleasure and trade, the only condition being the carrying of passports issued by a consul and countersigned by local authorities; and that, in addition to five ports newly opened to foreign commerce, the Yangtse River should become accessible as far as Hankow, three places along its course being designated as regular marts where foreigners might come and go at will. These three places were to be subsequently chosen; and, indeed, the operation of the treaty, so far as concerned the Yangtse, was to be deferred until the Taiping rebellion had been finally quelled.

The immediate interest of this compact was soon found to centre upon its tenth Article, namely, the Article opening the Yangtse so soon as peace should be restored. That article sealed the fate of the Taiping insurgents. It may, indeed, be said that the cause of the rebels received a fatal blow when the Tientsin and Peking treaties were signed. From that moment the foreign Powers became practically pledged to quell the insurrection, or, at any rate, to abandon their attitude of neutrality. Their material interests dictated that the Government from which their nationals were now to receive so many advantages, should retain power to implement its promises. They might have been content, however, to await the course of events more patiently had not the treaty contained its tenth article, namely, that which provided for the opening of the Yangtse. The idea of allowing the Taipings to remain for any great length of time an obstacle to a consummation of such great commercial value must soon have become insupportable. No attempt was made to support it.

During the year 1860 the Taipings gained signal successes. By a series of rapid and skilfully concerted movements their great soldier, the Loyal King (Chung-wang), signally defeated and dispersed the Imperialist armies which had invested Nanking, and then, pushing down the Yangtse Valley, carried town after town, some surrendering at his summons, some making a feeble show of resistance. In May he reached the city of Suchow where, within a walled area of thirteen miles in circumference, and in suburbs one of which extended for ten miles, a million of inhabitants carried on industries and amassed riches that made the place one of the most celebrated capitals of China. Before the approach of the Taipings, the Imperial Viceroy ordered the destruction of these suburbs in order to facilitate the defence of the walled town, but this act, supplemented by terrible atrocities on the part of the fugitive Imperialist troops, caused such anarchy that the Taipings did not encounter any serious opposition when they arrived. Thence they continued their conquering progress southward and eastward. Verbal descriptions of campaigns convey no clear geographical conception. In this case the most easily intelligible statement is that the Chinese coast-line arches eastward; that the embouchure of the Yangtse is at the apex, and that the Taipings had now obtained almost complete possession of the section of the arch southward of the big river. Shanghai and Chefoo still remained in the hands of the Manchus, and their capture was of cardinal importance to the insurgents who, holding them, would gain access to the sea, with its facilities for obtaining supplies, and would also be brought into contact with foreigners from whom they expected moral support, if not material assistance.

But the Manchus also turned their eyes anxiously towards foreigners at this critical juncture. It happened that just when Suchow was threatened by the Taipings, the Anglo-French forces were assembling at the island of Chusan preparatory to the Peking campaign. To the Viceroy of the two Kiang who, if he lost Suchow, was not unlikely to lose his head, this seemed an excellent opportunity to procure succour from foreigners. He made formal application to the British and French. But although the French Envoy was willing enough, his British colleague declined to divert any part of the army from its original purpose, and thus the Viceroy lost his city and, in due sequence, his head.

Meanwhile the Chinese inhabitants of the walled city of Shanghai — which city is altogether distinct from the settlements — had also conceived the idea of obtaining foreign aid. They went about the matter in a practical manner, subsidising adventurers who had been drawn to the place by the scent of disturbance, and placing them under the command of Ward and Burgevine; the former an American filibuster of some experience, resourceful, dauntless, and loyal; the latter also an American, not without courage, but certainly without principle. From the time of these men's employment the tide of Taiping fortune began to ebb. Ward's force, composed of most heterogeneous elements, succeeded, after one failure, in capturing from the insurgents a town lying eighteen miles above Shanghai on the Hwangpo. He then pushed on to the attack of another town held by the Taipings; but the Loyal King came down on him and inflicted a crushing defeat, capturing all his guns and boats, and driving him back to the town he had originally seized. There the Taiping leader invested him, and then moved down the Hwangpo towards Shanghai. He had been invited thither, it would seem, by some Frenchmen who visited him in Suchow, and he expected a friendly welcome from the population of the settlements. But so soon as his approach became known, the walls of the city were manned by British troops. He had preceded his arrival by a letter to the Consuls promising that foreigners should not be molested. In reply there was addressed to him a curt notice that if he attempted to capture the city he would find it defended by the allies. This notice does not appear to have reached him; and, relying on the assurances of neutrality previously given by responsible British authorities, he moved against Shanghai with a force of three thousand men, his own bodyguard.

The remarkable and sudden departure made on this occasion by the British from their promise of neutrality was explained by Sir Frederick Bruce in the words: "Were Shanghai to become the scene of attack and civil war, commerce would receive a severe blow." A conspicuously able, large-minded man, Sir Frederick must have given profound thought to this matter. He knew that his decision virtually involved the ultimate success or failure of the Taiping cause,[1] and he knew that to employ British troops for the purpose of preserving to the Manchu Government a city lying wholly outside the foreign settlements, could not possibly be reconciled with any reasonable definition of neutrality. But, in point of fact, neutrality was impossible. It had already been violated by the foreign community of Shanghai, who had converted the place into a basis of warlike supplies for the Imperialists; and had the Taipings obtained possession of the city, the old question of the customs dues would have presented itself again in a most acute form; for an exercise of force could alone have prevented them from levying duties, whereas, if the foreign customs staff lent their aid to make collections for the rebels, the Peking Government might justly have complained. When Mr. Consul Alcock organised the foreign customs, he forgot altogether to observe that he thus virtually guaranteed British aid to the Manchu dynasty in any national insurrection. Probably Sir Frederick Bruce chose the course calculated to prove least embarrassing in the end. But, as is often the case in great historical crises, the true circumstances did not admit of public enunciation. The British Minister was obliged to pretext hypothetical tradal interests as an excuse for employing the arms of his country in a situation where neutrality had been solemnly promised — promised unconditionally too, for when Sir George Bonham visited Nanking to give assurances to the insurgents, he did not even hint that inviolability for the foreign settlements would be essential to the maintenance of Great Britain's neutral attitude.

---

[1] See Appendix, note 6.

Of course the Taipings were driven back from Shanghai. They suffered heavily, but inflicted little injury; for it can scarcely be said that they used their arms against the foreign garrison. Shanghai also suffered, but not at the hands of the insurgents. Two of its suburbs were burned down by the British and one by the French. The latter was "by far the richest and most important collection of native houses," being the residence of the Chinese wholesale merchants, where "immense quantities of goods were stored." It burned during three whole days. Commerce certainly suffered "a severe blow," but not exactly in the manner anticipated by Sir Frederick Bruce. The French, however, profited. They added the devastated area to their "concession."

These things happened on the 18th of August, 1860, and following days. The news, when received in Peking, must have tended materially to soften the blow presently dealt under the walls of that city by the Anglo-French expedition. All the while that it was undergoing chastisement at the hands of its formidable assailants, the Manchu Government cannot but have felt that an impregnable barrier had now been erected between it and the Taiping inundation. Nevertheless, on June 10th of the very year when these events occurred, Sir Frederick Bruce, writing to Lord John Russell, had said: "No course could be so well calculated to lower our national reputation as to lend our material support to a government the corruption of whose authorities is only checked by its weakness."

After his repulse before Shanghai, the "Loyal King" addressed a long proclamation to the foreign consuls at that place, saying, among other things: —

> "When my army reached Suchow, Frenchmen, accompanied by people of other nations, came there to trade. They personally invited me to come to Shanghai to consult respecting friendly relations between us in future. Knowing that, like us, your nations worship God, the Heavenly Father, and Jesus, the Heavenly Elder Brother, and are therefore of one religion and of one origin with us, I placed entire and undoubting confidence in their words, and consequently came to meet you at Shanghai. . . . I came to make a treaty, in order to see us connected together by trade and commerce. I did not come for the purpose of fighting with you. . . . I shall for the present repress this day's indignation and charitably open a path by which to alter our present positions towards each other."

The movements of the rebels during the remaining months of 1860 and throughout 1861 need not be followed here. In the latter year an important event occurred. Sir James Hope, the British admiral on the China station, undertook an expedition up the Yangtse. It has already been noted, that although the Treaty of Peking provided for the opening of the great river to foreign trade, the actual commencement of commerce was to be deferred until Chinese Imperial authority should have been restored along the banks, large parts of which were then held by the Taiping insurgents. No one but the Chinese themselves can say whether, when they inserted that proviso, they did not clearly foresee that it would contribute vitally to the restoration of Imperial authority. They must, however, have been singularly undiscriminating observers if they had not already learned that where trade was in question, the British were the last people in the world to await the tardy advent of opportunities which a little dash and enterprise might greatly accelerate. Lord Elgin had no hesitation whatever. He directed Admiral Hope to take a squadron up the Yangtse with a view to "throwing open the general coasting-trade of the river," which was a much larger result — it may be observed parenthetically — than the treaty contemplated. Evidently the coasting-trade could not be expected to prosper if goods had to pay duties to two sets of col-

The movements of the rebels during the remaining months of 1860 and throughout 1861 need not be followed here. In the latter year an important event occurred. Sir James Hope, the British admiral on the China station, undertook an expedition up the Yangtse. It has already been noted, that although the Treaty of Peking provided for the opening of the great river to foreign trade, the actual commencement of commerce was to be deferred until Chinese Imperial authority should have been restored along the banks, large parts of which were then held by the Taiping insurgents. No one but the Chinese themselves can say whether, when they inserted that proviso, they did not clearly foresee that it would contribute vitally to the restoration of Imperial authority. They must, however, have been singularly undiscriminating observers if they had not already learned that where trade was in question, the British were the last people in the world to await the tardy advent of opportunities which a little dash and enterprise might greatly accelerate. Lord Elgin had no hesitation whatever. He directed Admiral Hope to take a squadron up the Yangtse with a view to "throwing open the general coasting-trade of the river," which was a much larger result — it may be observed parenthetically — than the treaty contemplated. Evidently the coasting-trade could not be expected to prosper if goods had to pay duties to two sets of col-

OLD TOMBS IN THE INTERIOR.

lectors — Taipings and Imperialists. Admiral Hope, a shrewd, resolute officer, understood that a definite choice must be made between the two belligerents: it must be Taipings *or* Imperialists, certainly not Taipings *and* Imperialists. As a matter of fact his choice was made ere ever he turned his steamer's bows up-stream from Shanghai. He had already pronounced the Taipings an "organised band of robbers," and upon that estimate he unvaryingly proceeded. It was, in truth, due mainly, if not wholly, to Sir James Hope's persistent incentive that British forces were ultimately employed to crush the insurrection. Mr. Consul Parkes accompanied the Admiral. He too shared Sir James's view. The rebels, he declared, were "a pack of robbers." But it was long before Parkes acquiesced in the policy of exterminating them, if, indeed, he ever did.

Many accounts were written of this Yangtse expedition, for it was accompanied by men keen of observation and skilled of pen. But as a guide to the political situation the private letters[1] of Mr. Consul Parkes are incomparable. From them the reader learns that, on reaching Nanking, Sir James Hope found the insurgents "well disposed and desirous to be friendly." They might have recalled and resented their experiences of the preceding year at Shanghai. Had they evinced any disposition to do so, "the Admiral would have brought up a large force from

---

[1] See Appendix, note 7.

Shanghai and drubbed civility into them." These little touches, never intended by their writers to reach the eye of the public, illumine, like lightning flashes, the minds of the actors in the drama. The Taipings, then, being in a mood that did not require any drubbing, Sir James Hope conveyed his instructions to them. He did not think of consulting them. He sent them a message couched "in plain terms;" and it should be understood that terms which elicited the epithet "plain" from Consul Parkes must have been very plain indeed. The Taipings were informed "that we had acquired the right of navigating the Yangtse, and that they must not interfere with our merchant ships in the employment of this right; that a ship-of-war would be stationed at Nanking to protect British interests, and see that our people behaved themselves; and that if they attacked any of the newly opened ports on the river, they must not molest British subjects or their property. This communication was made on March 31, 1861. The treaty had been signed in Peking on the 24th of October, 1860. Such was great Britain's conception of awaiting the restoration of Imperial Authority along the banks of the Yangtse.

In truth, the treaty did not at all warrant these proceedings. Its sanctions were flaunted in the faces of the Taipings by Admiral Hope; but had the text been accessible, the insurgent leaders might have wondered. What the treaty provided was, that "the Upper and Lower Valley of the Yangtse being disturbed by outlaws, no part shall be for the present opened to trade, with the exception of Chinkiang, which shall be opened in a year from the date of the signing of this treaty." Beyond Chinkiang, which lies forty-five miles below Nanking, the provisions of the treaty could not be extended by any stretch of imagination until at least a year had elapsed. The British were not trespassing, however. They had the Chinese Government's endorsement of their proceedings — endorsements readily given for obvious reasons.

But the Taipings did not argue. Having submitted with good grace to a process which Mr. Parkes describes as "wringing the insufferable conceit out of them" — a process which any one familiar with the methods of that most uncompromising Englishman can readily conceive, — they proved "reasonable enough," promised to do everything required, "put us upon their own ponies, and sent us down to our boat respectably attended, and with all sorts of protestations of friendship, and assurances that if we came again we should be properly received."[1]

Throughout 1861 an interesting process was observable in the British official mind — the process of determining whether an attitude of neutrality towards the Taipings could any longer conduce to the interests of British trade and to the cause of humanity. The process was assisted partly by events, but mainly by Sir James Hope's tenacity of purpose. Setting out from the conviction that the Taipings were "an organised band of robbers," the British Admiral's direct observation of the desolation caused by the rebellion along the Yangtse's banks and of the cruel sufferings that overtook vast crowds of fugitives who abandoned their homes at the first sign of the Taipings' approach, seems to have convinced him — though he did not immediately proclaim the conviction — that interference was peremptorily demanded in the cause of humanity. He does not apppear to have given much thought to the possibility that the devastation and hardships he witnessed were due to the ferocity of the Imperial forces not less than to the cruelty and insubordination of the adventurers serving in the ranks of the Taipings.[1] Neither does it seem to have occurred to him that an Occidental army marching through China and treating the towns as Shanghai had been treated by its Anglo-French defenders, and as the foreign invaders of Chili had treated Peh-tang, Sinho and the Yuen-ming Yuen, would leave in its track a scene as desolate and a population as miserable as he and his friends observed in the Yangtse Valley.[2] His reasoning apparently took the form that had there been no Taipings, the Chinese nation would have been saved from all this unhappiness, and that, therefore, the Taipings should be crushed.

---

[1] See Appendix, note 8.

Ningpo served as a touchstone for testing the true quality of the sentiments animating the moulders of British policy at this crisis. Five weeks after Admiral Hope's agreement with the insurgent leaders in Nanking, news of the Taipings' successes convinced him that Ningpo must soon become an object of their attack. Being then at Nagasaki, and therefore beyond the reach of instructions from Peking, Sir James Hope had to act on his own responsibility. His action showed clearly the bent of his mind. He directed his second-in-command, Capt. Dew, to "place himself in communication with the leader of the rebel forces," to "require him to desist from all hostile proceedings against the town," and to "remind him of what had taken place the preceding year at Shanghai." Capt. Dew was further "to place himself in communication with the Chinese authorities for the purpose of ascertaining what their means of resistance were and the probabilities of their proving successful;" he was to "point out to them such measures as circumstances might render expedient," and he was to "place every obstruction in the way of the capture of the town by the rebels."

---

[1] See Appendix, note 9.

[2] See Appendix, note 10.

Meanwhile the British Cabinet in London and the British Minister in Peking clung to their often-professed policy of neutrality. Sir Frederick Bruce, five months prior to the commencement of this forcing process by the iron-willed sailor, had directed the British Consul at Ningpo to "confine his efforts, should the city be attacked, to a mediation which might save the place from being the scene of pillage and massacre," to "take no part in the civil contest," nor to "afford any military protection to the town"; and this programme had been duly approved by Her Majesty's Foreign Secretary. It is permissible to suppose, therefore, that Lord J. Russell was somewhat startled when he received a copy of Admiral Hope's instructions to Captain Dew. Accomplished facts, however, weigh heavily in Downing Street. His Lordship approved the Admiral's measures, but seized the occasion to repeat his injunction that "Her Majesty's Government did not wish force to be used against the rebels in any case except for the actual protection of the lives and property of British subjects."

This is typical of the whole story — London, from a distant background, iterating its feeble formula of neutrality; the British representative in Peking endorsing the echo of the formula, but gradually ceasing to find it audible; and the strong sailor, at the scene of action, treating both protests much as he would have treated a forecastle mutiny.

While Sir James Hope's despatches explaining his measures were *en route* for Peking and London, Captain Dew was framing defensive programmes for the Manchu garrison at Ningpo, and fitting heavy guns with carriages to mount on the wall. Presently (June, 1861) Sir James himself appeared upon the scene. Addressing the Taiping commander-in-chief through Captain Dew, — for Admiral Hope in all his communications with the Taipings did the Chinese the honour of copying the exclusiveness which had cost them so dear at Canton, — he begged that the insurgents should desist from advancing within two marches of Ningpo; and he added, "Should these my wishes be disregarded, . . . I may be compelled to assist in the defence of Ningpo."

It was at this stage that the virus of the Admiral's energy began to infect the Minister in Peking. Sir Frederick Bruce had a difficult task to perform in breaking away from his own record. Exactly one year previously he had declared to Lord J. Russell that "no course could be so well calculated to lower British national reputation as to lend material support to a Government the corruption of whose anthorities is only checked by its weakness. Nothing had happened during the twelve months to modify that estimate of the Manchu Government. Its weakness was more than ever palpable, "deathblows," as Consul Meadows wrote, having been dealt to it "from the external action first of British arms alone, and now of British and French combined"; and as for its corruption, the ashes of the Yuen-ming Yuen bore witness. Yet within the twelve months something had certainly happened to alter the situation from a British point of view: the Manchu Government had been forced to grant tradal concessions, the full advantages of which could not be reaped so long as the empire remained disturbed, and had also been forced to promise indemnities whose ultimate payment depended on the customs receipts. It is not conceivable that an Englishman of Sir Frederick Bruce's type, had his judgment been untrammelled, would ever have allowed these considerations to outweigh the belligerent rights of men fighting for their country's freedom and for the cause of Christianity against "paganism." But Sir Frederick Bruce's judgment was not untrammelled. The Admiral on the station, the man of action, dragged him steadily in the direction of crushing the "band of organised robbers," and he yielded. Not immediately, indeed; it was necessary to convert the home Government. In June, 1861, he wrote to Lord Russell: "Our permanent interests are those of trade, the prosperity of which is linked with order and tranquillity. We have, in addition, a temporary interest arising out of the indemnities payable from the custom-house revenue, which is, however, intimately linked with the former. What is to become of these interests if the ports fall into the hands of the rebels?" It is difficult to discover in this question, and its preface, any trace of the luminous reasoning that generally distinguished Sir Frederick Bruce's writings. Why should not trade flourish in a Taiping-ruled China as well as in a Manchu-ruled? By the capture of Nanking in 1853 a considerable section of the producing districts fell into the hands of the Taipings; by the capture of Suchow in 1860 virtually the whole of the silk-producing districts came under their control. Now, in 1853 the export of silk was twenty-five thousand bales, in round numbers, and in 1861 it was eighty-eight thousand, while the corresponding figures for tea were seventy-three thousand and eighty-seven thousand pounds. Such figures did not indicate that even the disturbance necessarily caused by warlike operations had crippled the expansion of commerce, and still less did they indicate that Taiping rule was desolating and destructive. Sir Frederick Bruce's solicitude about his country's tradal interests in general does not appear to have been warranted by facts; and as to his particular query about the things that might happen if the ports fell into rebel hands, he had answered it himself just six months previously when he wrote: "It does not appear to me necessary to take any part in this conflict; but our material interests in Shanghai justify us in insisting on its being exempted from attack until the insurgents have sufficiently established their superiority to enable us to consider the contest, as respects that part of China, at an end. In that case the population of the town will be quite ready to acknowledge the new power, and the authority of the Mandarins will fall without a blow." Truly, had

Sir Frederick been a small man, anxious about consistency and continuity of record, his embarrassment at this juncture would have been painful. But he was not greatly troubled by such things. A new apprehension disturbed him: the apprehension lest by interfering prematurely, England should be "deprived of the power of making her aid a matter of bargain with the Imperial Government. The longer," he said, "we are able to preserve an indifferent attitude between the two parties, the more inclined they will be to bid higher for our friendship and support."

These last words were addressed to Sir James Hope. Accompanying them was an inquiry as to the possibility of driving the Taipings from Nanking by a naval attack alone. From that moment Admiral Hope knew that in any hostile measures adopted against the insurgents he would have the British Minister's support. In fact, the Minister had outdone the Admiral; for whereas the former now thought even of attacking Nanking, the latter still had doubts about the expediency of quarelling with the Taipings at all, since "at any moment they might stop the whole trade of Shanghai." Meanwhile both Admiral and Minister had to await some further expression of opinion from London. It came in the usual faintly suggestive form. Lord John Russell wrote: "It might be expedient to defend the treaty ports if the Chinese would consent not to use those ports for purposes of aggression."

Such a sanction does not seem very inspiriting. It was quite sufficient, however. All British officials understand the significance of a hypothetical hint from the foreign office. It means, "act, but be prepared to take the responsibility of failure."

Under these circumstances Sir James Hope's antipathy to the Taipings seems to have grown rapidly. It matured before the close of the year. No reverses had overtaken the insurgents, nor had any act of theirs brought discredit on their cause since the Admiral's expression of doubt as to the expediency of quarrelling with them. But the time was now approaching when the promise given by their leaders at Nanking would expire. They had reluctantly pledged themselves to leave Shanghai unmolested until the close of 1861, and Sir James thought that some measure must be adopted to procure an extension of their promise. In November he directed Mr. Parkes to proceed at once to Nanking, and peremptorily order the rebels not to approach within thirty miles of any of the consular ports, threatening them with force if they refused to comply. Parkes declined to obey. "I decline," he said, "to give the world a chance of condemning me for bringing about a war with the rebels now that the war with the Chinese Government has been terminated; and this is just the way to get up a cause of quarrel." Parkes had already suffered by acting as the lieutenant of a bellicose chief. The scathing, and in many respects unjust, criticisms to which he had been subjected in connection with the lorcha *Arrow* affair were fresh in his mind. Sir James Hope, however, had no such record to deter him. He himself proceeded to Nanking, and there, through his flag-captain, addressed to the Taiping Authorities one of the most arrogant and imperious despatches ever penned. It did not contain any semblance whatever of the amenities observed by ordinarily polite people in addressing each other. The exordium was this: "I am directed by the Commander-in-chief of the Naval Forces to acquaint you —" and then followed a curt recital of demands couched in exactly the kind of language that a senior officer would use to a junior in disgrace. At the head of the list stood a claim for "7,563 taels, 1 mace, 7 candarenss, 4,800 dollars, 20 bales of silk, and 2 muskets," stolen from "certain British subjects in the territories which are held by your armies," and "immediate and satisfactory arrangements for compensation" were declared to be necessary. Then followed a mandate that "junks carrying British colours must be allowed to pass up and down the river free from examination or any other molestation," an arrangement which would have practically secured the free use of the water-way for all Imperial troops and munitions of war, in spite of both banks being in the possession of the insurgents; then an instruction that a Taiping officer must accompany the Admiral to Shanghai for the purpose of causing the evacuation of any ports occupied by the insurgents in its vicinity; and finally an announcement that "as a large and valuable British trade had sprung up at Kiukiang and Hankow, the Commander-in-chief is under the necessity of requiring a promise from you that your forces will not approach these places within 100 *li*, and also that you are distinctly to understand that Silver Island, the residence of the British Consul at Chinkiang-fu, is not to be molested." If any potentate in Europe, save and except his own Sovereign, had addressed such a communication to Sir James Hope, that officer would have considered that nothing less than a declaration of war could properly answer the insult. The Taipings did not declare war. They replied by a conciliatory and carefully reasoned document. It seemed to them that people "united by religion should compare their wants with those of others, instead of seeking only their own profit at the expense of the interests of their fellow-men;" and they ventured to remind Sir James Hope that "though commerce may be to you the means of livelihood, to us the possession of territory is all important," — not inappropriate comments on a despatch which began by demanding the payment of so many pounds, shillings, pence, and farthings, and ended by laying down, in fact, the fine principle that a nation's aspirations to free itself from the yoke of an usurping and alien dynasty must be subordinated to the commercial convenience of a few foreigners. To the British Admiral's demands the Taipings refused their assent. They reminded him that, on the occasion of his last visit, he had asked for nothing more than security of British life and property at any place captured by them, — security they were prepared again to guarantee, — and they made an earnest appeal that "since friendly relations exist between us, let us regard each other as people of the same family." Sir James Hope's reply excelled his original communication. One quotation will suffice: —

> "The towns of Shanghai and Woosung, as you well know, are occupied by the military forces of England and France, and if you repeat the absurdity of attacking them, you will incur, not merely a repulse as on a former occasion, but such further consequences as your folly will deserve. Your refusal to enter into an engagement to leave Silver Island, Kiukiang and Hankow free from molestation, all places which you have not the slightest chance of attacking with success, proves to the Commander-in-chief that your expressions of friendly feeling are mere words, and the necessity of dealing with you accordingly."

Of course Sir James Hope intended to quarrel with the Taipings when he directed his flag-captain to write such despatches. He cannot have laboured under the smallest doubt about the result.

But before the crisis came, it chanced that an awkward incident occurred — awkward from the point of view of the insurgents' detractors. In November, just at the time when Consul Parkes was declining to be bearer of Admiral Hope's thunderbolts to Nanking, the Taipings moved against Ningpo, and early in December they captured it; although, as Admiral Hope wrote (with curious indifference to the duties of neutrality, as well as to Lord John Russell's explicit condition), "everything had been done to assist the Imperialists in the defence of the town, except the use of force in its favour." Before taking the place, the Taiping leaders, happily unconscious of the treachery practised against them, had complied in the most courteous manner with the wishes of the Consuls, and had evinced an unequivocal anxiety to establish friendly relations with foreigners. They also behaved with marked moderation in the moment of victory.[1] In fact, had they deliberately sought to contrive an object lesson calculated to disprove the charges constantly preferred against them by their enemies, — charges of cruelty towards their own countrymen and insincerity towards foreigners, — they could not have succeeded better. This incident, if in one respect it temporarily postponed the execution of the Bruce-Hope policy, in another tended to precipitate it. For the Taipings naturally conceived that if they were quietly permitted to occupy Ningpo, the capture of Shanhai might be effected without any untoward complications.

Therefore, at the commencement of 1862,

---

[1] See Appendix, note 11.

having taken the provincial capital, Hangchow, and being now in possession of the whole of Chekiang province except Shanghai, which served as the Manchu's last stronghold and basis of supplies in that region of China, the Taipings moved against the city which they had hitherto spared at the request of the British authorities. Historians, perplexed to account for what followed, have alleged that in taking this step the Taipings violated their engagement to leave Shanghai unmolested. That is a misapprehension. The engagement held valid for the year 1861 only.

Shanghai was not immediately attacked; the Taipings confined themselves to capturing the various places in its vicinity, operations which resulted in the flight of large numbers of country-folk and the crowding of the foreign settlement with destitute persons of both sexes and all ages. It was the depth of a severe winter; and the hardships suffered by these unhappy fugitives, many of them entirely destitute, horrified the foreign residents. Charity of the most large-hearted, full-handed nature was dispensed; but as each day added its tale to the heavy total of deaths from starvation and exposure, the indignation of Europeans and Americans in Shanghai began to rise higher against the indirect author of all this pain and misery. The effects of war are hideous everywhere, but above all in country like China, where military licence having become a traditional terror, the ap-

having taken the provincial capital, Hangchow, and being now in possession of the whole of Chekiang province except Shanghai, which served as the Manchu's last stronghold and basis of supplies in that region of China, the Taipings moved against the city which they had hitherto spared at the request of the British authorities. Historians, perplexed to account for what followed, have alleged that in taking this step the Taipings violated their engagement to leave Shanghai unmolested. This is a misapprehension. The engagement held valid for the year 1861 only.

Shanghai was not immediately attacked; the Taipings confined themselves to capturing the various places in its vicinity, operations which resulted in the flight of large numbers of country-folk and the crowding of the foreign settlement with destitute persons of both sexes and all ages. It was the depth of a severe winter; and the hardships suffered by these unhappy fugitives, many of them entirely destitute, horrified the foreign residents. Charity of the most large-hearted, full-handed nature was dispensed; but as each day added its tale to the heavy total of deaths from starvation and exposure, the indignation of Europeans and Americans in Shanghai began to rise higher against the indirect author of all this pain and misery. The effects of war are hideous everywhere, but above all in country like China, where military licence having become a traditional terror, the ap-

A CHINESE FRUIT SELLER.

proach of an army, whether of allies or of enemies, creates a hysterical mania of flight among the civil population. Many an Anglo-Saxon and many a Frenchman, as he saw delicate women and helpless little children perishing among the snows and frosts of that hard winter in Shanghai, must have burned to take vengeance on the Taipings.

As usual, the insurgents preceded their approach by a friendly communication to the foreign authorities. In reply, the French and English commanders issued an announcement, not sent to the Taipings, but to "whomsoever it might concern," and couched in the most contemptuous tone. It declared that anyone attempting to attack Shanghai or Woosung would do so at his peril. It is uncertain whether this intimation reached the insurgents. At all events they made no attack upon Shanghai. But Admiral Hope's hostility had now become uncontrollable. He determined to take the field against the insurgents. His reasons for this momentous decision were given by himself: —

> "The proceedings of the insurgents have been conducted at a distance much too close to be consistent with the respect due to the occupation of the town by French and English forces, or to leave its supplies of provisions and native trade unaffected."

Thus the objects of the campaign were to drive the Taipings to a respectful distance and to preserve to Shanghai its supply of provisions.

The area to be neutralised for these purposes was, roughly speaking, a semi-circle with a thirty-miles' radius, having Shanghai for centre. Without loss of time the operation of expelling the Taipings from this region was commenced by French and English forces acting in combination with a Chinese contingent. The formality of giving notice to the Taipings seems to have been considered superfluous. No negotiations took place, nor was the alternative of withdrawal offered.

It is scarcely necessary to say that the ill-armed insurgents made no effective resistance. At the first place attacked, over a hundred of them were shot down, the allies losing one man. At the second place, about a thousand Taipings fell, the French and English escaping without a single casualty. It has been seen that a main object of the campaign was to preserve Shanghai's stores of provisions. It has also been seen that the flight of numbers of peaceful inhabitants from their homes had produced much destitution, and that restoration to their villages would have constituted the most effective form of relief. In pursuance of the former object, large stores of grain found in the vicinity of the first place attacked were burned; in pursuance of the latter, the second place attacked was set on fire after the rebels had been driven from it with heavy slaughter. Moreover, the allies looted everything they found in both towns.

All this had been done without any sanction from the British Government or from its Representative in Peking. Three weeks later the Cabinet in London, entirely ignoring, of course, what had taken place at Shanghai, conveyed to the admiralty the Queen's commands that "Vice-Admiral Hope should be instructed to defend Shanghai and to protect the other treaty ports not in the hands of the rebels, so far as it is in the power of Her Majesty's naval forces to do so." Even if Admiral Hope could have foreseen, when he struck his first offensive blow on February 21, that on March 11 Lord J. Russell would pen a despatch recommending resort to arms for defensive purposes, his independence would still be memorable. He probably did foresee, however, and events fully justified his acumen, that so long as England was not openly involved in another war, or required to make new military efforts, any exploits achieved by the forces available in China would receive *post-facto* approval in London. Throughout the year 1862, Her Majesty's Government is found perpetually endorsing belligerent operations in flagrant excess of its own previous sanctions. But as these operations were invariably successful, no situation could have been more gratifying politically.

Sir James Hope followed up his offensive initiative by recommending that the French and English military commanders should be instructed to drive the rebels from the district mapped out by him as a zone of "respect." Assent was promptly given by Sir Frederick Bruce; and on April 3 the campaign commenced under General Stavely, Admiral Hope, and Admiral Protet. Lord J. Russell's gentle recommendation that Shanghai should be defended had then performed about one-half of its voyage eastward.

The mixed force met with unqualified success. Its weapons proved so superior to those of the Taipings that the latter were generally destroyed before they could be said to have come into action. Between the 21st of February and the 31st of May, ten engagements were fought, and nine places captured from the Taipings, the casualties suffered by the latter being thirteen thousand, while those of the French and English totalled seven killed and forty-one wounded. Every place captured was looted by the allies, and some were burned. The French Admiral Protet fell at the capture of Najaon. After his death it was currently stated that his countrymen gave no quarter to the Taipings, sparing neither age nor sex. A similar charge was preferred against some of the British sailors. Such accusations are heard in connection with every war, wherever fought and under whatever circumstances. Nothing can be confidently alleged about the Hope campaign except that the disparity between the casualties on the Taiping side and those on the side of the allies imparted to the affair a ruthless aspect, and that the

French and English disgraced themselves by wholesale looting.

The policy of defending the treaty ports having been thus vigorously inaugurated, it became necessary that Ningpo should be recovered from Taiping possession. A combined attack by Imperial forces, Chinese pirates, and a British naval squadron effected this on the 10th of May. The details cannot be discussed here. It must suffice to notice that up to the 22d of April, in other words, up to a date one month subsequent to the inauguration of the Hope campaign in the Shanghai district, the Ningpo insurgents gave no cause of complaint to the foreigners in the adjacent settlement. On that day an accidental discharge of shotted guns from an insurgent battery during a salute, led to a complaint from the British naval authorities, and a demand that the battery should be demolished. But the replies of the Taipings were "so satisfactory, and tended so much to impress on the British commander their desire to maintain friendly relations with the English and French," that he withdrew the demand for the demolition of the battery, and asked only for the removal of the guns. It was not likely that the Taipings, whose comrades were being shot down wholesale by an Anglo-French force in the neighbouring district, would consent to destroy their means of defence at Ningpo. On the other hand, the friendly juxtaposition of a Taiping city and a foreign settlement after the commencement of the Hope campaign, would have been an obvious impossibility. The expulsion of the Taipings had to come; and though the comradeship of Chinese pirates and British blue-jackets at the assault of Ningpo is a record that does not embellish the pages of history, the issue itself was inevitable. In common justice, however, it must be admitted that up to the very last the Taipings showed wonderful moderation. No reader of the British parliamentary papers can hide from himself the fact that they abandoned, slowly, and with extreme reluctance, the hope that they would ultimately find friends and brethren in the foreigners whose religion they espoused. On July 3, 1862, by which time some seventeen thousand of their soldiers had been struck down by the Anglo-French force, and many others had been handed to the Imperialists for execution, General Staveley, in a despatch to the Secretary of State for War, said: —

> "Europeans continue to visit the rebel country for purposes of trade and are treated with civility. Large quantities of silk have been brought into Shanghai during the last fortnight, and trade seems in a flourishing state."

No feature of these strange events attracted a larger share of public interest than the part taken in the campaign by "Chinese Gordon," afterwards the hero and victim of Kartoum.

Ward, whose early military essays, undertaken at the instance of Chinese merchants in Shanghai, led to his arrest on a charge of violating the neutrality laws, found himself raised to an eminence of importance and distinction when Hope's idea became the vogue. It is to this remarkable American, intrepid, resourceful, a born leader of men, that belongs the credit of conceiving and carrying into execution the device which, more than anything else, proved efficient in crushing the rebellion, the device of organising a Chinese corps under foreign officers. When among the many bullets that mutilated his body from time to time, the fatal one at last found its billet, the command of the motley battalion he had controlled so ably and led so brilliantly, fell into the hands of Gordon, after two smaller men had futilely essayed the task. Up to that time Ward's corps had not been favourably regarded by the British authorities. The officers of the regular army, as is their wont, were disposed to sneer at this horde of civilians aping the soldier; and it must be admitted that Ward's men had become notable for looting as well as for other irregularities such as generally disfigure the conduct of mercenary troops. But from the moment of Gordon's appointment the "ever victorious army," as Ward's corps had been named by the Chinese, became a *protégé* of the British Government, and received every possible facility for obtaining supplies and munitions of war. It has always been, and probably will always remain, a matter of interesting speculation how a Christian fanatic like Gordon could have persuaded himself, or been persuaded, to assist materially in quelling an insurrection of professing Christians against pagan usurpers. His emotional humanity and religious bigotry probably furnish an explanation. Sharing the conviction adopted by Frederick Bruce in the middle of 1861, the conviction as "to the destructive nature of the insurrection and the blasphemous and immoral character of the superstition on which it was based," he saw primarily the terrible sufferings inflicted upon hundreds and thousands of innocent people, and secondarily the unorthodox quality of the Taipings' creed. It is easy to understand the zeal with which such a man would fight against supposed desecrators of the holy Scripture and spoilers of the people. He led the "ever victorious army" during a twelvemonth of almost perpetual fighting and nearly continuous success. The secret of his strategy was the use of steamers. By means of these, plying on numerous waterways that intersect the country where many of his triumphs were won, he held the insurgents at a fatal disadvantage; for they never at any time possessed, or could procure, a flotilla serviceable for the rapid transport of troops. In artillery, also, Gordon had an enormous superiority. For siege purpose he commanded a fine park of guns lent by the British general,—so fine that the fear of losing them induced the general to attach many of his best officers to the "ever victorious army," and his field artillery incomparably outclassed anything the Taipings could oppose to it. Perhaps, too, it will not be erroneous to say that the voice which a later generation of Englishmen might have raised in condemnation of their country's action at this crisis of Far-Eastern history was stilled by the thought that "Charley Gordon of Khartoum" would have to be included in the arraignment. Difficult, indeed, is it now to see what good purpose was served by Anglo-French interference. The Chinese Government never made for British aid that "high bid" which Sir Frederick Bruce at one time anticipated. So astutely did they and their officers in the field manage matters that services without which they must have lost an empire appeared always to be tendered, never solicited; and in the sequel nothing remained to France and England except the satisfaction of having reinstated a government to support which, in the some-time conviction of Her Majesty's Minister, must essentially lower British reputation. It is not even permitted to think that the cause of Christianity was advanced by the event. Speaking of the excesses committed by conscripts in the Taiping ranks, Sir Frederick Bruce once observed that "the humane and merciful character of Christianity, so fitted to recommend itself to and to evoke the higher qualities of our common nature, is tarnished by its alliance with men who openly wage a war of extermination against their enemies." But if ever Christian countries allied themselves with a ruthlessly exterminating Power, such an alliance took place when England and France clasped hands with the Manchus.[1] For the rebels there was no quarter; those that escaped the bullet or the bayonet passed under the headsman's sword. The last appeal made to Foreign Powers by the despairing remnant of the Taipings should have sounded strangely in the ears of those to whom it was addressed: "The doctrine of our Heavenly Father, the Almighty God, and of Jesus Christ, teaches us that he is merciful, saving us, answering to prayers, and unselfish."[2]

---

[1] See Appendix, note 12.

[2] See Appendix, note 13.

Chapter III

THE SEQUEL OF CONQUEST

EACH crisis in China's foreign relations during the past sixty years has seemed to Western observers a necessary point of new departure in her career. "Now at last the time is come," they have said, "when she must awake from her conservative lethargy or submit to national effacement." The termination of the Taiping rebellion appeared to be essentially such a time. In their first war with England the Chinese had employed provincial troops only. Between the invaders and the élite of the Tartar metropolitan army there had been no collision, nor had the wave of disturbance made itself felt perceptibly at Peking. But in 1860 the French and English, without any apparent effort, had swept out of their path the finest and best equipped soldiers available for the defence of the Manchurian throne, had captured Peking itself, had driven the Emperor a fugitive from his capital, and had laid his favourite palace in ruins. Then, after displaying this signal proof of ability to shatter the empire, they had turned their arms against its domestic enemies, and, while crushing these with equal ease, had demonstrated, at the same time, to the Manchu ruler that his own subjects might be moulded into fighting material such as would effectually guarantee him against any recurrence of destructive emergencies.

The Sovereign himself, however, was well understood to be incapable of interpreting these striking incidents. A debauchee, enfeebled physically and morally, he had seen but a part of the strange drama, when death overtook him at Jehō almost before the débris of his Summer Palace had ceased to smoke, and just when European collectors of bric-à-brac were busily adding to their collections specimens of the art-objects stolen by the soldiers of Christendom from the Yuen-ming Yuen. It had been the purpose of his Majesty to defeat the arrogant and violently asserted claims of foreign states by removing the imperial capital to Jehō, and leaving the intrusive representatives of the outer world to establish their legations in a city far remote from the Court to which they were accredited; and after his death the instigators of his conservative purpose constituted themselves regents during the minority of his successor, then a child of six. But their plans were so badly laid that they fell victims to a *coup d'état*, in which the principal actors were the Empress Dowager, Tsai An, Prince Kung, younger brother of the deceased

Emperor, and Wen Hsiang, whom Sir Harry Parkes described at the time as "a very promising statesman." The Empress Dowager, refusing to join the Emperor in his flight to Jehō, had remained in the capital throughout the stormy events of 1860; and it was mainly through her contrivance that the eight regents were arrested, tried,—after the manner of Chinese trials,—and executed. Thus the political power passed into the hands of this daring and eminently shrewd lady, and during the forty-one years that have elapsed since that event nothing has permanently shaken her authority.[1] Another *coup d'état* was needed, however, to preserve the continuity of female rule. In 1873, her Majesty's son attaining the age of 18, it became necessary to transfer the reins of government to him. He had given evidence of independent and even adventurous proclivities, which made it problematical whether the influences hitherto surrounding the throne would remain paramount after he found himself firmly seated there. The direct representative of these influences was Prince Kung, uncle of the young Sovereign and confederate of the Empress Dowager. Within two years of his assumption of administrative authority the Emperor issued a decree deposing Kung from his status of imperial prince, and on the very day after the publication of this sentence another decree by the Empress Dowager[2] reversed it. The public thus informed that the anticipated friction within the palace had become acute, watched anxiously for the next event. It took the form of an announcement that the Emperor had fallen ill, and within a few months he died. There is little probability that the suspicions excited by this incident will ever be confirmed or dispelled. Some allege that his Majesty's demise was deliberately contrived; others, that wilful mismangement converted a remediable illness into a fatal malady; others, that both versions are baseless. Whatever the truth may have been, the astonishment caused by the event soon yielded to curiosity about its sequel. For the problem of the succession now presented itself under circumstances dangerously complicated. The deceased Emperor had left his young wife *enceinte*. It would have been natural and proper to await the birth of her offspring; and, failing male issue in that line, an heir should have been chosen from the family of the oldest of the late monarch's three uncles. But suddenly the world learned, one morning, that the infant son of the youngest uncle, Prince Chun, had been proclaimed Emperor; and then followed, in rapid succession, the death of the deceased sovereign's young wife, her babe still unborn. A special providence seemed to remove from the path of the Empress Dowager every obstacle to the continuance of her authority. The newly proclaimed heir was her nephew,—the child's mother being her own sister,— and its father naturally proved pliant in the hands that had contrived this great honour for his family. Thus Tsai An secured another lease of power, paying for it no higher price than the loss of Prince Kung's friendship, who, already in part estranged, now fell still farther away, when, as one of the elder uncles, he saw his son's claims thus summarily ignored.

---

[1] See Appendix, note 14.

[2] See Appendix, note 15.

This irregularity or crime — whichever it should be called — of 1875 appears destined to bring its own punishment. Kwangsu, who thus succeeded, at the age of three, to the sovereignty of the vast Chinese empire, grew up to feeblest estate of manhood. The hope that issue of his body might some day sit on the throne had soon to be abandoned. But he had not been long loosed from the leading strings of the Empress Dowager when, falling under the influence of short-sighted radicals, he attempted (1896), to carry out a series of reforms far beyond his country's assimilating capacity. The resulting disorder called the old Empress Dowager from her retirement. In a moment the whole edifice of novelties lay in ruins, and those that had assisted the young Emperor to build it were corpses or fugitives. Kwangsu's authority was rudely taken from his hands, and once again the world looked to learn that an inmate of the Palace had "ascended heavenwards on the golden dragon." But no catastrophe of that nature ensued. For a time the punishment meted out to the rash young Emperor found a limit in loss of the actuality of sway, and in the humiliation of being sent back to the nursery. Then followed another selection of an heir to the throne; and this time the choice fell upon the son of a prince who had already placed himself at the head of an anti-foreign revolutionary movement, — the Boxer outbreak, — and is now an exile. The new heir, meanwhile, gave evidence of such vicious propensities that his name had to be struck from the succession, and no *remplacant* has yet been found. Twice, then, this lady, Tsai An, has arbitrarily nominated Princes Imperial; on both occasions her choice proved faulty, and to-day the throne is without recognised successor. Her Majesty will probably see to it that such an element of possible disturbance is removed in good time; but in the business of king-making fate does not seem to favour her, and the interval remaining for resolute action cannot be long.

From the very outset of her extraordinary career the world — or at least that portion of it having any insight into Chinese affairs — recognised in the Empress Dowager a woman of eminent capacity, and from well nigh the very outset the newspaper organs of foreign opinion in China poured upon her head a stream of abuse such as no other living sovereign, above all a woman, has ever been called on to endure. When she assumed the control of affairs, the Manchu dynasty seemed to have entered into

to the rash young Emperor found a limit in loss of the actuality of sway, and in the humiliation of being sent back to the nursery. Then followed another selection of an heir to the throne; and this time the choice fell upon the son of a prince who had already placed himself at the head of an anti-foreign revolutionary movement, — the Boxer outbreak, — and is now an exile. The new heir, meanwhile, gave evidence of such vicious propensities that his name had to be struck from the succession, and no *remplacant* has yet been found. Twice, then, this lady, Tsai An, has arbitrarily nominated Princes Imperial; on both occasions her choice proved faulty, and to-day the throne is without recognised successor. Her Majesty will probably see to it that such an element of possible disturbance is removed in good time; but in the business of king-making fate does not seem to favour her, and the interval remaining for resolute action cannot be long.

A POPULAR TEA HOUSE IN THE OLD PART OF SHANGHAI.

From the very outset of her extraordinary career the world — or at least that portion of it having any insight into Chinese affairs — recognised in the Empress Dowager a woman of eminent capacity, and from well nigh the very outset the newspaper organs of foreign opinion in China poured upon her head a stream of abuse such as no other living sovereign, above all a woman, has ever been called on to endure. When she assumed the control of affairs, the Manchu dynasty seemed to have entered into

the shadow of its death. The most important strategical points in the empire were occupied by foreign forces; the richest regions of the realm were over-run by Taiping insurgents; the Nienfei — rebels scarcely less formidable — devastated Shangtung, and the Mohammedan population of Yunnan had risen in revolt.[1] Certainly if disastrous events have any strength to startle a government into sharp perception of the need of reform, that should have been the case with the Manchu Government in 1861; and since the leading powers in the State at the moment were first, the Empress Dowager, who had just "sent silk cords" to the conservative regents; secondly, Prince Kung and Wen Hsiang who had shown themselves liberal and enlightened; and thirdly, Li Hung-chang, upon whom, as a leader of reform, foreign attention was already beginning to be centred, the prospect looked encouraging in the eyes of China's well wishers, as well as in their eyes who imagined that her complete emergence from seclusion would bring rich affluents to the world's commerce.

Many of these hopes seemed likely to be realised. By way of foundation for a national army worthy of the name, Major Gordon received authority to establish a camp of instruction in the vicinity of Shanghai. He brought to the task all the vehement energy of his nature; and in a short time the essential elements of military training had been created at Fung-huang-sham, not excluding the translation of manuals and other printed aids to the study of strategy and tactics. Gordon quickly wearied of this work. The routine of the parade-ground and the barrack-room could never have been tolerable to a man of his disposition except as imminently preluding a campaign. He soon resigned the post in favour of Major Jebb. At Taku in the north a similar enterprise under the direction of Lieut. Colonel Thomas, appeared to have the earnest approval of the Chinese authorities. But it was rapidly seen that the Peking Government took only the most languid interest in these new departures. The Manchus had no desire to have their Chinese subjects welded into strong fighting material. Still less did they view with favour any measures tending to raise military enthusiasm in the country. Whatever solicitude was bestowed on the two training-camps could be traced to British officials, who hoped that when the foreign garrison evacuted Shanghai, a suitable *remplacant* would be at hand to guarantee the great emporium of British Far-Eastern trade against perils from Triads, Taipings, Nienfei, or other lawless elements of the immense Chinese nation. Such solicitude neither central nor local officials in China could be expected to reciprocate; and thus the two camps, after a few years of languishing existence, passed quietly out of life. They had accomplished nothing except to suggest a fact which foreign onlookers found scarcely credible, but which must be now accepted as proved, namely, that the Manchus, so long as they occupy the throne of China, will be reluctant to create a powerful national army of the European type.

---

[1] See Appendix, note 16.

These, however, were by no means the sole outcomes of that eventful epoch. Two other projects, less dependent on official caprice for their welfare, were conceived and consummated, namely, the establishment of arsenals at Kiang-nan and Foochow. It seemed as though, in all these doings, the Chinese Government was influenced by a desire to evince concrete appreciation of the services it had received from foreign nations, rather than by any serious purpose of equipping itself with strong armaments. England, France, and America had each contributed to the overthrow of the Taipings. Therefore the training-camps were officered by Englishmen, the Kiang-nan arsenal was placed under American direction, and the Foochow enterprise had Frenchmen for organisers and controllers. The Kiang-nan institution is still flourishing. Its first director, Mr. F. J. Falls, did his work well. Excellent munitions of war have been manufactured there in times of national emergency, many useful books have issued from its translating section, and not a few Chinese interpreters have graduated from its schools. The so-called "arsenal" at Foochow would be more properly described as a ship-building yard. Its original purpose, according to the words of its projector, M. Prosper Giquel, was to supply China with a fleet of warships and transports, and to train naval officers and experts. That large programme it did not accomplish; but its want of full success cannot be attributed in any degree to Giquel, a man of exceptional parts. Ward, Burgevine, and Gordon are usually spoken of as captains of Chines forces in the Taiping insurrection; but Giquel and d'Aiguebille belong justly to the same category. These two Frenchmen did not command the advantages that the American leaders, and above all, the British, enjoyed. Only the scantiest resources could be placed at their disposal. Their force numbered 400 men, and for arms they had rifles imported by foreign merchants for sale to the Taipings, but confiscated by the Customs *en route*. Firearms destined for such a purpose were likely to be much more dangerous to those using them than to those against whom they were directed. The men of the Franco-Chinese corps found that to the chance of being shot by the enemy, there was added the probability of being mutilated by the bursting of their own weapons. Yet under d'Aiguebille and Giquel they did fine service. Giquel was one of those rare men that never waste an opportunity. Arriving in China in 1856 as a naval officer, the year 1862 found him equipped as a competent Chinese scholar, and it was to the industry he had thus shown in acquiring an apparently useless and most difficult language that he owed his appointment to the post of director of the Foochow arsenal in 1866. Thirty-seven Frenchmen served under him in the construction yard and in the schools of language, naval architecture, and mathematics, the whole forming an establishment that reflected honour on France, and did good service for China. Fate, with its usual waywardness, decreed that this monument of French industry, together with several of the ships constructed at the arsenal, should be destroyed by a French squadron within twenty years of Prosper Giquel's appointment.

Another progressive step taken by China in the sequel of this juncture was the despatch of a band of students to Europe. The students had received a preliminary education at Foochow; and after three or four years at Creusot, Saint-Chamond, and elsewhere, they became thoroughly competent experts. Other missions followed. Their members were not confined by any means to studies connected with the art of war. They pursued also the path of political science and of jurisprudence; and many of them returned to China with acquirements which, it was fondly hoped, would render their possessors so many centres of progressive influence.

Undoubtedly China might be said to have made a start in a new direction at that eventful epoch of her career. Her most signal failure at the moment was the result of an attempt to supply herself with a navy. The need for ships, forced upon her attention by exploits of British squadrons at her great expense, was rendered acute by the Taiping rebellion; for there could be no doubt that the futile attempts of her land forces to drive the insurgents from Nanking and to recover the Yangtse Valley would be speedily changed into success by the co-operation of ships-of-war. Her perception of these facts having been quickened by counsels from Sir Frederick Bruce and others, Mr. H. N. Lay, Inspector-General of Customs, who happened at the time (1862) to be in London, was entrusted with the duty of buying a fleet. Prince Kung represented China in this matter. He behaved with extraordinary largemindedness. To give such a commission to a foreigner was in itself an evidence of confidence unparalleled in Chinese history, except, perhaps, by Kublai Khan's appointment of Marco Polo to be Governor of Yangchou. But Prince Kung did more. He authorised Lay to engage the personnel of the squadron, to fix the salaries, and, in short, to make every necessary arrangement. The only way to account for what followed is to suppose that the magnitude of the trust reposed in him disturbed Mr. Lay's mental equilibrium. Having secured the services of Captain Sherard-Osborn, he concluded with that officer an agreement almost too incredible to find a place even in a work of fiction. The very name given to the squadron — "the European-Chinese Fleet" — sounded like the title of a burlesque. Osborn was to take the command, ensured to him absolutely for four years. He was to have entire control, not alone of this squadron, but also of every vessel in the service of the Chinese Empire. He was to obey orders coming from the Emperor only, Lay undertaking to be the channel for communicating such orders, and pledging himself not to transmit any that did not meet with his own approval. Osborn was to nominate all the officers and men, subject to the sanction of Lay, as "representative of the Emperor." Lay and Osborn were to make careful inquiry into any complaints formulated by Chinese officials against the officers or men of the squadron. The fleet, being European, must by all means have a flag of European character, "to guarantee its efficiency and to assure to it proper respect." Therefore Lay agreed that there should be a green standard with two yellow lines and a blue imperial dragon in the middle. And so on. Of course, when this megalomaniacal monstrosity reached China, troubles gathered about it quickly. The Chinese wanted to place it under the command of one of their own countrymen. Osborn objected. The Chinese wished it to serve at the seat of war, where alone it was needed, under the supervision of the Generals conducting the campaign.

Lay objected. The Chinese urged the utter infeasibility of direct orders from the Throne, which never commanded fleets, and which, being in Peking, could not possibly give intelligent instructions to a squadron operating hundreds of miles away. Osborn and Lay objected. Then it became the turn of the Chinese to object, which they did very effectively by abandoning the whole scheme, and sending Lay away, well recompensed pecuniarily, but destined to become an object of historical ridicule. Prince Kung pregnantly observed that had Lay been a Chinese subject, he would have been punished according to law; but being an Englishman, there was nothing for it save to request his return to England. Yet the author of "The Englishman in China" calls this Lay-Osborn incident a "signal illustration of the invincible distrust of foreign auxiliaries which dominates Chinese policy, and prevents the empire from ever having an army or a navy." Truly described, it becomes an illustration of Chinese excessive trust in foreign auxiliaries.

It will be observed that in this movement of military and naval reform, the Central Government's active share was limited to the Lay-Osborn fiasco. Provincial officials conceived and carried out all the rest. That is a cardinal feature of whatever attempts China has made to equip herself with armaments in modern times. Military matters have been abandoned to local initiative and direction: naval have been undertaken by the Peking Government. Had the Lay-Osborn scheme matured, the squadron might eventually have become provincialised, its headquarters at Nanking or Foochow. But the credit of authorising the project belonged to Prince Kung, as did also some of the discredit attaching to its failure; and thus the earliest impulse of naval reform must be said to have come from Peking. So also did the second, and, by an interesting parallelism, as Prince Kung's name was associated with the former, Prince Ch'un's is with the latter. Prince Ch'un, commonly called the "Seventh Prince," is already known to the reader as the father of the child raised to the throne by the Empress Dowager in 1875, in defiance of the lawful order of succession. It was an easy inference that, since the son of the Seventh Prince had been chosen by the Empress Dowager for this high distinction, the Seventh Prince himself must be a *persona grata* with the Imperial lady, and must consequently share her political creed. There has always been something like an universal conspiracy among English publicists in China to denounce the Empress Dowager as a bigoted conservative, fiercely opposed to all progress, and quite unscrupulous in her measures to preserve the ancient order of things. Japanese statesmen, who undoubtedly have a closer insight into Chinese affairs than Occidentals, do not take that view. It would be impossible, they say, to reconcile so much blindness in foreign affairs with so much astuteness in domestic. There are, indeed, ties difficult to snap suddenly, which attach the Manchus to existing conditions. No other throne in the civilised world supports such a vast crowd of dependents; for it has always been an inviolable Manchu rule that the gifts of fortune must be shared by the chief of the imperial clan with its members; and these, in the lapse of centuries, have multiplied so that an incredible mob of relatives, poor in the direct ratio of their consanguinity's remoteness, now live by the throne's bounty, their blue blood excluding them from bread-winning pursuits. Such a weight of parasites necessarily drags the dynasty back from new departures. In that respect they stand to the Manchu Government in the same relation that the Japanese *samurai* occupied towards feudalism — supporters of the system by which they are themselves supported. The most enlightened Manchu sovereign could not entirely escape their paralysing influence. Further, since every ruling family, above all, an usurping family, must hesitate to promote a wave of change at the crest of which it cannot be sure of standing, and since the parasitical habits of a large majority of the Manchu ruling clan unfit them for intellectual leadership in any direction, there is here another factor making for conservatism. Therefore, be her impulses what they may, the Empress Dowager must walk warily. But had her real character borne any close resemblance to the caricatures constantly drawn in the imagination of foreign detractors, her credit with the cleverest men among four hundred millions of subjects could not possibly have survived the ordeals it has encountered during forty years of a greatly troubled reign. That is not the view of the open-port communities in China, however. They count the Imperial lady a thoroughly bad influence in Chinese politics; and their unfavourable estimate originally embraced the Seventh Prince, he being her confidant, so that, in 1871, Sir Rutherford Alcock, then British Minister in Peking, described him as "violently hostile (to foreigners), and joining in all efforts to make the anti-foreign faction predominate."[1] Yet when, in 1884, this Prince became a recognised power behind the throne, with a reconstituted *Tsung-li Yamen,* he proved himself a man of enlightened and liberal views. Never, in truth, did facts run so completely counter to current theories. But the treaty-port critic was not one whit disconcerted. With unabated assurance he continued to see in the Empress Dowager a political curse to her country and an ethical stigma to Chinese society.

Under the Seventh Prince's régime a naval board was organised in Peking, he himself being placed at its head, and China procured a fleet. That was easy enough. So also were the employment of British naval officers for purposes of instruction, the establishment of a naval school at Tientsin, and the fortifying of naval ports at the entrance of the Gulf of Chili, this last work being entrusted mainly to German engineers. Thus, the central Government came into possession of an apparently efficient navy. But it remained still without an army. The instruction camps established near Shanghai and at Taku had been broken up, and the foreign instructors dismissed, before the organisation of a naval board in Peking and the acquisition of a fleet. Here and there, however, prominent Viceroys had raised and trained special corps, availing themselves of the assistance of German experts. This was especially true of the metropolitan province, Chili. There Viceroy Li Hung-Chang, who, after the Empress Dowager, occupied the most prominent place in his country's domestic and foreign politics during the last thirty years of the nineteenth century, had a well-drilled army, variously estimated at from twenty-five to forty thousand men, and supposed to be capable of holding its own against any troops in the world. Altogether, between the years 1885 and 1894, there grew up among foreign observers in China, as well as in Europe and America, a firm conviction that the huge empire of the Far East was a power to be reckoned with, not, indeed, for offensive purposes, but assuredly for defensive. Had England or France, or both together, been required, at any time during these ten years, to repeat the exploit of 1860, they would have set about the task with reluctance and misgiving. It was Japan that pricked the bubble. In 1894–5 she captured the new fortresses, annihilated the new fleet, and shattered the new armies. Then the world, passing to the opposite extreme, pronounced China altogether contemptible. A conviction gained vogue that the only strong element in her system is tradition, and that her Government's sway rests solely on moral force. How the latter theory can be reconciled with the fact that in every great city a Manchu garrison is stationed, and in every province a local army, it is difficult to see. The more easily intelligible truth seems to be that China has not reconciled herself to making a permanent effort altogether disproportionate to the emergencies of her ordinary situation. She does not endorse the logic of the man who used cold water habitually for shaving purposes, lest, if he fell into the custom of using hot, he might, some morning, be inconvenienced by the kettle's absence. Her idea of land forces and sea forces is that they need only be sufficient for the everyday purposes of administration. Anything more would be wasteful. To be perpetually prepared for a great crisis, though great crises do not occur once in a century, is, in her opinion, foolish squandering of energy and resources. It is probably from that point of view that the civilisation of the Occident presents to her its most deterrent aspect. The States of the West exhaust themselves to maintain great armaments which may never justify their existence. They subject themselves to a perpetually painful strain for the sake of minimising the danger of an occasional hurt. There ought to be some way of avoiding such an irrational rule of life; and China appears to be still searching for that way in the face of a series of most convincing proofs that her national existence depends on abandoning the search, and frankly following the unlovely, uncivilised and illogical example of the Occident. It must be remembered, too, that a heavy burden would have to be imposed on the people in order to equip the country with powerful armaments. They are the most lightly taxed people in the world, yet no people rebel so fiercely against any increase of imposts. That appears to be the one thing against which their patience is not proof. Each province, or each viceroyalty, might be content to maintain its own army. But that would scarcely be compatible with the permanence of Manchu rule. Thus national energy is not concentrated on armaments, and China has shown herself a contemptibly weak-kneed giant in the struggle forced on her by her new friends. She seems to be to-day as far as ever from reconciling herself to the necessities of the novel situation in that respect.

---

[1] See Appendix, note 17.

This want of efficient forces, supplemented by reluctance to use efficiently even those that she possesses, is apparent in her domestic politics as well as in her foreign. Hers is not the only executive machine, it is true, that falls out of gear at the touch of mob violence. But among nations she has an unique record for failure to deal with household disorders, which have again and again brought national disaster in their train. These exhibitions of impotence and their fatal results have been connected chiefly with the religious question; a problem that grows in magnitude from month to month, and threatens to involve at last the disruption of the empire.

Nothing is more necessary in considering this problem than to obey, if possible, the Confucian maxim of trying to place oneself in the other side's position. The attempt leads often to results not at all flattering to Occidental pride; but reason and justice revolt from the notion that there is no Chinese side; that men who in everything relating to the affairs of everyday life show themselves eminently moderate and sensible, should be entirely incapable of displaying either of those characteristics in their attitude towards Christianity and its propagandists.

The result of the "restitution" article in the Peking Convention of 1860—the article providing that all religious and benevolent establishments, cemeteries, and dependent buildings, confiscated from Christians in days of former persecutions, should be restored *via* the French Representative in Pekin — was that the *Peh-tang* (northern church), *Nan-Tang* (southern church), *Si-Tang* (western church), and *Tung-Tang* (eastern church), together with the lands attached to them, were handed over to the French Minister. The Chinese scrupulously observed the terms of the Convention, though they could not in every case give immediate effect to them; for, as Prince Kung, with unconscious irony, remarked in writing about the *Peh-tang:* "A great number of years have passed since it disappeared, and I have therefore ordered the local authorities to make a minute and careful inquiry into the matter." The search for the *Peh-tang* was typical of what had to be undertaken in many other places. In the course of long years the lands where Christian edifices had once stood, and sometimes even the edifices themselves — in the rare cases where they remained intact — had passed through many hands, and even the memory of their original use had become obliterated. To recover these from their actual owners much violence had to be done to the rights of property. A recent French writer has justly remarked that "this clause, executed literally, would evidently cause nothing less than a new *bouleversement* of the distribution of property in China, already greatly disturbed by the Taiping rebellion. It would have been necessary to revert to the time of the persecutions at the beginning of the eighteenth century in order to find the lands formerly possessed by Christians"; and Sir Rutherford

(northern church), *Nan-Tang* (southern church), *Si-Tang* (western church), and *Tung-Tang* (eastern church), together with the lands attached to them, were handed over to the French Minister. The Chinese scrupulously observed the terms of the Convention, though they could not in every case give immediate effect to them; for, as Prince Kung, with unconscious irony, remarked in writing about the *Peh-tang*: "A great number of years have passed since it disappeared, and I have therefore ordered the local authorities to make a minute and careful inquiry into the matter." The search for the *Peh-tang* was typical of what had to be undertaken in many other places. In the course of long years the lands where Christian edifices had once stood, and sometimes even the edifices themselves — in the rare cases where they remained intact — had passed through many hands, and even the memory of their original use had become obliterated. To recover these from their actual owners much violence had to be done to the rights of property. A recent French writer has justly remarked that "this clause, executed literally, would evidently cause nothing less than a new *bouleversement* of the distribution of property in China, already greatly disturbed by the Taiping rebellion. It would have been necessary to revert to the time of the persecutions at the beginning of the eighteenth century in order to find the lands formerly possessed by Christians"; and Sir Rutherford

A CHINESE CARPENTER.

Alcock's comment on the same clause was: "We must suppose a French army entering London and there dictating the conditions of peace, and among others one that all church property confiscated by Henry VIII. should forthwith be restored to the Roman Catholic Church by the present holders, however acquired, and without compensation, and that the French Government should be appealed to in order to enforce the vigorous execution of the stipulation." Of course there is the consideration that the Chinese Government agreed to the clause. But when a man is required to repeat a formula with a loaded pistol placed to his head, his responsibility for the words he utters is not large. It has been claimed that when Baron Gros dictated to China this extraordinary stipulation, he never contemplated its strict enforcement. "There was no question," wrote M. Cordier in 1901, "of exacting strict execution of an Article which would have had the result of enriching the missions to the great moral prejudice of their work, the character and object of which are so elevated, to cause veritable spoliations and to produce terrible disturbance in Chinese real estate. What was required was simply to render more easy the work of missionaries, not to build it on ruins. The land necessary for building churches, establishing cemeteries, founding schools and orphanages, was the only reclamation that should have been formulated." Unfortunately such an interpretation cannot be reconciled with the triumphant language of Baron Gros — quoted in a previous chapter — when, after describing the extreme pettiness of the territorial acquisition obtained by England at Kowloon, he contrasted the fact that *le gouvernement chinois s'est engagé à rendre au ministre de France toutes les églises catholiques, avec leur cimetières, leur terrains et leurs dépendances, qui avaitent été confisqués dans les provinces et dans la capitale de l'empire, aux chrétiens qui les possédaient autrefois.* Besides, the limitations that M. Cordier suggests as having been contemplated by the framers of the treaty were not observed in practice. It has been shown above with what frank loyalty Prince Kung applied himself to carry out the stipulations of this monstrous article. Eleven years later the same Prince Kung, in a celebrated state paper, wrote: —

> "During the last few years the restitution of chapels in every province has been insisted upon without any regard for the feeling of the masses, the missionaries obstinately persisting in their claims. They have also pointed out fine, handsome buildings (belonging to, or occupied by, the gentry or others) as buildings once used as churches; and these they have compelled the people to give up. But what is worst, and what wounds the dignity of the people, is that they often claim as their property *yamêns,* places of assembly, temples held in high regard by the literati and the inhabitants of the neighbourhood. Buildings which were once used as chapels have been in some cases sold years ago by Christians; and, having been sold and resold by one of

the people to another, have passed through the hands of several proprietors. There is also a large number of buildings which have been newly repaired at very considerable expense of which the missionaries have insisted on the restitution, refusing at the same time to pay anything for them. On the other hand, there are some houses which have become dilapidated, and the missionaries put in a claim for the necessary repair. Their conduct excites the indignation of the people whenever they come in contact with each other, and it becomes impossible for them to live quietly together."

It may be objected that Prince Kung's statement of the case is exaggerated. However that may be, it must at all events be accepted as an accurate presentation of what the Chinese themselves believed in 1871. And when the fact is remembered that in China real estate belongs not to an individual, but to a family, which family, in turn, forms part of a clan, one begins to understand that each of these acts of spoliation must have created for Christianity a wide circle of enemies. In any European country such procedure would probably cause a revolution. Had the framers of the French Treaty deliberately set themselves to contrive that the Christian religion should become an object of popular hatred in China, they could scarcely have devised any more efficacious method.

The British Treaty of 1858 made provision simply for official toleration of Christianity. "Persons teaching it or professing it" were "alike to be entitled to the protection of the

Chinese authorities, nor should any such, peaceably pursuing their calling, and not offending against the laws, be prosecuted or interfered with." Even that was manifestly unwise from a political point of view, and probably injurious to the best interests of Christianity itself. The question of religious tolerance is degraded by being thrust into the text of a treaty of amity and commerce where it ranks equally with a provision for the opening of a new market or for the fixing of a customs tariff. Above all is such a question out of place in a convention dictated at the point of the sword. The Chinese, as every reader of the history recounted in these pages must admit, had shown themselves one of the most tolerant nations in the world. They suffered the Buddhists, they suffered the Nestorians, they suffered the Jews, they suffered the Mohammedans, and they suffered the Christians until these rendered themselves intolerable inmates of the empire. In 1858, for the first time in their history, a foreign religion was forced upon them by armed conquerors. A rule of conscience was dictated to them as well as a rule of commerce.

The French Treaty went a good deal farther than the English ; for whereas the latter made no provision whatever for the propagandism of the foreign faith in the provinces, the former stipulated that "efficient protection should be given to missionaries proceeding peacefully into the interior of the country, furnished with passports." Moreover, the French Treaty contained these two clauses:

> No restrictions shall be placed by the Authorities of the Chinese Empire in the right recognised for every individual in China to embrace Christianity if he desires, and to follow the practices without being liable to any punishment on account of the fact.
>
> Everything formerly enacted, proclaimed, or published in China by order of the Government against the Christian cult, is completely abrogated and remains invalid in all the provinces of the Empire.

England was content to secure protection and immunity for her own subjects professing, practising, or teaching Christianity. Possibly her treaty might have been interpreted as requiring liberty of conscience for Chinese subjects also, but that would have been liberal rendering. France, however, placed the matter beyond doubt. All the old vetoes imposed by the greatest of the Manchu sovereigns, Kangsi, Yungching, and Chienlung, were to be "completely abrogated;" every person in China was to be free to become a Christian if he pleased, and the Chinese Authorities were to answer to France if any restriction was placed upon the freedom of their own nationals' consciences.

It has already been seen, that by the trickery of a French priest, acting in the capacity of interpreter to Baron Gros, the provisions of the sixth Article of the Peking Convention were materially enlarged. Apparently, success encouraged repetition. Baron Gros, when it fell to his duty to dictate a form of passport for religious propagandists visiting the provinces, stated simply that the bearer should be allowed to travel freely, should have aid and protection in case of necessity, but should not, under any pretext, visit towns or villages occupied by the rebels. This passport, when it emerged from the hands of the French translator, contained nothing whatever of the veto as to visiting places occupied by the rebels, but did contain provisions that the bearer should be allowed "to preach his religion in any locality, to reside there, to lease or buy lands there, and to construct temples to *Tien-shu* or houses." The fraudulently interpolated clause in the sixth Article of the Peking Convention did not go beyond securing for missionaries the privilege of "leasing land or buying or building houses in all the provinces of the empire." The fraudulently interpolated clause in the passport secured to them the right of buying land. Thus a concession obtained originally by force was subsequently extended by fraud. Under such auspices did Roman Catholicism make its second entry into China. At the time of its first entry, in the seventeenth century, Matteo Ricci's falsehood obtained for him the privilege of residence in the interior. That record was thrown into the shade by the chicanery of his successors in the nineteenth century.

One expects to find that these dishonest interpolations were repudiated by the French Government. They were not. On the contrary, the question of the free purchase of land by missionaries in the interior occupied a prominent share of French diplomatic attention in Peking from 1861 to 1895. At first individual priests, taking large advantage of the privilege, purchased lands in their own names. This procedure, obviously incompatible with any policy which the French Government could respectably endorse, ceased, after a time, to be adopted, being exchanged for a method of collective purchase. But the Chinese local authorities, who had quickly been estranged by the incidents of Roman Catholic propagandism, found in this new arrangement an opportunity to be obstructive. If a certain form had to be adopted for a deed of sale, then obviously the local officials must examine the latter before registering it. This they insisted on doing by way of preliminary to the act of sale, the result being that the intending seller generally received an official hint to abandon the transaction. Not until 1895 was this state of affairs remedied, and M. Gérard's despatch prescribing the remedy deserves to rank with Admiral Hope's missives to the Taipings in Nanking. He formulated three conditions as indispensable ; he prefaced each with the phrase *j'ai demandé et je demande*, and he concluded his despatch with the words : *J'attends de Vos Altesses et de Vos Excellences, dans le plus* *bref délai qui Leur sera possible, une réponse entièrement et de tout point conformé à la présent communication officielle. Ceci est urgent et de la plus grande importance.* All this on the strength of a fraudulent supplement to a fraudulent interpolation! In April, 1895, when M. Gérard penned this despatch, the news of the surrender of the last remnant of her fleet at Wei-hai-wei, and of her final defeat by the Japanese, had been only a few days in China's possession. Within twenty-four hours she agreed to M. Gérard's demands.

Before Baron Gros left Peking in 1860, he signed passports for twenty-eight missionaries then secretly living in the interior of the country. Very soon the number received large accessions, so that, ere many years had passed, Roman Catholics were represented by some forty bishops and sixty hundred and fifty priests, scattered throughout the eighteen provinces. Protestantism did not show itself backward. Society after society hastened to send toilers to this vineyard where four hundred millions of pagans were waiting to be converted; and if Roman Catholicism had a list of seven hundred workers, Protestantism's roll contained twelve hundred names, more than half being women.

The work of propagandism went on with apparent smoothness for five years, and then commenced a series of outrages which may be said to have continued almost without interruption ever since. The first victim was the Abbé

Mabileau, killed in Szchuan in 1865. In this case the incident did not attract much attention. The Abbé's murderer died under the executioner's hand, and a sum of eighty thousand taels was exacted from a prominent man of the locality against whom the Christians preferred a charge of having instigated the assassination. Probably nothing has tended to discredit missionaries more than these exactions of money payments, inaugurated in 1865, and repeated again and again afterwards. Kwangtung became the scene of the next outbreak. It resulted in injuries to M. Delavay, destruction of a church, killing of seven or eight native Christians, and wounding of about one hundred. Minor troubles were subsequently reported from the same province; and in 1869 Szchuan once more attracted attention, the Abbé Rigauld being killed there, together with thirty-nine of his flock, women and men, while on the other side over two hundred were said to have been killed, and three times that number wounded. Special interest attached to this last affair because it elicited a memorial from the literati and the people, setting forth their grievances, and thus furnishing information as to the real sentiments of the people at that time. The memorial declared that the trouble had its origin in the conduct of Bishop Desflèches, who, not discriminating between the evil and the good, admitted to the ranks of Christianity men having no object except to avail themselves of its protection for preferring unjust claims and creating disturbances, supported by the missionaries, and sharing with them ultimate awards or indemnities. It spoke of the eighty thousand taels exacted after the death of Abbé Mabileau; of one hundred and fifty thousand taels paid for a church destroyed at Chung-king, and of further exactions. The memorialists described also a sanguinary conflict in the preceding year, owing to Christian interference on the occasion of a wedding between a convert and a non-Christian; and, above all, they complained of a native convert, Tann, an ordained priest, who, on two occasions, led bands of Christians to deeds of violence, causing the death of over two hundred people. Asked to surrender this Tann to justice, Bishop Desfléches' answer was that he had gone to Europe. Whatever deductions be made from this memorial on account of bias, there remains much that deserves attention. The same year (1869) saw a disturbance in Hupeh, owing to rumours that children had been killed and mutilated in Christian orphanages; saw a native Christian seized and tortured in Kwangtung for the same reason; saw churches and religious establishments in Kweichou pillaged, and the Abbé Gilles beaten so that he died two months subsequently; and saw pillaging of missionary residences in Kiangnan, as well as the publication of an incendiary placard in Hunan. Among many extravagantly abusive and monstrous accusations, this placard set forth two facts the importance of which is now fully recognised; namely, that Christians denounced the worship of ancestors, requiring a convert to destroy his ancestral tablets as a proof of sincerity; and that whatever the missionaries did, they claimed exemption from the operation of the law courts. Meanwhile the Protestant missions had not enjoyed immunity. No assassinations took place, it is true; but in 1868 a child's hospital established at Yang-chou, in Kiangsu, by the China Inland Mission, was burned by a mob, rumours having been circulated about cruel treatment of the little inmates. Investigation showed that this outrage had been prompted by the literati, who believed that Roman Catholics from Tientsin would be the victims; but it may be doubted whether, as a general rule, the Chinese distinguish clearly between Roman Catholics and Protestants, or between various sects of the latter. All followers of Christianity are apparently placed by them in the same category.

England applied to this Yang-chou affair her usual panacæa, war-ships; and a trouble about land purchased by a missionary at Fouchow in the same year led to the appearance of the inevitable gun-boat. It thus appears that by the year 1869 the people of many provinces had become bitterly incensed against the missionaries.

The following year, 1870, was marked by a massacre on a large scale, the scene being the

Roman Catholic Cathedral and orphanage at Tientsin. With reference to this shocking affair many strenuously worded accounts have been published, several of them abounding in details and deductions of a purely conjectural nature. Doubtless the whole truth will never be known. But the assured facts admit of easy statement.

Early in the month of June sinister rumours began to circulate in Tientsin. They were of the same nature as those responsible for the disturbances in Hupeh and Kiangsu, related above, namely, that children, kidnapped for the Roman Catholic Orphanage, had been killed in order to obtain their eyes and their hearts for medical purposes. It is certainly true that children had been kidnapped, though not for the orphanage. Four men, arrested for the crime on the 6th of June, were executed the same day. It should be noticed that the kidnapping of children is not infrequent in China. Little girls are the usual victims, being sold into domestic servitude or for immoral purposes. Intelligence that kidnappers are prowling in the neighbourhood always suffices to throw a Chinese community into a paroxism of excitement; and if the offenders are caught, summary vengeance is wreaked upon them. On the 18th of June a young man, apprehended in the act of child-stealing, was sent to the city magistracy in Tientsin, where he confessed collusion with the gate-keeper of the Cathedral and

and other Catholics, to whom he had sold children. It need scarcely be observed that the Sisters of Mercy knew nothing about such evil practices. But by giving monetary rewards to persons who procured children for the Orphanage, they adopted a course not unlikely to suggest sinister inferences. Their innocence found no credence among the Chinese. At a meeting of local literati the matter came under vehement discussion, and the City Magistrate issued a strongly phrased proclamation on the subject of kidnapping. That day an English physician, riding through the town, escaped murderous assault only by the swiftness of his horse. The following morning a high Chinese official of Tientsin — the *Taotai* — waited on the French Consul, M. Fontanier, explained the charges preferred against the Sisters of Mercy, and urged that they should exercise greater care in their choice of agents. M. Fontanier assented. A few hours later other visitors were announced, one being the District Magistrate, the other a delegate from the Imperial Commissioner of Trade. The latter official, Chung Hou, had always shown himself very friendly to foreigners. But the office he filled in Tientsin did not invest him with any executive authority, so that his intervention at this crisis was necessarily limited to warning and advice. By one of those unhappy conjunctures which often divert the course of events into a calamitous channel, it happened that the French Consul, M. Fontanier, was a passionate, self-opionated man, and that the Chinese District Magistrate lacked tact and discretion. Convinced that to allay popular excitement and prevent murderous consequences, a public inquiry into the affairs of the Cathedral and the orphanage could alone be efficacious, the magistrate vehemently urged Fontanier in that sense, warning him, in the same breath, with considerable show of excitement, that the alternative would be a popular *émeute*. He spoke with only too much truth. But the Consul took fire at once. Considering himself insulted by the Magistrate's manner, and construing his words as a menace, he abruptly terminated the interview, declining to discuss the matter with any one except the Commissioner for Trade, but, at the same time, telling the Magistrate that he should be held responsible for the troubles he seemed to predict, "for I am persuaded that he was the sole instigator of them."[1] The following day (20th June) the Commissioner for Trade visited the Consul and explained that, while not approving the local authorities' decision to ask for a public inquiry, he had been unable to convince them of its needlessness, and had thus been compelled to accede. There can be little doubt that had the French Consul retained sufficient *sang-froid* to consider the facts intelligently, disastrous consequences would have been averted; for the situation was then under control by the local authorities, and they had shown their willingness to work in concert with the Consul. But M. Fontanier failed wholly to appreciate the danger. "This little incident," he wrote, "which might have turned out badly without the intervention of Chang Hou, seems to be now nearly over." His field of vision was occupied mainly with the rude demeanour of the District Magistrate towards himself. At 10 o'clock on the morning of the 21st the City Magistrate repaired to the gates of the Cathedral, and demanded that the porter, charged with complicity in kidnapping, should be handed over. The *Taotai* and another official accompanied him. They preferred their demand three times unsuccessfully. Meanwhile, a crowd having collected, and showed signs of becoming turbulent, tidings were despatched to the Consul, who repaired at once to the *yamên* of Chung Hou, together with the Chancelier, M. Simon, and another Frenchman, M. Coutris. Chung promised to send officials to quiet the crowd. Before they could be found, the Consul lost patience, used some violent language, and drawing his sword, struck the table with it. Chung sought to pacify him; but Fontanier crying out that he had already heard the crowd threaten his life, and that surely Chung Hou should die first, fired two shots from his revolver at the Commissioner, narrowly missing him. Some of the officials present now intervened, and pushed Fontanier towards the door. The foremost of them received a heavy sword-slash across the face. The Consul then turned to leave the *yamên*, preceded by the Chancelier brandishing a sword. At the door they met the City Magistrate, to whom the Consul addressed some violent remarks, and received, in turn, advice not to lose his temper. He fired at the Magistrate, missed him, and killed a servant who had come with him. Then the Chancelier discharged two barrels of his pistol into the crowd outside, who attacked and assassinated him, treating the Consul similarly. M. Coutris hid himself in the *yamên* and emerged safely the following day. Whether these things contributed directly to what happened at the Cathedral and Orphanage, it is impossible to say. Before the unfortunate Fontanier proceeded to Chung's *yamên*, stone-throwing had commenced at the Cathedral, and from that to incendiarism and massacre the interval seems to have been short. Ten Sisters of Mercy were killed, some of them being treated in the terribly brutal manner which they were accused of employing against children. Two priests shared the fate of the sisters, as did four other French subjects and three Russians. On its way home from the scene of these horrors, the crowd destroyed eight Protestant Churches.

---

[1] See Appendix, note 18.

To these details must be added a word about the Cathedral at Tientsin. It does not appear

pushed Fontanier towards the door. The foremost of them received a heavy sword-slash across the face. The Consul then turned to leave the *yamên*, preceded by the Chancelier brandishing a sword. At the door they met the City Magistrate, to whom the Consul addressed some violent remarks, and received, in turn, advice not to lose his temper. He fired at the Magistrate, missed him, and killed a servant who had come with him. Then the Chancelier discharged two barrels of his pistol into the crowd outside, who attacked and assassinated him, treating the Consul similarly. M. Coutris hid himself in the *yamên* and emerged safely the following day. Whether these things contributed directly to what happened at the Cathedral and Orphanage, it is impossible to say. Before the unfortunate Fontanier proceeded to Chung's *yamên*, stone-throwing had commenced at the Cathedral, and from that to incendiarism and massacre the interval seems to have been short. Ten Sisters of Mercy were killed, some of them being treated in the terribly brutal manner which they were accused of employing against children. Two priests shared the fate of the sisters, as did four other French subjects and three Russians. On its way home from the scene of these horrors, the crowd destroyed eight Protestant Churches.

A PICTURESQUE FARM.

To these details must be added a word about the Cathedral at Tientsin. It does not appear

that the idea of considering the people's prejudices has ever been entertained by the planners of French religious establishments in China. A few months after the conclusion of the Peking Treaty, negotiations obtained at Canton a site for a Cathedral in that city. The negotiators on the French side, it may be remarked *en passant*, were the officer commanding the French garrison, and the Captain of a French frigate, Canton being in armed occupation by the allies. Naturally a *superbe emplacement* was obtained. It was the site of the celebrated Yeh's *yamên*. There, where the stout-hearted old Chinaman had defied overwhelming force to wring from him an apology for an act he did not acknowledge to have been wrong, a vast Roman Catholic Cathedral rose on the ruins of his former residence. When completed, it stood the most conspicuous object in the city. So, too, in Peking massive towering structures rose, dominating the capital, and perpetually reminding the Chinese of their humiliation. One of these structures — the Pei-tang — actually overlooked the Imperial Palace grounds. It had been erected in spite of the Court's earnest protest; it stood for many years a rude reminder of defeat, as well as a galling obtrusion on the privacy of the Palace; and a special embassy to Europe, together with the grant of another site three times as spacious, and a heavy monetary payment, were needed to procure its removal. The same inconsiderate spirit, responsible for these non-Christian goads to Chinese passion, was displayed in the use of yellow tiles for roofing the Cathedrals in the capital; though the use of yellow is by law restricted to Imperialism. At Tientsin, also, the site selected for the Cathedral, and the style of the edifice, could not fail to make the heart of any patriotic Chinaman burn with indignation. The site was incomparably the best in the city. It lay at the junction of the Grand Canal and the Peiho, where an Imperial residence had once stood; and on that ground, conspicuous from every part of the district, the Roman Catholics raised a magnificently massive, lofty edifice, towering above everything in its vicinity, and dwarfing the residences of the wealthiest citizens, as well as the principal public offices. By irresistible force these results had been attained. Of irresistible force they were the insulting emblems. And by irresistible force alone could they be preserved.

As to the treatment of this incident by the Chinese Government, many accounts have been compiled to prove that the Authorities in Peking were in sympathy with the Tientsin populace. Is there any occasion for such demonstrations? May it not be assumed as natural and even inevitable that the Chinese Government would have gladly extenuated the crime of its own subjects, and that it felt reluctance in admitting the full measure of their guilt? Yet, even of that reluctance it cannot be said that there were any unseemly displays. A week after the event, the Sovereign published a decree, assigning the catastrophe partly to popular suspicion that the kidnappers were in direct relations with the Roman Catholics, partly to the violent conduct of M. Fontanier. His Majesty ordered the Viceroy of the province to undertake an investigation. The same day, Chung Hou received instructions to proceed to France as special envoy for the purpose of conveying an expression of his Government's regrets. Nothing could have been more appropriate than such steps. The Viceroy's investigation, however, moved too slowly for foreign impatience. It appears to have been imagined that the thirst for swift vengeance which naturally devoured the compatriots of the unhappy victim ought to have spurred the Viceroy also, and there was much outcry against him. Nevertheless, within twelve days of his arrival in Tientsin, he was able to report to the Throne that not one of the families of the one hundred and fifty children formerly in the Orphanage made any complaint on the score of kidnapping; that the stories about mutilating the little ones were wholly groundless; that the authors of these stories had no proofs to offer, and that the citizens had been misled by placards posted in their own province and elsewhere. The Viceroy had sufficient wisdom to understand that partial investigation and precipitate punishment would have ill met the requirements of the situation. He further recommended the degradation and punishment of two important local officials for weak and negligent conduct before and during the massacre. All this having been published in an imperial decree, the French Chargé d'Affaires announced to the Chinese Government that, unless the heads of the two incriminated officials and of a general officer fell before the 31st of August, he would haul down his flag. It is curious to observe the identity between Eastern and Western behaviour under similar conditions. This very question had threatened to disturb, and had sometimes actually disturbed, the relations of China with other countries. Several times she had demanded that summary justice should be executed on foreigners at whose hands her people had met death. The demand obtained the reception it deserved. Foreign States answered that the course of their laws must not be disturbed. But never had China asked, as M. de Rochehouart now asked, that officials whose guilt had not been proved should be beheaded within a given time or the alternative of war accepted. The Peking Government answered in courteous terms that the evidence did not warrant the capital punishment of the two officials, and that, as for the General, he had not been associated in any way with the affair, his presence at Tientsin being merely an incident of a journey on sick leave. The matter ended with the degradation and banishment of the two officials, the execution of twenty of the rioters and the transportation of twenty-five. Monetary expiation was made as a matter of course.

Chapter IV

CHINA'S EDUCATION

IN a long despatch from Prince Kung to M. de Rochechouart, recounting the steps taken by the Chinese Government after the Tientsin massacre, the Prince said:—

"Although the affair of Tientsin is terminated, we must still occupy ourselves with the measures to be taken against every unfortunate eventuality."

It was supposed at the moment that these words pointed to nothing more than the step described in their immediate context; namely, the removal of the Viceroy of Chili's residence from Paoting, the capital of the province, to Tientsin, where he could exercise direct supervision over the excited population. But the Prince contemplated much more than that. He had in mind the whole missionary question; and the fruit of his thoughts, as well as of those sharing with him the responsibilities of Government, found expression in a remarkable document. It appeared a few months after the massacre, and took the form of a circular letter to the Foreign Representatives. Wen Hsiang was credited with the actual authorship; but there is a strong probability that some of the ideas emanated from the very able foreigners serving China as customs officials.

What the authors of the document sought to lay before its readers was a *résume* of the abuses connected with Christian propagandism in the absence of all legal restraint or control. They directed their complaints chiefly against Roman Catholics; but they noted that, so far as concerned the mass of the people, no distinction existed between the different sects of Christianity, all being alike comprehended in the animosity excited by the acts of some. The gravamen of the offences cited in the circular was that neither Chinese administrative authority nor Chinese customs were respected by the Roman Catholic missionaries. Being removed by the treaties beyond the reach of Chinese jurisdiction, they availed themselves of this exception in a manner calculated to excite popular prejudice. In the matter of orphanages, for example, which had proved the source of so many evil rumours, the missionaries insisted on complete independence of local official supervision. Seeing that by carrying on their work — work which the Prince and his fellow-authors frankly admitted to be benevolent — behind doors closed to all Chinese observation, they created an opportunity for injurious suspicions, the obvious remedy lay either in frank co-operation with Chinese officialdom, or in transferring the scene of their charitable labours to their own countries. But most eminently productive of evil was missionary interference between their native converts and the operation of the laws of the land.

The cross of Christ had become a rallying point for the dregs of the population, — for men who, so far from obeying any religious impulse, saw in the foreign religion merely an ægis to cover evil deeds, and to secure exemption from discharging public obligations. Thus, on the one hand, these unscrupulous persons were enabled to practise all kinds of chicanery at their neighbours' expense, being secure of missionary support in the law courts, and of gun-boat succour in the last resort; and, on the other, they could with impunity refuse to join in public subscriptions, and even to pay taxes or special imposts, to which all their townsmen were liable, and which consequently became more onerous for the rest. Even in cases of actual criminality, the Roman Catholic missionary interfered between the law and its just victim; and the administrators of the law had learned by bitter experience that to exercise their legitimate functions in the face of foreign protection generally involved evil consequences for themselves. Thus each Christian community became, in the eyes of its Chinese neighbours, a kind of Alsatia, whose inmates had a guaranty of indemnity for all their acts, as well as the privilege of exemption from bearing their due share of general burdens. All these things were greatly accentuated by harsh and inconsiderate enforcement of the treaty provision for the restoration of property confiscated in the long-past days of Christian persecution; since in numerous cases the compulsory restitution of such property inflicted most grievous and unjust loss on its then *bonâ fide* owners. Further, the missionaries rendered the position still more intolerable by, on the one hand, arrogating for themselves official rank with all its insignia and privileges — an assumption of secular authority not only unbecoming, but also tending to accentuate the offensive character of their extraterritorial *imperium in imperio;* and, on the other, encouraging their converts to break away from all Chinese traditions, and openly eschew Chinese time-honoured manners and customs.

Such, in brief summary, was the indictment laid against the Roman Catholic missionaries in 1871 by responsible Chinese statesmen. The remedy they proposed, stated with equal brevity, was that all foreigners visiting or residing in the interior of the country for purposes of Christian propagandism should divest themselves of extraterritorial privileges and become subject to territorial jurisdiction, as they would be in any Western country. In that case their work, falling under the supervision of local officialdom, equally with the work of propagandists of other foreign faiths, as Islamism and Buddhism, would at once cease to be an object of popular suspicion, and the communities of native Christians, being no longer invidiously segregated from their fellow-countrymen, would be able to cherish and practise their faith in unobtrusive tranquillity. "Wherever the Catholic missionaries have appeared," said the Circular, "they have drawn upon themselves the animadversion of the people," and whenever serious collisions arise, local officials think only of a temporary settlement, and foreign officials "place before us unacceptable means which they wish to impose on us by force." But "the Prince and the members of the Yamên" (Foreign office) "are impressed with a desire to ward off from henceforth eventualities so menacing. In fact, they fear in all sincerity lest, after the arrangement of the Tientsin affair, the animosity of the ignorant Christians of the Empire should take a more decided tone of insolent bluster; that the bitterness of the popular resentment should increase; and that so much accumulated bad feeling, causing a sudden explosion, should bring about a catastrophe. It would then be no longer possible for the local authorities, or for the high provincial functionaries, or even for the Tsung-li Yamên, to assert their authority. . . . The greatest rigour does not reach the masses, and where their anger manifests itself, there are persons who refuse to yield their heads to the executioner. Then when the evil becomes irremediable, and when the wish we all have to preserve so great interests will no longer be effectual, the men who direct the international affairs of China and Europe will not be suffered to decline the responsibility which falls on them. In short, in the direction of affairs, the important point in China, as in Europe, is to satisfy opinion. If, failing in this duty, oppression and violence are employed, a general rising will at last take place. There are moments when the supreme authority is disregarded. If the high functionaries of China, and the Europeans on whom now rests the responsibility of the affairs which now form the object of our anxiety, remaining unmoved spectators of a situation which threatens the greatest danger to the Chinese people, as well as strangers, traders, and individuals, make no effort to find a solution which may effectually remedy the evil, it will follow that it will be out of their power to deal in a satisfactory manner with the matters which interest the public." The Circular closed with these words: —

> "The rules which we now propose are the last expression of our firm will to protect the missionaries, and have nothing in their import hostile to them. If they sincerely endeavour to conform themselves to them, good harmony might be maintained; if, on the other hand, the missionaries consider these same rules in the light of attempts upon their independence, or contrary to their rights, they may cease to preach their religion in China. The Chinese Government treats its Christian and its non-Christian subjects on a footing

of perfect equality; that is the evident proof that it is not opposed to the work of the missions. In return, the missionaries, allowing themselves to be duped by the Christians (native), do not adhere faithfully to their duties. From this state of things a hatred of the masses must result, which it will be very difficult to combat, and a general overthrow of order, which will make all protection an impossibility."

The compilers of the Circular, although they noted that "trade had in no degree occasioned differences between China and the Powers," whereas "the same could not be said of the missions which engendered ever-increasing abuses," did not note a significant fact which can scarcely have failed to occur to the reader, namely, that in pre-convention days — days prior to the French protectorate of Roman Catholic missions, and to the residence of religious propagandists in the interior under extraterritorial conditions — there had been no purely popular demonstrations of murderous animosity against Christians. Official persecutions there had been, indeed; but the people, of their own motion, showed no disposition to resort to acts of violence. That is very striking, especially as regards the time when Christian propagandists, being proscribed by the authorities, were obliged to carry on their labours secretly, and could not count on official protection or redress against any outrage on the part of the people. When the first passports for missionaries were signed by

Baron Gross in 1860, twenty-eight of them bore the names of propagandists then living secretly yet safely in the provinces. That marked difference beween the temper of the populace towards Christian propagandism in pre-convention and in post-convention days, seems to show clearly that the animosity of which Christian preachers and their flocks are now so often the victims, is provoked, not by Christianity itself, but by changed methods of propagandism, namely the methods of extraterritoriality.

Another point also failed to find a place in the Circular; no mention appeared there of the fact that the privileges of residence and land purchase in the interior were fraudulently enjoyed by the missionaries. The Chinese never raised that issue. They might have repudiated the interpolated clauses in the treaty and in the passport, so soon as they discovered them; for the treaty itself contained an article providing that the French text should be regarded as the original. But they seem to have considered that having signed the Chinese text open-eyed, they were morally bound by all its stipulations. Whether many Western Governments would have shown themselves equally scrupulous under the circumstances, may be questioned.

Another notable point is, that although the conduct of Protestant missionaries in China places them generally beyond the reach of the charges preferred in the *Tsung-li Yamên's* Circular of 1871 — except, perhaps, in the matter of indifference to Chinese customs and traditions — they have not made any serious attempt to differentiate themselves by repudiating the fraudulent interpolation in the French Treaty. They have indeed showed that in taking practical advantage of that interpolation under the most-favoured-nation clause their conscience is sorely exercised; but nevertheless they have taken advantage of it. Certainly to some departure from the code of strict integrity it is permissible to apply the extenuation that the end justifies the means.

Of course the question of permanent interest is, what confidence may be reposed in the *Tsung-li Yamên's* accusation? It is here that the silence of the Roman Catholic missionaries presents a barrier to clear judgment. These heroic men never open their mouths in self-defence. They evidently think that whatever suffering the charges of detractors inflict on them must be borne patiently and in silence as part of the duty they owe to their cause. In this respect their consistency is splendid. They look for a higher judgment than that of man. No testimony offers, therefore, except that of the Chinese, or of men who, professing a different creed, may not be held entirely free from bias. The unanimity of such testimony, however, removes all possibility of doubting that the state of affairs in 1871 was pretty much what the *Tsung-li Yamên* represented it to be, and that it remains so to this day. On the other hand, the Roman Catholic missionaries must be assumed to have deliberately weighed the advantages of the system they pursue. They are eminently compent men, and no considerations of inconvenience or suffering for themselves would possess the smallest weight as against the better promotion of their cause. That they would gladly submit their own persons to Chinese jurisdiction if they thought that Christian propagandism would be advantaged by such a step, admits of no question. But the welfare of their converts belongs to a different range of reasoning. The administration of justice in China presents shocking abuses. Torture is employed, in court to extort confession, in jail to extort money; witnesses are thrust into prison as well as accused persons; the sufferings incidental to incarceration cause more deaths than the executioner's sword; the connivance of minor officials can always be secured to prosecute an unjust claim; and the consequences of becoming involved in a suit where corruption has been practised successfully by an opponent or where prejudice exists, are often worse than financial ruin. To protect their converts against such abuses, so far as protection is possible, may well have seemed to Roman Catholic propagandists an inevitable obligation, and to withdraw the protection after it had created a spirit of bitter animosity among the non-Christian population can scarcely have appeared a thinkable act. Further, it is not to be supposed that the Governments of Europe and America would consent to entrust the persons and property of the missionaries to Chinese jurisdiction. Whatever the missionaries themselves might choose, their countries will never officially sanction such an arrangement until China effects reforms justifying it. Thus at China's door the fault ultimately lies. The foreign Powers, when they allowed the missionaries to reside beyond the limits of the treaty ports, and, at the same time, insisted on their enjoyment of extraterritorial privileges, committed a wrong; for if they claimed for their subjects or citizens exemption from Chinese jurisdiction, the plain duty devolved on them of providing an efficient substitute for that jurisdiction. They did not provide any substitute; for a consular tribunal officiating at a distance of scores, or even hundreds, of miles from the place of an event cannot be called an efficient substitute. In practice the consul's only appearance upon the scene of missionary labour is when he comes with a gun-boat in the sequel of some anti-Christian outrage. But that failure on the part of Western States is far outweighed by China's failure to correct the administration of her law. The law itself is not flagrantly defective. It is the judiciary that deserves reprobation. And China leaves it wholly unmended. The task of amendment would be immense. It would involve a radical reform of the whole administrative system, for judicial abuses represent

be supposed that the Governments of Europe and America would consent to entrust the persons and property of the missionaries to Chinese jurisdiction. Whatever the missionaries themselves might choose, their countries will never officially sanction such an arrangement until China effects reforms justifying it. Thus at China's door the fault ultimately lies. The foreign Powers, when they allowed the missionaries to reside beyond the limits of the treaty ports, and, at the same time, insisted on their enjoyment of extraterritorial privileges, committed a wrong; for if they claimed for their subjects or citizens exemption from Chinese jurisdiction, the plain duty devolved on them of providing an efficient substitute for that jurisdiction. They did not provide any substitute; for a consular tribunal officiating at a distance of scores, or even hundreds, of miles from the place of an event cannot be called an efficient substitute. In practice the consul's only appearance upon the scene of missionary labour is when he comes with a gun-boat in the sequel of some anti-Christian outrage. But that failure on the part of Western States is far outweighed by China's failure to correct the administration of her law. The law itself is not flagrantly defective. It is the judiciary that deserves reprobation. And China leaves it wholly unamended. The task of amendment would be immense. It would involve a radical reform of the whole administrative system, for judicial abuses represent

A CHINESE HAND LOOM.

only a part of the monster evil. But China, though from the first obviously conscious of the stupendous danger of this missionary problem, has uniformly shrunk from the real solution — putting her own house in order. She has also shown strange inability to perceive, or to act upon the perception, that by promptly assuming the initiative in dealing with Christian complications she might draw the sting of the French protectorate. To arise to an occasion is not her habit. If it were, her international condition could not now be as pitiable as it is.

The *Tsung-li Yamên's* remarkable Circular produced scarcely a ripple on the surface of the political sea. To many persons, especially to editors of Far-Eastern journals, it presented itself in the light by which Mr. Consul Parkes had viewed the attempt of the Shektsing braves to repel a foreign invader, "a gratuitous piece of impertinence." The remotest suggestion of submission to Chinese jurisdiction has always sufficed to rouse a storm of indignant protest among the open-port communities; and as the trail of that heresy overlaid the circular, the whole document was incontinently damned.

Officially its reception, though not equally contemptuous, evinced some scepticism in the genuineness of the compilers' convictions. For England and America, of course, the task of replying was simplified by the fact that the reflections of Prince Kung and his colleagues scarcely touched the subjects of the Queen or the citizens of the United States. Mr. Low and Sir Thomas Wade understood that the charges were not laid at the door of their nationals, and that no elaborate rejoinder was required. The two officials did not, it is true, treat the problem in quite the same way; for whereas Mr. Low confined himself to a brief recital of the general principles of liberty of conscience, and the advantages of recognising it in its fullest sense, Sir Thomas Wade went into the whole question minutely and courteously, admitted the advisability of some of the Circular's recommendations, pointed out the impossibility of entrusting the lives and properties of British subjects to Chinese jurisdiction so long as Chinese laws remained what they were, and wound up by declaring that the source of all the trouble must be sought in the ignorance of the Chinese people, for which the Chinese Government alone was responsible, and which could not, in the eyes of foreign governments, constitute an excuse for outrages resulting from it. The main interest centred, of course, on the French reply, since to France's address the Circular was really directed. M. de Rochechouart undertook the duty of answering. A remarkable document issued from his pen; remarkable as displaying much of the supercilious distrust that informed foreign diplomacy towards China in those days. He dismissed the suggestion as to official supervision of orphanages by saying that the missionaries themselves would adopt whatever precaution might be necessary. He called the complaint as to missionary interference in civil affairs "a useless recrimination," since France also condemned such interference. He retorted to the charge of missionary interposition between converts and the operation of the laws, that such procedure was quite natural, and that if it degenerated into an abuse no diplomatic statement was needed to prove its culpability. He brushed aside the alleged grievances in connexion with restoration of confiscated Church property, by saying that the sixth Article of the Treaty had been drafted expressly to secure the right of restitution, though he frankly admitted that it should be exercised equitably; and he concluded by saying: "This examination of the eight Articles" (of the Circular) "leads the French Government to the conclusion that none of them is acceptable, and that none of them seems to have been even seriously proposed. The Circular is a skirmish intended to observe the ground and to sound it. The French Government believes that the Christians cause anxiety to the Chinese Government. It believes still more firmly that the Chinese Government makes use of them as a pretext. The systematic foes of foreigners make a great noise about the dangers caused by the Occidental sect. Clever people thus create an agitation by which they profit. In reality, however, the danger exists. It has grown for some years. It may become irremediable in default of an *entente* between the two Governments."

Frenchmen can be the most exquisitely polite people in the world, and they know how to be also brutally frank. M. de Rochechouart's comment that the Chinese Government's Circular was merely an *escarmouche*, and that they used the Christian question as a "pretext" only, can scarcely be classed among the amenities of diplomatic language. He admitted that the danger existed, and that an *entente* was necessary in order to prevent it from assuming irremediable dimensions; but by way of arriving at an *entente* he rejected China's proposals with something like scorn, and plainly accused her of using the question as a pretext.

Thereafter anti-missionary feeling continued to be displayed with increasing virulence. Taking the whole conventional period from 1842 to 1900, and excluding the wide-spread troubles in the latter year, thirty-four serious outrages stand recorded, in all of which foreign life was sacrificed and foreign property destroyed. When these incidents are analysed, it is found that they fall plainly into one of two categories: outrages having their origin in anti-Christian prejudice, and outrages proximately due to causes independent of Christianity. As for the details, they are set forth in voluminous literature inspired by the subject; but they may be dismissed here with the brief statement that the usual results of mob fury were attained in nearly every case, arson, murder, and pillage. Passion collectively displayed in China follows precisely the same route as it does in Europe.

In examining the records from 1860 to 1900, when a part of northern China broke into sudden flame, the conclusion cannot be avoided that among foreign nations France has the chief responsibility. Concerning her protectorate of Christians and its mischievous effects, enough has been said. But the service she exacted from religion as a pretext for drawing the sword cannot be passed without notice. She took up arms against the Taipings because they had killed one of her priests, and destroyed images in Roman Catholic churches. She took up arms against China in conjunction with England because a priest had been done to death by Chinese officials in Kwangsi. She took up arms against Cochin China in 1860, directing her troops thither after their withdrawal from Peking, in order to check persecutions of Christians, and to bring them under French protection. And the aggressive extension of her territorial acquisitions in Cochin China led her to Tonquin in 1884, involving her in a war with China. It is not imaginable that the import of all these things is hidden from Chinese statesmen. Unless they are blind to the plain significance of events — and most assuredly they are not blind — they must perceive that in those days no motive was so potent to drive France into the lists as a religious motive. Such an allegation cannot now be made, it is true. During recent years France's foreign policy has been, with few exceptions, eminently self-contained, moderate, and liberal, and probably in no European Power do the friends of peace place greater confidence to-day. But in the times here under special consideration she had a different record.

Her name is also intimately associated with the recrudescence of anti-foreign outrages after the Tientsin massacre in 1871. For, owing to the harsh claims advanced by her in Shanghai in 1874, a serious riot occurred. She possessed there a settlement, a so-called "concession," of large extent, considerable portions of it having been obtained by very questionable methods, as already seen. Residing in that wide area were some three hundred persons, against sixteen hundred in the adjacent Anglo-American settlement. The French attempted, in 1874, to carry out a project of road construction, involving the removal of a Chinese pagoda where were placed numerous coffins containing corpses awaiting ultimate removal to their native place, Ningpo. Nothing could have been more sacrilegious in Chinese eyes, and the result was a riot which led to the temporary abandonment of the project. The year 1898, however, saw its renewal with greater insistence than ever; and on this occasion the French again employed force, killing some eighteen Chinese, and wounding many others.

Natives of the adjoining province of Fuhkien owned the pagoda in question, and to the anti-foreign feeling thus engendered in that province, is apparently attributable a terrible massacre of Christians which took place there two years later. At the door of French aggression in Annam must also be indirectly laid the burning of thirteen mercantile establishments in Canton in 1883, and the wrecking of eighteen Protestant Churches in the same city and its environs in 1884.

Such were the chief outrages, not directly traceable to anti-Christian feeling, during the last forty years of the Nineteenth century. Distinct from them, and also from the catalogue of anti-Christian demonstrations, must be placed the murder of Mr. Margary, a British Consular official, in 1875, when travelling with an exploring expedition from Burmah towards Yunnan. This was an English enterprise. Regularly trodden trade routes, as the reader already knows, had connected India with south-western China from early centuries *viâ* Burmah. But when Mohammedan rebels — Panthays they were called by the Occident — over-ran Yunnan during the interval from 1855 to 1874, the volume of commerce flowing over these routes naturally diminished; and whatever disturbs commerce produces an immediate effect upon England's nerves. Besides, not only had the magnificence of the unknown long attached to Yunnan, but also, from the commencement of France's approaches towards southern China *viâ* Annam and Tonquin, a sort of political race began to be run between Gauls and Britons, the prize being, in England's eyes, large tradal possibilities with Yunnan and the south-western section of Szchuan, which two provinces are separated by the head waters of the Yangtse; and in French eyes, access to fabulous stores of mineral wealth. The veil of mystery was of course lifted years ago from the "cloudy south," as the name Yunnan signifies. Intrepid travellers, especially French, have told the world how in the north of the province a tangle of mountains is brooded over by heavy mists and fogs, so that sparse population and almost total absence of trade or industry are characteristic of the region; whereas from the centre to the south and south-west, the mountain ranges, which vary in height from 12,000 to 17,000 feet in the north to 7,000 or 8,000 in the south, gradually subside, and are interrupted by undulating tracts and valley-plains, where many towns and villages, lying close together, harbour tolerably prosperous inhabitants. They have also attested that mines of gold, silver, copper, lead, iron, salt, coal, zinc, mercury, and tin are worked at several places; but as to the richness of the deposits there is no trustworthy evidence. The Chinese are jealous of all scrutiny into such matters, nor can their conservation be greatly blamed; for owing to the presence of many semi-independent aboriginal tribes, Yunnan has always been an element of unstable equilibrium in the body politic, ever since it was added to the realm of the Middle Kingdom in the 9th century. It is a curiously inaccessible section of the world. To reach it from Shanghai entails a journey of fifty-seven days up the Yangtse supplemented by road-travel of thirty days; and to reach it from Canton means forty days up the West River and from twenty-five to thirty by road. But France, relying on information collected by some singularly plucky subjects of hers in 1868, came to believe that a much quicker road of access could be found from the Gulf of Tonquin; and she subsequently projected a railway starting from Haiphong, winding up the valley of the Sonkoi, and crossing the Chinese frontier at Lao-kai; while England, on her side, has an equally uncompleted scheme for reaching the province from Burmah *viâ* Tali-fu, which city lies on the southern shore of a lake called Urh-hai — one hundred miles long and twenty wide, — communicating with the Yangtse in the north-western corner of the province. The shadow of these great designs was beginning to project itself into the mental field of each nation in 1868; and while Doudart and Legrée were forcing their arduous way through Indo-China to the Yangtse, England, in the same year, sent a strong party of one hundred men under Major Sladen to penetrate from Bhamo to Tali-fu.

Romantic folks have blamed England for undertaking this enterprise, because its success would have placed her in intimate relations at Tali-fu with the Panthay leaders, then in open rebellion against her friend China. But commerce is the breath of England's nostrils. She must have it or perish. And if her presence at Tali-fu had prevented the awful massacre perpetrated there by the Chinese seven years later, if it had saved from almost complete extermination the Mohammedan population, would the best interests of humanity have been impaired? However, Sladen did not reach Tali-fu; his enterprise failed, and England suffered things to remain in *statu quo* for six years. In 1874 she approached the task again, sending an expedition from Bhamo under Colonel Brown. Margary went to meet the party from the China side, found them at Bhamo, turned back with them towards Yunnan, and had barely crossed the Chinese frontier in advance of his comrades when he was pulled from his horse and assassinated by disaffected Chinese train-bands, who subsequently turned their hands against the Chinese authorities. What makes this memorable is that in all the period of conventional intercourse Mr. Margary was the only foreign official who met his death at Chinese hands until 1900; and what further makes it memorable is that Great Britain adopted the strange device of sending a commission to investigate the facts *in loco*. Of course the commission was to be associated with Chinese officials, but even then the results of its inquiries and the measure of information it gathered must obviously depend solely upon the volition of the Chinese; so that failure, or at any rate only very partial success, was the inevitable result. Yet the same plan was pursued more than once on subsequent occasions. England's sword very nearly emerged from its sheath in connection with the Margary incident. Sir Thomas Wade, then in charge of British interests, threatened more than once to haul down his flag or to quit Peking; and indeed he did actually go at last to Shanghai, partly by way of demonstration, partly for the sake of his health. But the days of China's diplomatic infancy had now passed — the days when, as Mr. Michie humorously describes, Prince Kung and Wen Hsing used to take lessons in the rudiments of the game from the men with whom they were actually playing it. Not only had she become more or less *rusé* herself, but also she commanded the assistance of foreign sagacity.

The Lay-Osborn fiasco, terribly costly as it was, had one signal compensation: it placed at the head of her Customs service one of the most far-seeing and tactful men that ever made a notable career in the East. Sir Robert Hart, an Irishman by birth, has proved himself a great organiser, a great financier, a great diplomatist, and a great statesman. During thirty-nine years of continuous service, he has saved China again and again from serious complications; and while making her best interests the first aim of his policy, he has nevertheless contrived to remain loyal to the legitimate interests of all the Powers having intercourse with her. But of course he has also acted the part of a political barometer. Whenever a centre of depression seemed to be forming in the region of foreign relations, the *Tsung-li Yamên* tapped the Hart mercury for information as to the probable force and direction of the storm; and often China was thus enabled to remain serene in the presence of indications which, without such a guide, she might have mischievously construed.

If, apart from continuous hesitation to readjust her life to the new forces intruding into it, there is any error apparent in China's attitude towards the cardinal problems of the past twenty years, that error would seem to be failure to appreciate the potentialities of resolution. It received its first signal illustration, according to some critics, in the "state of reprisals" that grew out of the Tonquin complication. But there is difficulty in indorsing that verdict, as will be seen on examining the facts.

Modern history contains no franker instance of aggression than France's procedure in Annam and Tonquin during the early eighties. Her first incursion into the Cochin Chinese peninsula finds some slight excuse in religious motives; but for her subsequent enterprises against Annam and

Tonquin her own historians do not suggest any plausible pretext. It was expedient, as a matter of territorial expansion and as an ultimate means of gaining access to southern China, that Annam and Tonquin should be added to the districts she had already seized; and accordingly she set about seizing them. The operation proved unexpectedly difficult; for Tonquin was found to be defended by a force of semi-bandit soldiers, called "Black Flags," who fought with unexpected resolution and efficiency.

The arms of France sustained more than one reverse; and as it was an intolerable hypothesis that this could have happened with only guerilla foes in the field, the French became convinced, or persuaded themselves, that the "Black Flags" had the secret support of the Chinese Government; an inference which derived probability from the excellent nature of the arms and munitions possessed by them. No evidence was ever obtained in support of the supposition, but the obloquy to which it exposed China at the time affords a good illustration of the singular code by which Western people judge her acts. Annam was one of her tributary States. To protect its integrity as such would have been a point of honour in former times. But even though the two countries had not been bound together by any such tie, it was within the fundamental rights of China as a nation to preserve her frontier from contact with a strong, aggressive Power like France. The Peking Cabinet eventually summoned courage to take that view. It indicated two places any advance beyond which on the part of the French would be counted an act of war. The French took both places, and pushed on as if no such thing as an ultimatum had been disregarded; that is to say, pushed on with what speed they might, for the Black Flags harassed and checked them greatly. Still China avoided an open rupture, and the danger of war seemed to have been obviated by a convention signed at Tientsin. But unexpectedly there occurred a complication of an unparalleled character. The Convention practically gave Tonquin and Annam to France. It did not, however, fix a date for the occupation of certain positions whose tenure would assure France's possession. The French plenipotentiary pressed to have the time determined, and supposed that he had succeeded. He telegraphed to the officers at the front to advance; they did so, found the Chinese forces uninstructed to retire; moved on nevertheless, and being unprepared for serious fighting, were heavily repulsed. Then ensued an interchange of almost hysterical recriminations. The Chinese plenipotentiary solemnly denied that he had fixed a date; the French plenipotentiary declared on honour that he had; the Chinese commander at the front alleged that he had asked for time to communicate with Peking; the French commander denied the receipt of any such request.

There had apparently been a double mistake of interpretation, alike in Tientsin and in Tonquin. It would be superfluous to say that the French were thrown into a state of strong excitement by these events. Their veracity was impugned, their honour had been tarnished. M. Jules Ferry demanded an apology, together with an indemnity of ten million pounds sterling; and in spite of various efforts to contrive an *entente*, the two Powers found themselves virtually at war. It did not prove a very glorious war for France. The only striking operation throughout nearly a twelvemonth of strained relations was the destruction of a Chinese squadron, as well as of the arsenal at Foochow, and the dismantling of the forts in the Min River. There has seldom been a more striking event in any war. Foochow can be rendered absolutely impregnable from the sea. To approach it, a ship must first sail up a river whose entrance is commanded by islands and hills admirably adapted for forts, and must then push through a strait so narrow that a few torpedoes would close it effectually. The forts were there; the torpedoes were there; a rupture with France was imminent. Yet in the middle of July, nine French ships-of-war, and two torpedo-boats quietly passed up the river, and anchored near the town, within point-blank range of the Arsenal, and of a squadron of eleven Chinese-European-style war-vessels as well as a large number of war-junks and fire-ships. Not the slightest attempt was made by the Chinese authorities to protest against this proceeding. It constituted a conjuncture so novel as to be bewildering. For when Admiral Courbet and his ships steamed up the Min, China and France were still at peace; a perilous peace, it is true, but still peace. Therefore Admiral Courbet had the right to bring his ships to Foochow, and any effort on the Chinese side to hamper his movements would have amounted in itself to an act of war. So the ships lay there placidly for some three weeks, negotiations for an amicable adjustment of difficulties being continued all the while in the north. But suddenly, on the 8th of August, a French frigate and two gun-boats approached Kelung on the north-east of Formosa, bombarded the forts, and landed a party which captured the town. There had been no declaration of war. The Tricolor was still flying over the French Legation in Peking. Kelung had a coal-mine; and, in the event of war — then a scarcely avoidable contingency,— the possession of the place would have been very valuable to the French squadron. Whether that prospective advantage constituted an excuse for a sudden attack in time of peace, it is unnecessary to discuss. At all events, the advantage was not reaped; for the Chinese garrison of Kelung flooded the mine and destroyed the machinery before retiring. Apologists for France describe the operation as a means of forcing the Chinese Government to

was made by the Chinese authorities to protest against this proceeding. It constituted a conjuncture so novel as to be bewildering. For when Admiral Courbet and his ships steamed up the Min, China and France were still at peace; a perilous peace, it is true, but still peace. Therefore Admiral Courbet had the right to bring his ships to Foochow, and any effort on the Chinese side to hamper his movements would have amounted in itself to an act of war. So the ships lay there placidly for some three weeks, negotiations for an amicable adjustment of difficulties being continued all the while in the north. But suddenly, on the 8th of August, a French frigate and two gun-boats approached Kelung on the north-east of Formosa, bombarded the forts, and landed a party which captured the town. There had been no declaration of war. The Tricolor was still flying over the French Legation in Peking. Kelung had a coal-mine; and, in the event of war — then a scarcely avoidable contingency,— the possession of the place would have been very valuable to the French squadron. Whether that prospective advantage constituted an excuse for a sudden attack in time of peace, it is unnecessary to discuss. At all events, the advantage was not reaped; for the Chinese garrison of Kelung flooded the mine and destroyed the machinery before retiring. Apologists for France describe the operation as a means of forcing the Chinese Government to

make peace. But to commence hostilities with the object of accelerating amicable negotiation, is a kind of manœuvre not yet endorsed by civilised opinion. With the Kelung incident to warn them, the Chinese naval and military authorities at Foochow must have begun to feel uneasy as to the consequences of having a powerful French squadron anchored within pistol-shot of their positions. They could only wait, however. The 22d of August came, and with it news that the French Representative had hauled down his flag and left Peking. Still there was no declaration of war; and even had there been, it seemed scarcely possible that the French squadron should utilise for belligerent purposes a position gained under peaceful conditions. Thus the Chinese gunners and sailors sat down to eat their dinners on the 23d of August. Before they rose, a storm of shot and shell was flying about their ears. Admiral Courbet began his cannonade at ten minutes past two o'clock, and had virtually done all he sought to do by three. In fifty minutes the Chinese squadron, incomparably inferior to its assailants in everything that makes for destructive efficiency, had been annihilated.

It is not often that such an operation takes place within easy visual range of a crowd of non-belligerent spectators, and of course people unaccustomed to witness the horrors of war saw much that shocked them into accusing the French of needlessly ruthless methods. But military men agreed, at the time, that Admiral Courbet had been only thorough; to have done less than he did would have been to sacrifice an opportunity. There remains the question, was it a legitimately gained opportunity? The Admiral answered that duty required him to get into touch with the Chinese squadron, and to remain in touch with it, in view of imminently impending eventualities; that if the Chinese commanders thought themselves disadvantageously situated at Foochow, they might easily have put to sea or entered some other port long before the 23d of August; that they had more than six weeks to deliberate; and that whatever they had done he would have clung to them until the accomplishment of his destructive purpose, assuming that its accomplishment should become necessary. Evidently a similar situation may occur at any time in the Far East; and whether Admiral Courbet's action should be taken as a precedent or eschewed as an outrage, international jurists have not yet decided.

There never was any declaration of war. During the greater part of a twelvemonth, Chinese forts were bombarded and Chinese coasts blockaded, the French describing the condition as a "state of reprisals," and the Chinese practically acquiescing in the description. It is easy to understand why France invented this novelty in nomenclature. A declaration of war would have inconvenienced her seriously by closing to her every source of supplies eastward of the Mediterranean. But that China, with this palpable advantage before her eyes, shrank from profiting by it, is a fact not immediately comprehensible. The truth is, that her ambition being not to defy France, but to placate her, the quickest route to that goal seemed to offer by continuing a situation which, not having the dignity of actual war, might be terminated with proportionately less formality. It was a wise choice, and events justified it; for the road to peace ultimately disclosed itself in connection with the paltriest of incidents, the capture of a lighthouse tender by the French and through the instrumentality of an altogether informal medium, the London agent of Sir Robert Hart.

When the accounts came to be cast up, it was found that France had gained nothing except the world's applause of her naval ability. She had entered upon the "state of reprisals" because of a military reversal in Tonquin, and she emerged from them under the shadow of a second reverse in the same region. But apart from the evil impression which the whole affair must have produced on the Chinese nation, its finale is to be associated with the open inauguration of a policy fatal to the co-operative *entente* hitherto existing among the Foreign Representatives in Peking. Sir Frederick Bruce, probably the ablest minister ever sent by Great Britain to China, had introduced the co-operative system. He saw in it a diplomatic weapon of such palpably irresistible force that its mere display must obviate anything like vexatious or frivolous opposition on China's part, and great results might thus be achieved by entirely peaceful processes. The method worked admirably for some years. England, all the while, behaved with unswerving loyalty to her colleagues. Certainly any credit due to her on that score must be discounted by the reflection that, as her subjects enjoyed the lion's share of all accruing advantages, magnanimity came easier to her. Still the fact of her integrity stands, and also the fact that she never subserved the resources of diplomacy to the profit of individual traders. It was not so with her rivals in commerce and industry. The Peking Legation of more than one Power became, by and by, a species of touting agency for enterprising Europeans. It is not intended to set up an invidious discrimination. Different nations have different views of the uses of diplomacy, and all are entitled to obey their own canons. But when China discovered that the links holding together this formidable States' union offered themselves to be loosened by a little *sub-rosâ* affability in matters of altogether secondary importance, she began to practise successfully the old-time device of *divide et impera*, little foreseeing that a danger of her own division would ultimately result from the competition thus created. So long as the Representatives in Peking thought it necessary to manœuvre in the dark, China was in no peril. But at the conclusion of the "State of Reprisals," the French Government found itself so much out of pocket that, failing compensation by indemnity, which was plainly out of the question, it sorely desired to be able, when presenting the bill to the nation, to have some palliative of the "prospective-value" order. Therefore, in the peace convention, there was inserted a clause embodying some kind of stipulation about China's patronage of French industries. Diplomacy outdid itself in the construction of this clause, for when the text came to be read by business eyes it suggested two interpretations, both equally hypothetical; the first, that China should employ French industries alone in all her new undertakings, — a promise which China denied vehemently that she had ever intended to make, or could be supposed to have intended; the second, that she might perhaps bestow this favour on her late adversary — a rendering which, as being practically meaningless, the French with equal vehemence declared to be absurd. The end of this new dispute, a sequel not inappropriate to the wrangle preceding the "State of Reprisals," was that China gave certain orders to a French syndicate, and thus was brought upon the scene a factor destined to be much heard of thereafter, the concession-hunting syndicate.

In noting the educational influences that helped to mould Chinese conception of foreign peoples and their policy in coventional days, reference must be made to an incident belonging partly to the domain of Korean history and partly to that of Chinese. Among all the countries in the Far East, Korea preserved her isolation longest. China and Japan had both been finally drawn into the current of international relations more than a decade before Korea partially opened her doors. But she had not been able to exclude the Roman Catholic missionary. Between 1794 and 1866 eighteen of these intrepid men succeeded in entering the peninsular kingdom. Out of that number, fourteen were killed. Ten of them met their death in the month of March, 1866; and when the news was carried to Chefoo by one of the three survivors of the mission, it created much excitement among the fellow-countrymen of the martyrs. M. de Belloney represented France in Peking at the moment. Knowing that some relation of suzerain and vassal existed between China and Korea, he asked the *Tsung-li Yamên* whether it accepted responsibility for the murders and would exact reparation. Of course the *Tsung-li Yamên* answered in the negative. That sort of vassalage — the vassalage of a crown colony — had never entered the conception of the Middle Kingdom in dealing with the tributary States in its neighbourhood. Then M. de Belloney officially announced to the Chinese Government "the definite separation of Korea, the King's forfeiture of his throne, and the exclusive right of the Emperor, our august Sovereign, to dispose of the country and of the vacant throne according to his good pleasure." He added that "the prince to whom will be confided the destinies of Korea, under the protectorate of His Majesty the Emperor of France, shall make profession of the Christian faith." It need scarcely be added that the French Government did not approve this remarkable declaration. But whereas the declaration bore date July 13, the disavowal was not penned until November 10, a delay which could not fail to confirm Peking's conception of the missionary question's force as a factor in French politics. In the meanwhile Admiral Roze, commander of the French Squadron in China, proceeded to Korea with seven ships; but so far from establishing France's title to dispose of the Kingdom, he accomplished nothing beyond the capture of a town, the destruction of some forts and buildings, and the acquisition of £8,000 worth of silver ingots.

Chapter V

THE CLOSING EPISODES

DURING the period covered by these various incidents, anti-Christian outrages continued to be recorded from time to time. There were now over twenty open ports where foreigners assembled for commercial purposes in great or small numbers; but from these places no news came of violence, assault, or bloodshed. Questions, it is true, presented themselves; above all, the question of internal taxes levied on goods imported from abroad or intended for export abroad. This matter has already been explained,[1] and nothing need be added here except that it constituted a source of perpetual discontent to the foreign merchant. For the rest, if the story of the open ports taught anything, it taught that the Chinese people regarded foreign commerce with not unfriendly eyes, and were prepared to co-operate peacefully with the foreign resident for its conduct and development. Why not, indeed, seeing that the benefits accruing to Chinese middle-men and producers far outweighed any vexations or humiliations, real or imaginary, suffered in intercourse with the masterful stranger? Besides, taken all around, the foreign merchant at the treaty ports was a fine type of humanity. Li Hung-Chang, one of China's greatest men in any age, when required, in common with other high provincial dignitaries, to advise the Throne on the broad question of treaty revision, wrote in his memorial of 1867: "I have had several years' experience in conducting business with foreigners, and am thoroughly familiar with their character. I have found that, no matter what they are engaged in, they act honourably, without deceit or falsehood." Little did this remarkable man, single-hearted patriot, and profoundly astute statesman, little did he foresee, when he penned this appreciative eulogy, that the newspaper organs of the men he thus praised would one day pour upon his head the vilest abuse, charging him with selling his country for Russian gold, and with prostituting his talents and his opportunities to purposes of personal aggrandisement. His appreciation of the foreign merchant may be taken as embodying the view of intelligent Chinese in general. And the Chinese themselves, whose commercial probity made them worthy to deal with the foreigner, won from him the respect and friendship that their qualities as shrewd, sensible, large-minded, and upright traders deserved. Each side admired the other, and both worked together in the pleasantest, smoothest manner. At Shanghai, incomparably the greatest of all these emporia, a place where Anglo-Saxon and Teutonic energy, practicality, and love of order, had produced a settlement so admirably administered and so excellently managed as to be a model of everything that represents success in municipal government — at Shanghai it was curious and interesting to see how the prosperous Chinaman gradually assimilated foreign views of life, its pastimes and its refinements, until the places of recreation on which Mr. Consul Alcock, in the early fifties, had looked with disapproving eyes as products of riotous energy, became more frequented by the native than by the alien. Moreover, whether trade flourished or languished, whether vexed questions made the atmosphere sombre or newly won privileges revived flagging hope, the foreign merchant was always ready to give generously and freely for the relief of suffering Chinese. In 1878 insufficient rainfall produced a terrible famine in the northern provinces of Shansi and Shensi, and, to a less extent, in Honan and Shantung; a famine ultimately responsible for the deaths of about nine millions of persons. Foreign residents in China contributed something like half a million *taels* — £160,000 —for relief purposes, and sent to the distressed regions as distributors of aid fifty-nine heroically charitable men, four of whom toiled so unremittingly that they died of exposure and overwork. In Taiyuen, the capital of Shansi, the Governor gave a public funeral to one of these noble Christians—Taiyuen, where, twenty-two years later, another Governor, Yü Hsien, directed the massacre of fifty foreigners, men, women, and children, whose lives had been devoted to the same benevolent effort on China's behalf that the province witnessed in 1878. This was no isolated example of foreign charity. Whenever occasion arose, the open-port resident came forward with unfailing generosity. It has been calculated that during a thousand years, ended in 1643, the Yangtse Valley suffered from more than eight hundred famines. That proportion was fully maintained in the last half of the nineteenth century; and the valley of the Yellow River, "China's Sorrow," added more than its quota of disasters. Whenever news of such events reached Shanghai or any of the other open ports, — but above all Shanghai, — the foreign community showed a spirit of charity which wholly ignored every memory of "questions" or outrages. These things could not fail to influence the Chinese, and there is reason to know that they did influence them. But even though the life of the open-port merchant were not rendered luminous by bright deeds of mercy, nothing in his intercourse with the Chinese can be said to have produced dangerous friction, nor did he become the victim of anti-foreign virulence except on fitful and altogether exceptional occasions, such as the riots of 1874 and 1899 in

---

[1] See Appendix, note 19.

Shanghai, both caused by the affair of the French "concession," and the riots of 1883 and 1884 in Canton, for which French aggressions in Annam were indirectly responsible.

On almost every occasion of charitable effort missionaries — Protestant and Roman Catholic alike — were the prime movers and ultimate distributors. Notably was that the case in the great famine of 1878. It may be supposed that, coming with such a passport, they would have been hospitably and joyfully received. On the contrary, suspicion, distrust, and even open hostility, dogged their footsteps at the outset. For a moment it seemed that nothing would be possible except to scatter broadcast the gifts of which they were the bearers, and to fly before this antipathy. They persevered, however, and had the satisfaction of completely overcoming all prejudices in the end. But the fact that prejudices had existed retained its significance. In mediæval times, foreigners might have visited these provinces, and did visit them, without provoking any display of animosity. Now, in the last quarter of the 19th century, they found ill will everywhere. There was not, on this occasion, any question of religious propagandism. What provoked the sentiment of the provincial Chinese, men living far inland beyond the reach of exasperating experiences, was the sight of the foreigner, *qua* foreigner. Only at the open ports, where commerce served as a lubricator, did contact fail to produce friction. The year 1891 witnessed an extraordinary outbreak of anti-missionary violence in the Yangtse Valley and also in Manchuria. Within the short space of three months no less than nine riots occurred in the former district. In four cases serious results were averted, but in five the rioters succeeded in wrecking or burning mission buildings. Only two foreigners met their death, one of them a customs officer. The fury of the mobs seemed to be directed against tangible evidences of Christian propagandism rather than against propagandists themselves. In Manchuria the record was more sanguinary; hundreds of native Christians — Roman Catholics — fell victims to what must be called an insurrection rather than a riot, and before order could be restored many thousands of the insurgents had to be shot down.

Specially notable in connection with these riots were the facts that their cause could easily be traced and that effect followed cause with singular rapidity. During the closing months of 1890 and the early part of 1891, a stream of anti-Christian literature spread its poisonous waters over many of the central provinces. One of the chief affluents had its source in Hunan, where a high Chinese official, not actually in office at the time, devoted a skilled pen to composing brochures of the grossest and most injurious character. These were scattered broadcast, their author, Chou Han, sparing no expense to manufacture a hostile public opinion.[1] He did not work alone. Fellow-thinkers in other places employed their literary talents and their purses in the same cause, so that hundreds of thousands of Chinese learned to regard the Christian religion as a vehicle for cloaking or promoting the worst vices to which human nature is prone. Artistic aid was enlisted to illustrate this shocking literature with pictures which represented Christian propagandists in a bestial and abominable light. That the seeds of the subsequent outrages were thus sown cannot be reasonably doubted. But whence came the seeds that bore such fruit in the breasts of Chou Han and his coadjutors? They were educated men, holding high positions in society. Was it a spirit of mere wanton mischief that prompted them to employ all their energies in the interests of murder and arson? Readers of what has been already written can have no difficulty in answering these questions. From Peking to Canton, China was and is anti-foreign. Twenty-three years previously, Prince Kung had said to the British Minster in Peking: "Take away your opium and your missionaries, and you will be welcome." Doubtless nine hundred and ninety-nine out of every thousand patriotic Chinese passionately endorse the protasis of Kung's declaration, and as passionately reject the apodosis.

---

[1] See Appendix, note 20.

For, it may be here remarked in parenthesis, opium had now come to stay. No clause in any treaty legalised it: such a source of mischief had to be introduced by a back-door. It found a place, therefore, in the tariff appended to the Tientsin Treaty of 1858, being thus indirectly sanctioned as an article of import on payment of a duty smaller than that which England then levied upon Chinese silk or tea. This last iniquity remained without remedy until 1885, when the British Government at length agreed that the drug should be taxed to the extent of eighty taels a *picul* (about twenty pence per pound). In 1896 Chang Chih-tung, Viceroy of Hupah and Hunam, a man respected throughout the length and breadth of China and by foreigners alike, composed and published a volume[1] which he called "China's Only Hope." In it he said this about opium: —

> "Assuredly it is not foreign intercourse that is ruining China, but this dreadful poison. Oh, the grief and desolation it has wrought to our people! A hundred years ago the curse came upon us more blasting and deadly in its effects than the Great Flood or the Scourge of the Fierce Beasts; for the waters assuaged after nine years, and the ravages of the man-eaters were confined to one place. Opium has spread with frightful rapidity and heart-rending results through the provinces. Millions upon millions have been struck down by the plague To-day it is running like wild-fire. In its swift, deadly course it is spreading devastation every-

---

[1] See Appendix, note 21.

where, wrecking the minds and eating away the strength and wealth of its victims. The ruin of the mind is the most woful of its many deleterious effects. The poison enfeebles the will, saps the strength of the body, renders the consumer incapable of performing his regular duties and unfit to travel from one place to another. It consumes his substance and reduces the miserable wretch to poverty, barrenness, and senility. Unless something is soon done to arrest this awful scourge in its devastating march, the Chinese people will be transformed into satyrs and devils!"

Sir Robert Hart attributes to Chinese statesmen the policy of encouraging the manufacture of native opium until it drives out the foreign, when, having the matter in their own hands, they will stop the pernicious habit in their own way. No other resource seems possible; but the road to success is not easy to discern.

Up to the year 1895 no large loss of missionary life resulted from any riot with the exception of the terrible massacre at Tientsin in 1870. But during the night of August 1, 1895, a band of eighty men, belonging to the Vegetarian Society, swept down upon a mountain resort at Whasang, near Kusheng City, and slaughtered seven young girls, a missionary and his wife, badly wounding seven others, of whom three were little more than babies, and two were girls of eleven and twelve respectively. In the same year, only a few weeks previously, the province of Szchuan had again been the scene of disturbances involving the destruction of many missions,

where, wrecking the minds and eating away the strength and wealth of its victims. The ruin of the mind is the most woful of its many deleterious effects. The poison enfeebles the will, saps the strength of the body, renders the consumer incapable of performing his regular duties and unfit to travel from one place to another. It consumes his substance and reduces the miserable wretch to poverty, barrenness, and senility. Unless something is soon done to arrest this awful scourge in its devastating march, the Chinese people will be transformed into satyrs and devils!"

Sir Robert Hart attributes to Chinese statesmen the policy of encouraging the manufacture of native opium until it drives out the foreign, when, having the matter in their own hands, they will stop the pernicious habit in their own way. No other resource seems possible; but the road to success is not easy to discern.

A CHINESE TEA-HOUSE.

Up to the year 1895 no large loss of missionary life resulted from any riot with the exception of the terrible massacre at Tientsin in 1870. But during the night of August 1, 1895, a band of eighty men, belonging to the Vegetarian Society, swept down upon a mountain resort at Whasang, near Kusheng City, and slaughtered seven young girls, a missionary and his wife, badly wounding seven others, of whom three were little more than babies, and two were girls of eleven and twelve respectively. In the same year, only a few weeks previously, the province of Szchuan had again been the scene of disturbances involving the destruction of many missions,

and causing terrible suffering — resulting sometimes in death — to a number of missionaries, men and women, who, flying from their fierce assailants, had to make journeys of almost indescribable hardship in the heat of a Chinese midsummer.[1] Shocking as these events were, two features relieved the darkness. One was the noble courage and patience of the missionaries themselves; the other, the fidelity and devotion of their servants and of the native Christians.

Of course reparation was exacted, and there were publications of imperial and viceregal decrees, eulogising the labours and objects of Christian propagandists, and calling on the people to tolerate and respect them. But when did adequate punishment overtake a mob, and of what use is it to restrain the convulsions of a patient leaving untreated the malady that causes them?

Between 1890 and 1900 many causes operated to augment Chinese aversion to foreigners and their innovations. It has been stated above that at the open ports, where commerce with its mutually-enjoyed profits and its community of interests acted as a lubricator, the machine of many nationalities moved smoothly enough. But this must not be read in the sense that foreign trade and industry generated no factors of disturbance. Apart from the ever-festering sore of the opium question, there were other troubles which must be included in any review of the situation. They have been lucidly analysed by Sir Robert Hart in his series of remarkable essays, "These from the Land of Sinim," and by that most attractive, keen-sighted, and equitable writer, the Rev. A. H. Smith, in "China in Convulsion." Mr. Smith says: —

---

[1] See Appendix, note 22.

> "The Chinese have exerted their phenomenal talents for business without being in the least aware that the processes are under the control of inexorable natural laws, and without a dawning comprehension of the truths of political economy. The views entertained in Western lands in regard to what constitutes 'progress' are radically different from anything to be found in China, where nobody knows or cares anything about 'progress.' Even in the Occident the triumphal march of invention and economy is strewn with the wrecks of fortunes and of lives which have been blighted or extinguished by 'improvements,' by new 'labour-saving inventions,' and the like. But in Western countries it is possible for one whose business has been ruined by an improvement, or an alteration in fashion, to take up something else which in time will do just as well; or, if he fails in this, 'the heaven is high and the earth is wide,' and there is still abundant opportunity for successful emigration in many different directions.
>
> "In China all is far otherwise. The artificer is able to do one thing only, and that, it may be, in a hereditary craft, for any other than which he is as little fitted as a fish for air-breathing. Matches from foreign lands, kerosene oil with the lamps of diversified varieties, have displaced Chinese industries on a great scale, with social consequences which it is impossible to follow in detail. One reads in the reports to the directors of

steamship companies of the improved trade with China in cotton goods, and the bright outlook all along the coast from Canton to Tientsin and Newchwang in this line of commerce; but no one reads of the effects of this trade of expansion upon innumerable millions of Chinese on the great cotton-growing plains of China. These have hitherto been just able to make a scanty living by weaving cloth fifteen inches wide, one bolt of which requires two days of hard work, realising at the market only enough to enable the family to purchase the barest necessities of life, and to provide more cotton for the unintermittent weaving, which sometimes goes on by relays all day and most of the night. But now, through the 'bright outlook' for foreign cotton goods, there is no market for the native product, as there has always been hitherto. The factors for the wholesale dealers no longer make their appearance as they have always done from time immemorial, and there is no profit in the laborious work of weaving, and no productive industry which can take its place. In some villages every family has one or more looms, and much of the work is done in underground cellars where the click of the shuttle is heard month in and month out from the middle of the first moon till the closing days of the twelfth. But now the looms are idle and the weaving cellars are falling into ruins.

"Multitudes who own no loom are able to spin cotton thread and thus earn bare support — a most important auxiliary protection against the wolf always near to the Chinese door. But lately the phenomenal activity of the mills in Bombay, in Japan, and even Shanghai itself, has inundated the cotton districts of China with yarns so much more even, stronger, and withal cheaper than the home-made kind, that the spinning-wheels no longer revolve, and the tiny rill of income for the young, the old, the feeble, and the helpless, is permanently dried up. Many of the innumerable sufferers from this steady advance of 'civilisation' into the interior of China have no more appreciation of the causes of their calamity than have the Japanese peasants who find themselves engulfed by a tidal wave caused by an earthquake or by the sudden or gradual subsidence of the coast. Yet there are many others who know perfectly well that before foreign trade came in to disturb the ancient order of things, there was in ordinary years enough to eat and to wear, whereas now there is scarcity in every direction, with a prospect of worse to come. With an experience like this, in many different lines of activity, the Chinese are not to be blamed for feeling a profound dissatisfaction with the new order of things."

These remarks must be supplemented by observing that beyond the comparatively small number of persons directly connected with foreign trade, probably very few Chinese recognise its advantages, still fewer its necessity, and very great numbers regard it as an unmixed evil. The eighteen provinces of China, "each of them as large and many of them more populous than most European States," offer a field for commerce so extensive that the term domestic can scarcely be applied to it with propriety. Tradal energy found ample room within these eighteen kingdoms for its most ambitious projects, and would have been thoroughly content to exploit a market frequented by four hundred millions of people, without the smallest assistance from outsiders. In his essay on "China and Her Foreign Trade," Sir Robert Hart says:—

"The advent of the foreigner has been a death-blow to old and long recognised vested interests, and notably to China's own shipping trade and junk-owners. The coasting trade, which fleets of junks carried on fifty years ago, has almost been destroyed between Newchwang and the southern ports, and much of the southern trade has likewise passed from native to foreign bottoms; while on the Yangtse, an inland water, an ever-increasing home trade is attracting more and more foreign-flag steamers. Such change is not all bad: freights are lighter, goods are safer, passages are quicker, insurance is possible, and regularity has developed trade and increased passenger traffic. But the untravelled Chinese, who at first smarted under loss of business, has now travelled, and he asks 'Does any other country in the world allow foreign flags to participate in its coasting trade? Does any other throw open its inland waters to outsiders, and those, too, outsiders who are not only enjoying special commercial advantages, but are also by treaty extraterritorialised?' So that such change is not all good. The native capitalist of former days is a beggar now, and the crowds of junkmen he employed are as angry with their Government for permitting the foreigner to step in and seize such local trade, as with the foreigner himself for doing so."

Railway and mining concessions and the manner of procuring them have been additional causes of deeply rankling discontent. Ten years ago the very possibility of obtaining permission to build a line anywhere within the limits of the Chinese empire, or even of inducing the Chinese Government to undertake such a project outside the metropolitan province of Chili, where the persistent and enlightened courage of the great Viceroy, Li Hung-Chang, promised to overcome all difficulties and opposition, would not have been seriously considered. Now no less than eleven lines have been constructed, commenced, or projected. One of them is to run throughout the whole length of the country from Peking to Canton; another, from Tientsin to Shanghai and thence to Hang-chou and Ningpo; and yet another will travel south-west from Peking to Hsian, in the centre of Shensi. British syndicates alone have secured concessions for over two thousand miles of road, and Russia has actually built a line from her trans-Asian trunk-road through Manchuria to the Laotung Peninsula. As to the attitude of the masses of the people towards these enterprises, they cannot be credited with any fuller measure of economic enlightenment than were the inhabitants of England, for example, who rebelled so vehemently against the introduction of the iron horse; and to this general cause of hostility must be added the influence of geomantic superstition, as well as the plainly exasperating fact that the lines are to be built by foreigners and operated for their profit. Geomancy is very ludicrous no doubt. The men in the "foremost files of time" have done with such foolishness. But the thing that matters is what the Chinese feel, for most assuredly foreign railway projectors will not defer the work of construction until the Chinese people have been taught to despise *fung-shui* and all cognate superstitions. And even though such delay were possible, what warrant is there for attributing to the Chinese magnanimity such as no Occidental nation could possibly be expected to show? It would be counted extravagant to suggest that any European people, unless they had been previously beaten to their knees, would tamely suffer foreigners to build and operate railways everywhere throughout the country.[1] The strange fact is, however, — a fact which soon forces itself on the attention of every careful observer — that whereas the Chinese are roundly abused for intolerance, they are at the same time confidently expected to exhibit a degree of tolerance such as has never been shown by any independent nation since the world began. Among the educated classes, too, or at any rate among the section of them that have any knowledge of foreign affairs, the political significance of railway concessions granted to foreigners must be already apprehended, and is destined to become clearer every day. Each mile of foreign-owned railway in China is a menace to her independence.

Among maps of China hitherto compiled, the *Carte Spéciale*, issued in Paris, occupies a high place. It shows, among other things, the so-called "spheres of influence" of the various Powers in China. Russia's sphere includes the whole of Manchuria, and has for southern boundary the Great Wall as far as Ning-hia, so that the main part of Mongolia is also included. Germany's sphere is the entire province of Shantung. France's sphere embraces the provinces of Kwangtung, Kwansi, and Yunnan. To England is assigned Hongkong and a small fragment of the mainland in its vicinity, and the Yangtse Valley is declared to be international, like the Danube in Europe. It is interesting to observe how the French cartographist excludes from all share of the prospective spoils England, by whose soldiers and sailors China was opened to the nations of the world. But French jealousy of England is not the point. The point is, that this partitioning of her territories among three of the Great Powers of the Occident is openly projected, without the slightest reference to China's volition. Her title to have any voice in her own dissection never received the least recognition from the dissectors. They did not even take the trouble to conceal their designs from her; and during the last five years of the nineteenth century every Chinese statesman and official had the pleasure of learning that the Powers of Europe, whenever it suited their convenience, intended to cut his country into pieces, each taking a portion whose dimensions and location had already been fixed. Yet all the while these very Powers insisted on being treated by their future victim with the utmost confidence and friendship, never hesitating to accuse her of Oriiental distrust and racial prejudice if she displayed the least reluctance to be friendly and liberal. Of course to ear-mark certain portions of an empire's territory and assign them as "sphere of influence" to foreign States, is still a step short of actual partition. But the difference is inappreciable compared with the enormity of the insult. The Chinese are not without a sense of humour. When they were asked by each self-appointed "protector" of a "sphere" to pledge themselves against surrendering any part of the "sphere" to a third Power, they doubtless felt inclined to answer that if their desire to preserve it for their own sake were not efficient, there could not be much likelihood of their preserving for the sake of any one else. At the same time the reality of Europe's progress in international courtesy and sincerity was attested by the invention of this graceful euphemism. France, always artistic, had set the *fin-du-siècle* example by substituting "state of reprisals" for the vulgar term "warfare"; and now her rivals in civilisation soothed their own consciences and displayed their ingenuity by transforming "areas of aggression" into "spheres of influence."

---

[1] See Appendix, note 23.

There had been a time when the doings and sayings of foreign diplomatists or the ambitions of European Powers produced no perceptible effect on the mind of the Chinese nation; a time when information from the outer world never travelled beyond the limits of a treaty port, nor ever became diffused among the mass of the huge nation. But that state of wholesome ignorance gradually disappeared as the vernacular newspaper came into existence, and from 1890 onwards the growth of a new and dangerous public opinion began to be a feature of the era.

Then, in 1894–5, the war with Japan worked incalculable mischief. It totally dissipated the respect hitherto inspired by China's newly organised troops, by her fine modern navy, and by her nominally impregnable fortifications. Contempt took the place of consideration, and it was soon seen that she held her sovereignty on sufferance. Rumour alleged, indeed, that to obtain deliverance from Japanese exactions, she had made even more perilous concessions to another Power. If any one looks at the map of Manchuria, he will see that its southern litoral is deeply indented by two bays, the Gulf of Korea and the Gulf of Pechili, and that between the two a peninsula stretches far southward into the sea. This is the Liaotung Peninsula. From the opposite mainland of China the province of Shantung pushes out an arm northward towards Liaotung; and these two peninsulas, approaching to within two hundred kilometers of each other, guard the entrance to the gulf of Pechili. Any Power holding the Liaotung Peninsula and the litoral of the Bay of Korea would effectually bar Manchuria's access to the China Sea, and therefore to the Pacific, except through the Gulf of

Pechili, which, in turn, is dominated by the Liaotung Peninsula. So long as Manchuria remains completely in China's hands, the Gulf of Pechili suffices for all purposes of maritime communications. But any northern Power seeking to open a path to the sea through Manchuria would find itself confronted by an impossible barrier were Japan in possession of Liaotung and of the whole litoral stretching thence to the northern boundary of Korea. Now, Russia was precisely that northern Power. Her ambition, deeply cherished though not yet openly declared, was to seek in the Liaotung Peninsula her long desired port of access to southern seas, and by connecting it with her trans-Asian Railway, to lay out a chain by which Manchuria could ultimately be attached to the dominions of the Tsar. Indeed, Russia's strategical position in East Asia can never be complete until Korea also falls into her hands; but that, a consummation involving a life-and-death struggle with Japan, need not be discussed here. Now when, in May, 1895, the terms obtained by Japan from China in the sequel of the war were published, it was found that the Liaotung Peninsula and the litoral of the Gulf of Korea were to pass into Japan's hands. Of course that would have been a fatal barrier to Russia's hopes. She therefore persuaded France and Germany to unite with her in protesting; and since a protest coming from such a combination of Powers might not be disregarded, Japan had to step out. No one could clearly analyse Germany's motive in joining such a coalition. It was well understood that she had no manner of interest in the fate of Manchuria. Indeed, four years later, when Manchuria again entered for a moment into the sphere of Europe's practical politics, the Berlin Government frankly declared that it did not care a row of pins what became of the place. Apparently it is necessary to conclude that, in 1895, Germany adapted the programme of purchasing Russia's good will in the Occident by abetting her aggressions in the Orient; a not unnatural policy, since charity begins at home, but assuredly a policy somewhat disagreeable to contemplate from an Oriental point of view. However, having done China the apparently weighty service of rescuing southern Manchuria from the jaws of Japan, Russia was generally expected to claim a reward, as is her wont; and that general expectation crystallized, eighteen months later, into assured statements that a secret convention had been concluded in Peking, making various remarkable concessions on behalf of the Great Northern Power. This "Cassini Convention," as it was called — Count Cassini having been its alleged negotiator — may or may not have been a reality. It contained internal evidences which defied the most willing credulity; and perhaps all that can be said of it is, that it cleverly embodied the wishes which Russia might be supposed to entertain at that particular time. For it allowed her, in the first place, to carry her trans-Asian Railway across the north of Manchuria — which meant that the line would follow the chord of an arc through flat country instead of creeping round the periphery of the arc through mountains; it allowed her, in the second place, to construct a branch from this main road due south through Manchuria to the Liaotung Peninsula; it allowed her, in the third place, to post troops for the protection of these roads — an arrangement virtually amounting to military occupation at Manchuria; and it allowed her, in the fourth place, to hold as military bases, in case of necessity, two ports in the Liaotung Peninsula (Port Arthur and Talien), and one port in the Shantung Peninsula (Kiaochow). Rumours of this Convention and the comments it evoked from foreign journals helped greatly to disturb the mind of the Chinese nation.

The "Cassini Convention" was supposed to have been signed in September, 1896. On the 1st of November, 1897, two German missionaries were assassinated in the west of Shantung. The cause of the outrage remains to this day mysterious. A band of men suddenly attacked the compound where the missionaries resided, and having put them to the sword, departed, leaving the other inmates of the compound uninjured. It is certain that this assassination cannot be attributed in any sense to official connivance; the local magistrate was an intimate friend of one of the murdered priests. Within a very brief time German war-ships appeared off Kiaochow, one of the principal ports in Shantung, and seized the place. Then reparation was demanded from Peking. At first the foreign public supposed — what else could be supposed? — that the object of the seizure was to bring pressure on the Chinese Government, and that, so soon as due atonement had been exacted for the death of the missionaries, Germany would withdraw her war-ships. But, to the profound astonishment of every one, it was found that, after the terms of reparation had been formulated — and remarkably drastic terms they were, namely, 200,000 taels of silver on account of the dead men; rebuilding of a chapel destroyed in the riot; reimbursement of expenses incurred by Germany in occupying Kiaochow; dismissal of the provincial governor and his removal from the public service; and severest penalties for the assassins and the local officials — it was found that, on the top of these demands, Germany required to have Kiaochow for a naval base; to be granted exclusive coal-mining rights in Shantung; and also to receive railway concessions in that province. Never had the most rudimentary principles of international morality been so grossly outraged in the Far East. Never had such discredit been cast upon the cause of Christianity. For here was the doctrine frankly proclaimed, and put into immediate practice, that the murder of Christian propagandists constituted a pretext for territorial aggression and also for mining and railway exactions.

One method of meeting this extraordinary aggression would have been for China to concede all Germany's demands so far as the missionary outrage was concerned, and then to declare war until her territory, seized in time of peace, should be restored to her. Such a course would have embarrassed Germany terribly by closing to her every coaling station east of Gibraltar, and limiting her to the ships and stores already on the China station. But China yielded unresistingly. Perhaps she thought that Germany had inflicted on her own reputation an injury far outweighing the losses suffered by the Middle Kingdom. Certainly Germany's friends — and they abound in the Far East — hung their heads, and felt that a new stain had been fixed on the escutcheon of Western civilisation.

As for the degraded Governor of Shantung, Li Ping-heng, whom Sir Robert Hart described as "a really able, popular, and clean-handed official," he took up his private residence in Chili, just beyond the Shantung frontier, and devoted himself to fostering an anti-foreign movement, destined, three years later, to startle the world under the name of "Boxerdom."

Kiaochow had been one of the ports leased to Russia by the alleged Cassini Convention. But now Germany appropriated it for herself. Germany, then, did not believe in the Cassini Convention; for assuredly, having sacrificed so much to purchase Russia's good-will in 1895, she would not have undone all her work by seizing, in 1897, a place virtually in Russia's possession. There was an alternative hypothesis, however: Germany might have obtained Russia's concurrence. As to that, it is to be observed that the murder of the missionaries took place in a remote part of Shantung on November 1, and that orders to proceed to Kiaochow were issued to the German squadron at the mouth of the Yangtse on the 10th of the same month; also, that when the incident occurred the German Representative was at a place hundreds of miles up the Yangtse. If St. Petersburg, Berlin, and Hankow were brought into diplomatic agreement on such a subject within about a week, a record in interstate negotiations was achieved.

On the 3d of March, 1898,— that is to say, just four months after the Kiaochow incident,—Russia asked the Peking Government for a lease of Port Arthur and Talien, in the Liaotung Peninsula. She allowed China five days for consideration. On the 25th of March China consented. During the interval there had been no little excitement. Russia assumed a distinctly menacing attitude; France let it be plainly seen that she was cooperating with her European ally; England made a half-hearted effort to strengthen China's back; and China, after three weeks of bewildered hesi-

many, then, did not believe in the Cassini Convention; for assuredly, having sacrificed so much to purchase Russia's good-will in 1895, she would not have undone all her work by seizing, in 1897, a place virtually in Russia's possession. There was an alternative hypothesis, however: Germany might have obtained Russia's concurrence. As to that, it is to be observed that the murder of the missionaries took place in a remote part of Shantung on November 1, and that orders to proceed to Kiaochow were issued to the German squadron at the mouth of the Yangtse on the 10th of the same month; also, that when the incident occurred the German Representative was at a place hundreds of miles up the Yangtse. If St. Petersburg, Berlin, and Hankow were brought into diplomatic agreement on such a subject within about a week, a record in interstate negotiations was achieved.

TYPE OF WHEELBARROW USED FOR TRAVELLING.

On the 3d of March, 1898,—that is to say, just four months after the Kiaochow incident,—Russia asked the Peking Government for a lease of Port Arthur and Talien, in the Liaotung Peninsula. She allowed China five days for consideration. On the 25th of March China consented. During the interval there had been no little excitement. Russia assumed a distinctly menacing attitude; France let it be plainly seen that she was cooperating with her European ally; England made a half-hearted effort to strengthen China's back; and China, after three weeks of bewildered hesi-

tancy, yielded to what she thought inevitable. It was hard to reconcile all these doings with the theory that China had leased Port Arthur and Talien to Russia eighteen months previously by the Cassini Convention. The truth seems to be, that the Cassini Convention was a product of mere rumour, and that the policy of attaining a *pie à terre* in northern China had its practical inception in Germany's aggression at Kiaochow. Within a few days of Russia's acquisitions in Liaotung, England procured from China a lease of Wei-hai-wei, on the north coast of the Shantung Peninsula, the only port suitable for a naval station that remained to China in the northern regions of her empire. Thus for unhappy China the total results of the murder of two German missionaries were that three of the great European Powers had seated themselves permanently at the entrance of the Gulf of Pechili, thus commanding the maritime approaches to the metropolis; that the whole of Manchuria, a territory nearly as large as France and Germany combined, might now be counted a Russian possession; and that Germany regarded as the legitimate *hinter-land* of Kiaochow the province of Shantung, with its fifty-three thousand square miles of area, its thirty-seven millions of inhabitants, and its profoundly sacred character as the birthplace of Confucius and Mencius.

These "acquisitions" were speedily followed by a "request" from Great Britain for a lease of two hundred square miles of territory forming the *hinter-land* of the Kowloon promontory, and by France for the port of Kwangchow, north of the island of Hainan. England's leases proved particularly unfortunate; for at Wei-hai-wei and Kowloon alike the people of the district, attempting to resist these apparent acts of aggression, had to be shot down, and, moreover, received the name of "rioters," though "patriots" would have been a more appreciative term. During the year 1897 and 1898, it must have appeared clear to every intelligent unit of the Chinese nation that his country was being deliberately sliced up by foreign Powers, and that without some strong national effort the empire would soon be a thing of the past.

Not less, perhaps even more, than by these various incidents of foreign intercourse was the nation stirred to its depths by events that occurred in Peking between May and September, 1898. About a year previously the young Emperor, Kwang Hsü, had come into possession of administrative power, his aunt, the redoubtable Empress Dowager, retiring to the seclusion of the Summer Palace, as though she wished the people to understand that for whatever might now happen in the capital no responsibility would attach to her. The Emperor's acts soon showed that he had fallen under the influence of rash advisers, and that something like a revolutionary programme of reform had been mapped out in the Palace. Edict followed edict of the most drastic and even reckless character. Nothing could be more laudable than the ideas informing the various changes announced; but, whereas years of slow effort and infinite patience would have had to be employed in carrying out such changes successfully or even safely, the young Sovereign wanted to accomplish the whole in the twinkling of an eye. Old fashions were to be eschewed; old ideas laid aside; men of the new school were to be chosen for important posts; the army was to be re-organised, and education metamorphosed on foreign lines; revision of the laws and reconstitution of the judiciary were to be undertaken; the administrative machine was to be recast, foreign advisers being among its new components; the venerable standards of scholarship were to be replaced by knowledge of modern sciences; the schools throughout the empire were to be converted into places for studying practical Chinese literature and Occidental learning, and were to all serve as feeders for a great university in Peking; Chinese Ministers and Consuls in foreign lands were to set up schools for the sons of Chinese living there; no more rice was to be transported by the costly and tedious route of the Grand Canal; all offices in the nature of sinecures were to be abolished; and various other changes scarcely less radical were to be accomplished.[1] It was inevitable that all this should rouse vehement opposition in conservative quarters; and when collisions between the Sovereign's impetuosity, and the obstructiveness of dissenting officials began to result in the latter's degradation and dismissal, the commotion reached the ears of the old lady in the Summer Palace. She understood at once that what her nephew had undertaken must, if not checked, raise China beyond the reach of Manchu control. At once, therefore, she took steps to summon the leaders of the Imperial Clan, and to warn them of the impending danger.

---

[1] See Appendix, note 24.

Whatever action these measures of Her Majesty preluded, was precipitated by the discovery that the young Emperor, foreseeing the hostile attitude of the Empress Dowager towards his scheme of reform, had laid plans to put a final end to her authority by imprisoning her in the Summer Palace. Thereupon the resentment of the offended woman reinforced the indignation of the prudent ruler. With extraordinary rapidity the whole house of novel cards was dashed to the ground; the Emperor, compelled to sign his own surrender of administrative authority, found himself a prisoner in the very Palace where he had intended to incarcerate his formidable aunt; the noble Kang Yu-wei,[1] who had counselled most of the reforms, was a fugitive on a British man-of-war, and the heads of his younger brother and five other martyrs to the cause of enlightenment were exposed at the place of felons in Peking.

---

[1] See Appendix, note 25.

The bitter regrets inspired by this signal failure in the very hour of apparent triumph, betrayed some of the Occidental friends of progress into unreasoning invectives against the British Government's neglect of such a golden opportunity. They accused the London statesmen and their Peking Representative of failure to rise to an unique occasion, and of standing by with folded arms while the fury of blind conservatism wrecked the last hope of China's salvation, and dyed its hands in the blood of her noblest patriots. That sort of hysteria was probably inevitable under the circumstances. But even though such a conjuncture should again arise, it is not likely that any British Ministry will constitute itself the guardian of foreign reformers who undertake to metamorphose the polity of a vast empire by thunder-clap experiments.

Not merely because the reform leader, Kang-Yu-wei, fled from death to a British war-ship, or because every local English journal in Far-Eastern settlements denounced the Empress Dowager in unmeasured terms and eulogised the objects of her wrath, but also because the ceaseless insistence of foreigners that only by adopting Occidental civilisation could China be saved from ruin, had grown more and more offensive to patriotic Chinese, did these incidents in Peking, at the close of 1898, add fresh fuel to the flame of antiforeign indignation.

Throughout the year 1899 sporadic outbreaks and outrages indicated the existence of widespread disturbance in Chili and its two neighbouring provinces, Shantung and Shansi. Some of the troubles were connected with Catholic missions, some with Protestant, and some with causes independent of either. The most careful diagnosis could not get beyond the fact that the air was full of unrest. By and by, however, salient features began to detach themselves from the confusion. It was perceived that there existed, here and there, the elements of an organisation, called in some quarters the "Fists of Public Harmony" (*I-ho-Chuan*), in others the "Big Sword Society" (*Ta-tao-hui*). Under either name the associates were understood to be inspired by hostility to foreigners. Many analyses of this phenomenon have been published. All, with one exception, discuss the manifestations rather than the motives. That exception is Sir Robert Hart's account. Sir Robert says that the "Boxers" — by which name the "Fists of Public Harmony" ultimately came to be known, and will be forever known in Occidental history — were the outcome of a conviction which had forced itself on the mind of the Chinese Government that the only economical and effective method of protecting the empire against foreign aggression was to organise volunteer associations all over the country, which, in any moment of crisis, would rise and unite their strength to beat back the tide of invasion.

"The idea seemed to receive immediate confirmation from without in the stand a handful of burghers were making in the Transvaal; hence the Boxer Association, patriotic in origin, justifiable in its fundamental idea, and, in point of fact, the outcome of either foreign advice or the study of foreign methods. (Here follows a recapitulation of the factors of irritation caused by the operation of the treaties; by the fruits of missionary propagandism; by the privilege which the French Government demanded and obtained for Roman Catholic priests in 1899, the privilege of adopting the equipages and paraphernalia of secular rank and receiving the treatment due to high officials; by the Kiaochow affair, and by the cessions of territory at Port Arthur, Wei-hai-wei and Kwangchow Bay.) These doings, followed by the successful stand made against the Italian demand for a port on the coast of Chekiang,[1] helped to force the Chinese Government to see that concession had gone far enough and that opposition to foreign encroachment might now and henceforth be the key-note of its policy. Li Ping-hêng (cashiered in obedience to Germany's demand) had taken up his private residence in the south-eastern corner of Chili, close to the Shantung frontier; and the Boxer movement, already started in a tentative way in the latter province, now received an immense impetus from the occurrences alluded to, and was carefully matured and fostered by that cashiered official — more respected than ever by his countrymen. Other high officials were known to be in sympathy with the new departure and to give it their strongest approval and support, such as Hsü Tung, Kang I, and men of the same stamp and standing; and their advice to the throne was to try conclusions with foreigners and yield no more to their demands. However mistaken may have been their reading of foreigners, and however wrong their manner of action, these men — eminent in their own country for their learning and services — were animated by patriotism, were enraged at foreign dictation, and had the courage of their convictions."

---

[1] See Appendix, note 26.

Ranged on the same side was General Tung Fuh-hsiang, with his troops, a numerous body of soldiers raised in the north-western province of Kansu, and supposed to be at once fierce fighters and radically anti-foreign; while at the head of the whole organisation stood Prince Tuan, father of the now heir apparent. It will be observed that Sir Robert Hart's account attributes the origin of the Boxers solely to anti-foreign sentiment. But Chinese observers affirm that the organisation was directed also against the reform movement which Kang Yu-wei and his enlightened associates had done so much to foster. In short, the Boxers were intended to intimidate domestic reformers as much as to check foreign aggression. But, in the sequel, they threw their whole strength into a movement for the expulsion of foreigners from Chinese soil, and upon that rock they shattered themselves. What, then, was the immediate cause of this extraordinary attempt, which virtually amounted to throwing the gauntlet in the face of the world? Only one authority has attempted to explain the mad outbreak, and that is Wen Ching, author of "The Chinese Crisis from Within." Briefly stated, his analysis may be summed up thus: —

At the head of all anti-foreign officials stood Kang I, Assistant Grand Secretary, a semi-educated, superstitious Manchu, around whom the alarmed members of the Manchu clique had rallied when the thunderbolts of the reforming Emperor were beginning to strike them from the seats of power. Allied with him, but less violent and more of an opportunist, was Yung Lu, Commander-in-chief of the Manchu Army. These two men, conscious that their influence demanded the support and association of a member of the Imperial clan, gradually approached Prince Tuan, who stood next to the Emperor in the order of succession to the Throne. Ultimately a plan for the deposition of the Emperor and the nomination of Prince Tuan's son, Pu Chun, to be heir apparent, received the approval of the Empress Dowager. On January 24, 1900, an edict was issued, declaring that the Emperor had requested the Empress Dowager to appoint Pu Chun as his successor. This act, being considered preliminary to the Emperor's dethronement, threw China into a convulsion of excitement. Memorials reached the Throne from all quarters protesting against the deposition of the Emperor; and since it became evident that to persist in the project would dangerously alienate the Chinese section of the nation, the

Empress Dowager and Yung Lu drew back. But Prince Tuan, a violent, headstrong man, could not brook the notion that, in deference to remonstrances from the subject race, the publicly recognised claim of his son should be even temporarily set aside. He therefore espoused the cause of the Boxers more strenuously than ever, and took into his confidence General Tung Fuh-hsiang, already spoken of. The Boxers practised various religious rites which were supposed to render them invulnerable; and Prince Tuan, a thoroughly superstitious man, believed firmly in the efficacy of these rites. The Boxers, then, would constitute an instrument for punishing all the insolent Chinese who had shown their sympathy with the reforming Emperor as well as for checking foreign aggression. At this stage Prince Tuan, to placate his offended pride, was appointed a member of the *Tsung-li Yamên*. He immediately learned that the news of his appointment had excited the strongest possible condemnation in the Foreign Legations; and he determined to let loose the Boxer inundation, directing it against these contumacious foreigners, whose insolence and aggressions had roused him and others of his countrymen to fiery anger.

Of the bloody traces left by the Boxer wave as it swept through the provinces towards Peking, a terribly graphic record may be found in a volume called "The Martyred Missionaries of the China Inland Mission, and Perils and Sufferings of Some who Survived." That Mission alone lost 33 ladies, 25 men, and 21 children; and the number of martyrs among eleven missionary societies represented in the four provinces which were the scene of the disaster — Shansi, Chili, Chekiang, and Shantung —totalled 188, of whom 53 were children. Of Roman Catholics there fell 35 priests and 9 nuns in Manchuria, Shansi, Mongolia, Chili, and Hunan. As to the number of native Christians done to death, records do not exist. There is no evidence that the crime of assassination was supplemented by any of the horrors commonly perpetrated when women fall into the hands of a mob. The mercy of a speedy death was accorded. As for the conduct of the martyrs in their hour of trial, the letters written by many of them when death stared them in the face are at once the noblest and the most pathetic utterances in the English language. Never a word of complaint, of impatience, of resentment, is found from first to last. Mothers with children by their side waiting to pass under the slayers' swords, write in tones of gentle resignation and heroic but unconscious courage, accepting their awful fate with unshaken faith in the goodness of their God, and praying for the conversion of their assassins. Fathers that have struggled on through days of agonising wounds, hardships, and privations, and have watched wives and little ones droop and faint hour by hour, tell their story as though such shocking tortures were part of the duty they had always expected to perform. Christianity has no finer record; and as to the ennobling influence exercised by such men and women on their surroundings in China, there never again can be any doubt. Nor must it be forgotten that if they were Chinese who killed these lamented martyrs, there were Chinese also who, holding fast to their Christian faith in the same hour of danger, met the same fate as those whose teaching and example had converted them. The Chinese converts embraced death for the sake of the Christian religion, and in such exalted courage many of their murderers must have found a convincing revelation of the truth of the Nazarene's creed.

On the 13th of June the Boxers entered Peking. By that time the foreign community had assembled at the Legations with the exception of some Roman Catholic priests and their native converts who had taken refuge within the Peh-tang (Northern Cathedral). In the Legations were some six hundred Europeans and Americans — more than half of them fighting men — and three thousand Chinese, the latter consisting chiefly of native converts. A mixed force, under Vice Admiral Seymour of the British Navy, left Tientsin on the 10th of June for Peking; and had it reached the city, all the subsequent trouble would have been prevented. But the force spent too much time endeavouring to restore the line of communication by repairing the railway, instead of moving on at once to the capital, and thus the opportunity was lost.

The Boxers made at first no attempt to attack the Legations. They confined themselves to killing native Christians, burning churches, and destroying everything that savoured of Occidental fashions, as well as much that had no such distinction. The city was almost completely given over to pillage and rapine, for many of the soldiers co-operated with the Boxers in this work. But the Legations did not appear to be in any serious danger. One of the occupations of the inmates was marching out to rescue native Christians from Cathedrals to which the torch had been applied, or from the swords of Boxers. Had not any extraneous influence been imported into the situation, there is no valid reason to conclude that the Legations would ever have been attacked by Chinese troops; though, on the other hand, it is equally impossible to affirm that the party of Prince Tuan, Kang I, and General Tung would not have given effect to their policy of violence in spite of the more prudent views of the Empress Dowager and Yung Lu. Up to the evening of the 17th of June, Ministers of the *Tsung-li-Yamên* called personally at the Legations.

But in the meanwhile the officers commanding the allied fleets off the mouth of the Peiho had arrived at the conclusion that their communications with Peking were in danger and that the Chinese garrison of the Taku Forts contemplated laying torpedoes in the river. Meeting in council under the presidency of a Russian Admiral, they decided to demand the surrender of the forts within twelve hours. Of course that meant war. There could be no other issue. For the wires having been cut by the Boxers, who tore down telegraphs, tore up railways, and burned churches with equal diligence, the officer at the Forts could not consult his senior within the given time, and it was obviously out of the question that he should surrender on his own discretion. He refused; and at daybreak on the following morning (17th June) the ships took up convenient positions, bombarded the Forts and then landed a party which carried them by escalade.

This singular performance astonished the world. Evidently no alternative had been left to the Chinese. If it was not intended to force a fight, the natural course would have been to make war contingent on some specific act; to declare, for example, that any attempt to lay torpedoes or any attempt to re-enforce the garrison of the Forts would be regarded as hostile. But no such choice was given. What made the thing stranger was that Tientsin, forty miles distant, was thus left for at least two days at the mercy of large forces of Chinese troops then posted in its vicinity; that Admiral Seymour's relief expedition, harassed by Boxers between Tientsin and Peking, was placed in deadly peril, and that

Peking was completely isolated. So patent to onlookers were all these dangerous consequences that the officer chiefly responsible for the attack fell under suspicion of having precipitated hostilities in the selfish interests of the only country that stood to gain anything by war.

News of the capture of the Taku Forts having reached Peking on the 19th of July, the *Tsung-li-Yamên* sent a note to the Foreign Ministers, requesting them to leave the city within twenty-four hours, as their security could not be guaranteed any longer. It is tolerably certain that this note represented the result of a compromise between the war party and the peace party. The former had agreed to give the Ministers a chance of escaping, their neglect of it to be the signal for attack. It was an illusory chance. If Admiral Seymour with a thousand men, all combatants, had not been able to make his way from Tientsin to Peking in nine days, before war had broken out, what hope offered that three hundred and fifty mariners should safely escort over three thousand non-combatants from Peking to Tientsin after hostilities had commenced?

On the 20th of June siege was laid to the Legations, and continued in a fitful manner until August 14th, when a relieving force of various nationalities marched in. The remarkable feature of the siege, apart from the heroic defence of the little garrison, was that the Chinese never made a really spirited attack, and that their fire slackened sometimes for days together. Had they brought any resolution to the work, the Legations must have fallen at once. That was another illustration of the division existing in Palace counsels. The Empress Dowager, the Emperor, Yung Lu, and others, knowing what fate must ultimately befall China if the Legations were captured and their inmates put to the sword, contrived that the task should be left entirely to Hung Fuh-hsiang and the Boxers, who found it too much for them.

The verdict of history thus far has been that China, in this war, deliberately threw her gauntlet in the face of the world. How such an assertion can survive the established fact that hostilities were commenced by the world itself at Taku, China having no voice whatever in the matter, must be explained by observing that, in all questions between East and West, right is necessarily on the side of the Occident.

slackened sometimes for days together. Had they brought any resolution to the work, the Legations must have fallen at once. That was another illustration of the division existing in Palace councils. The Empress Dowager, the Emperor, Yung Lu, and others, knowing what fate must ultimately befall China if the Legations were captured and their inmates put to the sword, contrived that the task should be left entirely to Tung Fuh-Siang and the Boxers, who found it too much for them.

The verdict of history thus far has been that China, in this war, deliberately threw her gauntlet in the face of the world. How such an assertion can survive the established fact that hostilities were commenced by the world itself at Taku, China having no voice whatever in the matter, must be explained by observing that, in all questions between East and West, right is necessarily on the side of the Occident.

A CHINESE COUNTRY HOUSE.



Chapter VI

TO-DAY

NO chapter in the annals of China's foreign intercourse has been so accurately and copiously written as that describing the capture of Tientsin city by the allies, the march of the relieving force to Peking, the harrowing suspense of Europe and America during seven weeks while the fate of the Legations hung in the balance, and while no communication could be held with their inmates, the complete success of the Viceroys and Governors in the centre and south of China in preserving peace and protecting foreign life and property throughout the whole period of the trouble in the north, the flight of the Imperial Court to Hsiang, and its return in the spring of 1902, the peace negotiations brought to a successful issue in Peking after long and weary negotiations—not long and weary because of China's reluctance to show reasonable acquiescence, but mainly because of the great difficulty experienced by the foreign Powers in agreeing among themselves — and the first audience in the Palace after the Court's return, when the Empress Dowager wept as she received the ladies of the Legations. "Crocodile tears" they were called by treaty-port newspapers, but much pain and long anxiety may wear down the courage even of a Tsai An.

The terms imposed on China by the treaty of peace signed in Peking on September 7, 1902, presented some remarkable features. There had been much discussion among the Powers as to the punishment of supposed Boxer leaders, and of officials directly responsible for assassination of Christians. Certain Governments were disposed to insist that, by way of essential preliminary to commencing negotiations, the death penalty must be inflicted on a number of dignitaries indicated by the Foreign Representatives. But others objected to such a course. They contended that since among the incriminated persons a prominent figure was that of Prince Tuan, father of the Heir apparent, and since of the rest some had practical control of the Imperial Court by which they would have to be punished, an impossible situation must be created were any such ultimatum presented. Then there was the obvious objection that the probably incomplete, and certainly *ex-parte*, evidence obtainable by foreign investigators could not be held conclusive in any court of law, and that the only just and reasonable plan would be to leave to China's unfettered jurisdiction the identification of the offenders and the fixing of their penalties. Not much was said by Western publicists about the other view of the question, the view that some of the men responsible for the Boxer movement might have been loyal patriots, who, while they advocated and supported the organisation of volunteer bands in order to preserve China from the danger plainly threatening her integrity, never contemplated such a crime against humanity as the assassination of missionary men, women, and children, whose lives had been devoted to China's improvement, or such a crime against international law as the attempted destruction of foreign diplomatic envoys. Perhaps it would have been extravagant to look for advocates of that view among the representatives of the outraged Powers or among the friends and companions of the murdered missionaries. At all events, the Governments of Europe and America, yielding finally to the counsels of justice and expediency, avoided disfiguring the pages of history with such a record as that the opening year of the twentieth century had seen the Powers of the Occident combine to condemn unheard a number of high officials, and, by the pressure of overwhelming force, to secure their execution without any form of trial. In the end a measure of discretion was left to China; a very small measure, indeed, but still enough to "save appearances."

One result of this compromise was that the Representatives of the Powers had to append their signatures to a treaty, the second article of which declared that an Imperial Prince, together with the Lord High Censor and the Lord Chief Justice of the Chinese realm, had been ordered to commit suicide; and another clause of the same Article announced that they had done so. Li Ping-hêng, who had been driven to espouse the Boxer cause by the harsh and unjust sentence pronounced on him at the insistent instance of Germany, died probably by his own hand, as did also Kang I and Hsii Tung, these three thus escaping any penalty heavier than *post-mortem* degradation. Only three men were executed by Chinese order, among them being the monstrously cruel Governor, Yü Hsien, under whose immediate direction forty-four missionaries, including women and children, had been murdered in Taiyuen city; but three others, scarcely less guilty — the Provincial Treasurer, the Tartar General, and a Colonel — were put to death by the foreign Commanders at Paoting, where they had prompted or permitted the assassination of fifteen Europeans, including three children. Prince Tuan, the head of the Boxers, Duke Fu Ko, and General Tung Fuh-hsiang, escaped with banishment; and thus the sum total of the capital punishments actually inflicted by the Chinese Government on dignitaries of State, in deference to the demands of foreign Powers, were three compulsory suicides and three decapitations. It cannot be said that the law of a life for a life obtained judicial observance, — three suicides and three decapitations for two hundred and thirty-seven murdered foreigners.

But, on the other hand, a vast number of Chinese fell under the swords of the avenging troops; and it is undeniable that against many of these sufferers no offence could be charged except inability to exclude Boxers from their hamlets. Among all the incidents of the sanguinary year, none shocked the world so much as a wholesale massacre perpetrated by the Russians at Blagovestchensk on the Amur. From the other side of the river a Chinese battery bombarded this town on the 15th of July, 1900, killing three Russians and wounding six. Something like a panic ensued on the Russian side. The placing of the Chinese battery, at a distance of only a mile, had completely escaped the observation of the military authorities in Blagovestchensk. They telegraphed for instructions, which, coming in doubtful form, were construed to mean destruction of the Chinese population; and there ensued a terrible massacre, involving the lives of several thousands of inoffensive men, women, and children. Nothing so appalling occurred during the march of the relieving expedition to Peking, or throughout the subsequent year's occupation of Chili by foreign forces. But many disgraceful things did occur. There is necessarily much difficulty in passing just judgment on the conduct of troops in modern campaigns. The special correspondent, the telegraph, and the newspaper create an atmosphere seen through which the horrors of battle and bloodshed assume dimensions out of all proportion with the civilised humanity of the era, though possibly they would look insignificant could they be compared with an accurate picture of war as previous generations waged it. Such comparison being impossible, every careful historian must hesitate to determine whether the guilt of brutal licence and shocking cruelty lies at the door of elementary passions which defy, and always will defy, control in the presence of excitement and opportunity, or whether such acts should be counted as evidence of specially depraved natures. The facts as to the campaign conducted by foreign forces during parts of 1900 and 1901 in Chili, are that robbery, assassinations, and nameless outrages were committed by some of the men; that numbers of innocent and peaceful non-combatants were slaughtered or stripped of everything they possessed; that expeditionary columns, sent against villages which had not been guilty of any offence,[1] looted the residences of the chief local officials and shot down many of the inhabitants, and that whole districts were ruthlessly and needlessly laid waste.[2] The seeds of hatred sown in that evil time must add their quota to the crop of tares that overgrows so much of the story of foreign intercourse with China. Anglo-Saxons and Japanese took scarcely any share in the sowing; for which forbearance much credit accrued to the latter in Chinese eyes, whereas there was probably little discrimination in favour of the former.

---

[1] See Appendix, note 27.

[2] See Appendix, note 28.

Measures for preventing future outrages against foreign life and property had a larger, though less prominent, place in the treaty than measures for punishing past outrages. Belonging partly to both categories was the suspension, during a period of five years, of public examinations in all the towns where foreigners had been massacred or maltreated. That penalty could not fail to be severely felt, since it practically blocked the career of all youths in the proscribed districts. Respectable citizens, by whom its effects would be chiefly felt, might be expected thenceforth to exert all their influence in the cause of law and order. Purely preventive in character was the compulsory publication of edicts declaring, first, that membership of any anti-foreign society should be counted a capital crime; and, secondly, that in the event of immediate measures not being taken to deal effectually with anti-foreign troubles or other infractions of treaty in the future, the responsible Viceroys, Governors, and other local officials should be cashiered, and cease to be eligible for official employment.

The military situation was also dealt with. The Taku forts were to be rased as well as all those capable of preventing free communication between Peking and the Sea; foreign troops were to be posted at eleven places in Chili, for the purpose of securing such communication; the Legation area in Peking was to be converted into a fortified quarter with a permanent foreign garrison; and during two years from August, 1901, a veto was to be imposed on the import of arms and ammunition, as well as on "all material exclusively employed for the manufacture of arms." No one has yet discovered any material falling under this last category, but that is a detail.

With a foreign fortress and a foreign garrison in its midst; with its maritime communications in foreign military possession so that its supply of provisions might at any moment be cut off, Peking appeared to have lost all the essential qualifications of an imperial city. Nevertheless, the Court returned there. Any attempt to change the capital would have been construed by the foreign Powers as an evidence of bad faith. But among the many trials to which Chinese Sovereigns have been subjected by foreign intercourses, whether their follies, their crimes, or their misfortunes are chiefly responsible, none can have been bitterer or more unendurable than this necessity of living under the shadow of a foreign fortress, and having all vital supplies commanded by foreign bayonets. Surely the Manchu Government must soon begin to ask itself whether obligations so painful need be permanent?

Meanwhile it must be confessed that the situation now created is thoroughly logical. "In one way or other," said Sir Rutherford Alcock, "however we may disguise it, our position in China has been created by force — naked, physical force; and any intelligent policy to improve or maintain the position must still look to force in some form, latent or expressed, for the results." The dependence on force is now more plainly expressed than it has ever been at any previous stage of China's foreign relations.

There was an indemnity as a matter of course; an indemnity of 450 million taels ($333,900,000). It included compensation for losses suffered by private individuals. The Protestant missionaries, with noble magnanimity, refused to demand or accept any blood money, and showed altogether a spirit of moderation worthy of their faith. But when the claims of the various Powers came to be examined, it appeared that, with exception of England, Japan, and the United States, either mismanagement had swelled the bills, or the sums demanded were not assessed strictly on the basis of expenses incurred, though such had been the agreement.

The Powers, regarding this indemnity solely as a means of recouping their outlays and not at all as a fine imposed on China, took the logical view that the question of her resources must be duly considered. Therefore, after much deliberation, they decided that payment should be extended over thirty-nine years, four per cent being charged on the unpaid portion, and that assistance to discharge the debt should be given by an increase of the customs tariff. This last condition found ready acquiescence at the hands of States having small commercial interests at stake; they were altogether willing that countries like Great Britain, the United States, and Japan, by which the great bulk of China's foreign commerce is done,[1] should contribute liberally to the payment of the indemnity by submitting to a tax of ten per cent on all goods imported by them into China. The interested countries, however, taking a less munificent view of the situation, the discussion resulted in an agreement that the basis of the new tariff should be an effective five per cent *ad valorem*.

It was partly for the purpose of carrying this agreement into practice that negotiations were commenced in Shanghai in the spring of 1902, having for their object a general revision of the commercial treaties between China and foreign countries. When the opening chapters of these volumes were written, the author ventured to predict that the grand feature of the negotiations would be realised, namely, "the total abolition of all internal taxation, of whatsoever kind or description, on merchandise and products, whether native or foreign, whether for import or for export," in consideration of a substantial addition to the rates of the customs tariff.[1] Now, as the last chapter is written, news comes that, on September 5, 1902, the convention accomplishing this great change was concluded. The probable effects of such a change can scarcely be underestimated. Owing to the existence of innumerable tax barriers throughout the length and breadth of the empire, barriers at which a mob of hungry officials and underlings obtain for themselves a living by unauthorised exactions, prices of foreign commodities are raised almost to famine figures before the consumer is reached. All that is now ended — assuming that the treaty Powers can be brought into line with the great reform negotiated by England, a result which international jealousy is only too likely to prevent. No partial measure could have been successful. Had any barriers remained, an opportunity for abuses would have offered. But the whole will now be abolished so far as imports and exports are concerned. A very great authority on things Chinese wrote lately: "China needs neither import nor export, and can do without foreign intercourse. A fertile soil, producing every kind of food; a climate which favours every variety of fruit; and a population which, for tens of centuries, has put agriculture, the productive industry which feeds and clothes, above all other occupations — China has all this and more; and foreign traders can only hope to dispose of their merchandise there in proportion to the new tastes they introduce, the new wants they create, and the care they take to supply what the demand really means. The sanguine expectations which were expressed when treaties first regulated intercourse, a cycle back, have never been realized. Trade, it is true, has grown,[1] and the revenue derived from it has multiplied; but as yet it is far, far from what our predecessors looked for; and the reason is not that the Chinese Government actively opposed foreign commerce, but that the Chinese people did not require it. Chinese have the best food in the world, rice; the best drink, tea; and the best clothing, cotton, silk, and fur. Possessing these staples, and their innumerable native adjuncts, they do not need to buy a penny's worth elsewhere; while their empire is in itself so great, and they themselves so numerous, that sales to each other make up an enormous and sufficient trade, and export to foreign countries is unnecessary. This explains why sixty years of treaty trade has failed to reach the point the first treaty-framers prophesied for it." The Shanghai Convention of September, 1902, embodies all the reforms suggested by the united wisdom of merchants, consuls, and diplomatists. If China's foreign trade be capable of rapid development, it should now develop.

---

[1] See Appendix, note 29.

---

[1] See Appendix, note 30.

---

[1] See Appendix, note 31.

But to the student of international politics the most interesting Articles of this memorable Convention are these:—

ARTICLE XII.

China having expressed a strong desire to reform her judicial system and to bring it into accord with that of Western nations, Great Britain agrees to give every assistance to such reform, and she will also be prepared to relinquish her extraterritorial rights when she is satisfied that the state of the Chinese laws, the arrangement for their administration, and other considerations warrant her in so doing.

ARTICLE XIII.

The missionary question in China being, in the opinion of the Chinese Government, one requiring careful consideration, so that, if possible, troubles such as have occurred in the past may be averted in the future, Great Britain agrees to join in a Commission to investigate this question, and, if possible, to devise means for securing permanent peace between converts and non-converts, should such a Commission be formed by China and the Treaty Powers interested.

No one that has read the story of China's foreign relations as recorded in these volumes can doubt that their cumulative effect has been to store up in her bosom a fund of the deepest resentment. What she is now towards foreigners differs strikingly from what she was two hundred years ago; and what she is now, that she has been made by systematically harsh treatment such as no other nation ever suffered at the hands of alien Powers. After sixty years of intercourse under treaties of "amity and commerce," during which time the open ports and ports of call have grown from five to nearly eleven times that number, and forty-four Protestant missionary societies, represented by 2700 workers, have established 95 stations in the 18 provinces, the situation to-day is that the foreign Representatives are living in a fortress in the capital, garrisoned by foreign troops; that their communications with the sea, 120 miles distant, are guarded by foreign forces; that the whole of the metropolitan province may be said to be in foreign military occupation; that Manchuria is overrun by Russian troops; that Shanghai has a garrison furnished by four European Powers; that the world is still shuddering at the memory of a terrible massacre of Christians, European, American, and Chinese; and that the Chinese people are cursing foreign nations because of the burden of an idemnity rendered intolerable by the exactions of their own officials. If the Chinese themselves are largely to blame for this wretched result — and certainly they are to blame — that does not suggest that they find the position less irksome. Is there any warranted hope that the darkest hour has passed, and that the dawn of a brighter era is about to break? Is it imaginable that a nation of such experiences as China garnered during the nineteenth century should take foreigners to its bosom and treat them with confidence and friendship? Sir Robert Hart, writing three months after the foreign community, of which he was a leading member, had been saved from massacre in Peking by a foreign army, said: —

> "It must be freely allowed that the Chinese possess quite as large a share of admirable qualities as others, and that these are not merely to be found in isolated cases here and there, but are characteristic of the race as a whole and the civilisation it has developed. They are well-behaved, intelligent, economical, and industrious; they can learn anything and do anything; they are punctiliously polite; they worship talent, and they believe in right so firmly that they scorn to think it requires to be supported or enforced by might; they delight in literature, and everywhere they have their literary clubs and coteries for hearing and discussing each other's essays and verses; they possess and practise an admirable system of ethics, and they are generous, charitable and fond of good works; they never forget a favour and they make rich return for any kindness, and, though they know money will buy service, a man must be more than wealthy to win public esteem and respect; they are practical, teachable, and wonderfully gifted with common sense; they are excellent artisans, reliable workmen, and of a good faith that every one acknowledges and admires in their commercial dealings; in no country that is or was has the commandment, 'honour thy father and thy mother' been so religiously obeyed or so fully and without exception given effect to, and it is in fact the keynote of their family, social, official, and national life, and because it is so 'their days are long in the land' God has given them. Respect and not contempt, conciliation and not dicta-

tion, appreciation and not differential treatment — try this prescription and you will have a healthy body politic, and until this is done it will be the reverse. What is wanted is a settlement or understanding all will abide by, and not one they will everlastingly be kicking against and endeavouring to upset. To secure such a settlement, only one change is necessary; but that is a complete change, a radical change, a change of principle. The principle which underlies every treaty, and runs through every treaty stipulation, and which unhappily is at the bottom of all the mischief, is what is justly considered the most important, the most valuable, and, from the foreign standpoint, the most essential point in treaties with China, and that is the principle of extraterritoriality — could we but give up this, and relations would at once right themselves, rancour disappear, and friendliness rule instead. Trade would be freely permitted everywhere, and the investment of capital and development of internal resources meet with no unnecessary obstacle. The Government has already admitted in principle that natives may own steamers on coast and river, may establish telegraphic communication, may build railways, may open mines, may start manufacturing industries, and the foreigner has only to accept the same position to enjoy to their fullest extent the same privileges, besides ensuring the removal of what makes such enterprises unprofitable. It is not for a moment supposed that any Power is yet ready to throw up what all foreigners consider such an inestimable boon: all will say, China must abolish torture, must make new laws, must remodel the judicial system, must conform to the practice of Christian nations, before their Christian subjects can be submitted to native jurisdiction and before Chinese Courts can deal with the intricacies of commercial codes, and they will point to the example of Japan and bid China do likewise; and

tion, appreciation and not differential treatment — try this prescription and you will have a healthy body politic, and until this is done it will be the reverse. What is wanted is a settlement or understanding all will abide by, and not one they will everlastingly be kicking against and endeavouring to upset. To secure such a settlement, only one change is necessary; but that is a complete change, a radical change, a change of principle. The principle which underlies every treaty, and runs through every treaty stipulation, and which unhappily is at the bottom of all the mischief, is what is justly considered the most important, the most valuable, and, from the foreign standpoint, the most essential point in treaties with China, and that is the principle of extra-territoriality — could we but give up this, and relations would at once right themselves, rancour disappear, and friendliness rule instead. Trade would be freely permitted everywhere, and the investment of capital and development of [illegible] un-necessary obstacle. The Government has already admitted in principle that natives may own steamers on coast and river, may establish telegraphic communication, may build railways, may open mines, may start manufacturing industries, and the foreigner has only to accept the same position to enjoy to their fullest extent the same privileges, besides ensuring the removal of what makes such enterprises unprofitable. It is not for a moment supposed that any Power is yet ready to throw up what all foreigners consider such an inestimable boon: all will say, China must abolish torture, must make new laws, must remodel the judicial system, must conform to the practice of Christian nations, before their Christian subjects can be submitted to native jurisdiction and before Chinese Courts can deal with the intricacies of commercial codes, and they will point to the example of Japan and bid China do likewise; and

A GROUP OF CHINESE OFFICIALS.

Four members of the Tsung-li-Yamen and Mr. Conger. From left to right they are: Hsu Yung-i (beheaded by order of the Empress during the siege of Pekin); Wang Wen-Shao (who fled during the flight of the Empress); Chao Shu-Chiao (an official who Minister Conger believes should be beheaded); U. S. Minister Conger; Yu Keng (Chinese Minister to France).



China possibly may proceed to do likewise, but in the meantime the sore will rankle, and the temptation to misuse growing strength and throw off the yoke, instead of waiting patiently for the result of improvement, will be a constant, if not a growing, danger. On the other hand, it may be said that, while subjection to Chinese jurisdiction would make every foreigner take care to avoid offending — and there are prejudices to be respected as well as laws to be observed — and in that way keep them from its action, the probability is that, foreigners being comparatively so few, not only would the necessity for their appearance in Court be of rare occurrence, but the Chinese officials would everywhere be specially on their guard, and possibly receive the most express orders from their Government to not only observe the greatest circumspection in all their dealings with foreigners, but avoid subjecting them to any treatment that could be complained of anywhere by anybody. Nor should the effect of such a concession be spoiled by reservations and restrictions, beyond, perhaps, a stipulation for evidence to be taken on oath and some right of appeal; for the country, so to speak, would be on its honour, and the whole force of Chinese thought and teaching would then be enlisted in the foreigner's favour through its maxim regarding tenderly treating the stranger from afar. Such a change of principle in the making of treaties would widen and not restrict the field for merchant and missionary, and would simplify and not complicate the work of both consul and minister — would do away with irritating privileges, and place native and foreigner on the same footing — and would remove the sting of humiliation, and put the Government of China on the same plane as other nations. Of course it would be an experiment, but a promising one, whereas adherence to the treaties as they now stand will only continue the difficulties as we now know them; and although the suggestion cannot be expected to be either accepted or acted on now, it is here offered for consideration as a something which may serve as an explanation as well as prepare the way for what sooner or later must come to pass. It may have been — it may still be — expedient and even essential from the foreigners' point of view and the necessities of commercial law, to stand on Chinese soil with the ægis of extraterritoriality and the procedure of their own courts; but to the Chinese eye this is a spear and not a shield, and until it is withdrawn there will be no assured dwelling at ease, no real welcome for foreign intercourse. Restore jurisdiction, and the feeling of the responsibility to protect as well as the appreciation of intercourse will at once move up to a higher plane."

Elsewhere Sir Robert says:–

"There is such a thing as Chinese feeling and Chinese aspiration; and these will never be stamped out, but will live and seethe and work beneath the surface through all time, even under the most beneficent rule, and in the end — it may be sooner or it may be later — assert themselves and win their object. That the future will have a yellow question — perhaps a yellow 'peril' — to deal with, is as certain as that the sun will shine to-morrow. . . . The Chinese race, after thousands of years of haughty seclusion and exclusiveness, has been pushed by the force of circumstances and by the superior strength of assailants into treaty relations with the rest of the world, but regards that as a humiliation, sees no benefit accruing from it, and is looking forward to the day when it, in turn, will be strong enough to revert to its old life again and do away with foreign intercourse, interference, and intrusion. It has slept long, as we count sleep; but it is awake at last, and its every member is tingling with Chinese feeling — 'China for the

Chinese and out with foreigners.' The Boxer movement is doubtless the product of official inspiration; but it has taken hold of the popular imagination, and will spread like wildfire all over the length and breadth of the country; it is, in short, a purely patriotic volunteer movement, and its object is to strengthen China and for a Chinese programme. . . . The Boxer patriot of the future will possess the best weapons money can buy, and then the 'Yellow Peril' will be beyond ignoring."

These words created a great sensation when they met the eyes of the public in the beginning of 1901. At first, remembering the long experience, attested wisdom, and high station of the writer, the critics hesitated. But presently they denounced him in strong terms. It is the habit of a certain class of European commentators to maintain that long acquaintance with the Oriental people, and close study of their customs, their character, their literature and their ethics, unfit a man to pronounce an authoritative opinion about them. That is never said if his opinion is condemnatory. Only if he happen — as he generally does — to discover that they resemble, or perhaps excel in some respects, the general average of humanity, and that they have some right to respect and some title to esteem, then the strange theory is enunciated that long utilized opportunities of observation, which in any other instance would be counted a high credential to believe, have hypnotised him, impaired the robustness of his intelligence, or otherwise disqualified him to be seriously regarded. That was what some people said when they read Sir Robert Hart's analysis of China's case. Yet history indubitably confirms his views; for it tells that in the old days when foreigners, visiting or residing in China, obeyed her laws, submitted to her jurisdiction, and did not differentiate themselves from her people, they received hearty and friendly treatment. But history shows also that in those days Chinese laws and the manner of their administration were not separated from Western laws and Western judicial procedure by the wide gulf that divides the two systems to-day. It is idle to talk of entrusting foreign life and foreign property to Chinese jurisdiction until that gulf is bridged, and the duty of bridging it devolves upon the Chinese themselves. They are about to essay the task. By the terms of the Shanghai Convention they have gained England's assurance — very conditional assurance though it be — that she does not regard the maintenance of extraterritorial jurisdiction as perpetually essential; and they have gained her promise that she will consent to its abrogation whenever China shall have equipped herself to assume the resulting responsibility. That is an important recognition. The question is, will the Chinese nation wait quietly for so remote a consummation, or will the anti-foreign spirit flame out again, and produce a conflagration which, if it does not fuse the last rivets of the Chinese empire, will, at all events, condemn the country to another period of probation and distrust. The goal is far distant. Years must pass before China qualifies for such a mark of confidence. It took Japan just thirty years; and when she applied herself to the task in 1869, she possessed the great advantage that rulers and ruled alike were imbued with the spirit of reform. But in China the reformers have to walk warily. They must placate the conservatives, who form the bulk of the nation. It appears to be tolerably certain that the Imperial Court is now sincerely favourable to progress. Just before setting out from Hsian on the return journey to Peking, the Empress Dowager issued a decree declaring reform to be the very "life-pulse" of the empire; and since that time there have been practical evidences that Her Majesty's words were not, as was suspected at the moment, a mere formula of re-introduction to foreign society. China has taken Japan for model. That in itself is a striking proof of earnestness; for, as late as half a dozen years ago, she regarded her little neighbour with scornful dislike, counting her a renegade from the venerable teachings of the sages, and an upstart aping unlovely fashions. But now over six hundred Chinese students are acquiring Western knowledge in Japan; numerous translations of Occidental standard works made by Japanese experts are being put into a Chinese dress; many Japanese men of science are engaged as advisers in China; and there has just been elaborated for the throne's approval, an educational system closely following Japanese lines. Hitherto it seems to have been China's conception, that if she acquired the externals of Western civilisation, all its advantages would speedily accrue. Strong weapons, she thought, make strong men. But now she apparently understands that the man is much more important than the weapon, and so she begins at the root — education. Nevertheless, there is a disquieting indication. To establish schools teachers are necessary. She has, indeed, a fine supply of qualified teachers. The missionaries have been educating them for sixty years. All the time that China slept, tormented by nightmares of the truculent, unamiable foreigner, and visited by dreams of his expulsion, these pious philanthropists were equipping her sons with useful modern knowledge. Thus among the native converts there are hundreds of men competent to serve as teachers in the new schools. But it is extremely problematical whether China will employ them. Her reformers seem to shrink from the danger of antagonising the literati, who represent intelligent Chinese opinion, by frankly secularising education, and abolishing the old law which demands, from students and teachers alike, daily acts of worship before the tablets of the Sages. Hence, not only will the country be precluded from using the only immediately available material, but also injurious discriminations will be exercised against Christian converts, whose children will be excluded from the State schools as well as from all official appointments. Whether the nation which proudly claims to be the "protector of Christian Missions in the Far East" will consider such discrimination consistent with treaties guaranteeing freedom of conscience, is a question for time to answer. That same "protector" stands in the way of any practical arrangement for purging Christian propagandism of its dangerous features; for evidently the only steps to that end are, first, complete divorce of Christian missions from foreign official tutelage; and secondly, frank submission of Christian institutions to such a measure of Chinese official supervision as shall effectually dispel native suspicion. History does not show any other country where popular credulity is so naïve as in China, and where mobs can be stirred to a frenzy of such destructive resentment by rumours so extravagant. At this very time measures are being taken to punish the leaders of a Hunan crowd which recently murdered two missionaries because of their supposed responsibility for an outbreak of cholera. The unhappy victims had not the smallest warning. In a moment demented citizens rushed together, precipitated themselves on the residences of the missionaries, and completed the murderous deed. Such incidents will always be liable to occur so long as any mystery attaches to mission work. And each sanguinary occurrence will tend to postpone the time of foreign Governments' willingness to submit their nationals to Chinese jurisdiction.

It is thus a situation full of perplexity and menace. China's awakening, if, indeed, she be yet fully awake, seems to have come too late. The umbrage of her own people and the impatience of foreign Powers will not leave her time to complete reforms without which the origin of the former cannot be removed or the cause of the latter corrected. But if she be denied leisure to qualify for admission to the comity of nations, leisure to achieve protection by mimicry, the only alternative seems to be the disintegration of her empire and its partition among alien States. Onlookers deny the possibility of such an event. They say that the homogeneity and the individuality of the Chinese nation secure its permanence as an entity. Recent history does not suggest that these academical considerations would deter certain Western Powers from making the experiment.

Between Germany and England there was concluded, in 1891, an agreement that each should abstain from territorial spoliation in China unless some other Power set the example. A covenant to behave well so long as others did not create a bad precedent, evidently meant little. It was found ultimately to mean still less; for Germany declared — not without reason — that she did not interpret the compact as applying to Manchuria, and that she did interpret it as securing for herself parity of title with England to the Yangtse Valley. Thus a convention nominally intended to guarantee China's integrity was found to introduce a new claimant for the central section of her empire, and to sanction constructively the alienation of an eastern section measuring seven hundred thousand square miles. Germany had joined hands with Russia in 1895 to expel the Japanese from Manchuria. It does not seem to have occurred to Tōkyō statesmen, that, having regarded the protection of Manchuria as essential to the tranquillity of the Far East in 1895, Germany would declare herself indifferent to its fate in 1901. They therefore "adhered" to the Anglo-German Convention; and when a few months later, the true significance of that document became apparent, they perceived that their estimate of Europe's diplomatic standards required readjustment.

Manchuria, then, was to be regarded as the point of least resistance and greatest exposure to aggression.

Russia, though chiefly responsible for the attack on the Taku forts which opened the war, though willing to co-operate in every belligerent operation essential to the preservation of foreign life in China, and though justly credited with the rescue of Tientsin from deadly peril at the cost of gallant effort and much bloodshed, nevertheless displayed from the very outset her familiar policy of differentiating herself diplomatically from the Powers of the West. When, after the capture of Peking, the Powers proposed to hold it pending the conclusion of peace, Russia withdrew her troops, and removed her legation to Tientsin. When, on the verge of peace negotiations, the Powers declared that punishment of Boxer leaders and of violently anti-foreign Chinese officials must be an essential preliminary to discussion of terms, Russia declared herself unable to endorse that demand. When a German Field-Marshal having been appointed to command the allied forces in Chili, the time came for accepting his control, Russia marched her troops elsewhere, thus, by a happy exercise of foresight, dissociating herself from the punitory and predatory expeditions of the ensuing twelve months.[1] When, the rendition of the city of Tientsin to Chinese civil administration being earnestly desired by China, the foreign Generals dictated terms which the Chinese found irksome, Russia suddenly recalled her General, and stepped out of the conference. She was thus seen to be sedulously establishing a claim to Chinese gratitude for the sake of her special interests in Manchuria, and in the summer of 1901 this procedure culminated in the draft of a secret agreement which would have placed her in virtual possession of that vast region. It is necessary to add that St. Petersburg never avowed this agreement: the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs haughtily declined to be questioned about it. But the startled Chinese handed copies to the Representatives of other Powers. In Japan's eyes the addition of Manchuria to the Russian Empire signified that the latter would be placed in a position of almost inevitable menace to Korea. Accordingly, the Mikado's Government stirred themselves actively. London and Washington strongly co-operated; and finally China[1] stiffened her back to reject Russia's proposals. It has been generally supposed that the Tsar never contemplated, and could scarcely have been brought to sanction, any policy of territorial aggression in China. But for a moment His Majesty found the War party difficult to control, especially after the above rebuff. Gradually, however, more deliberate counsels prevailed at St. Petersburg; and on the 8th of April, 1902, the immediate future of Manchuria was disposed of in a remarkably moderate convention, by which Russia undertook to withdraw her troops from the whole territory in three six-monthly periods, the first ending on October 8, 1902, the last on October 8, 1903.

---

[1] See Appendix, note 32.

If foreign opinion in the Far East were canvassed, very few people would be found to credit the completion of such a programme. At the time of the convention's signature the world wondered; for the universal supposition had been that Russia's foot was planted permanently in

---

[1] See Appendix, note 33.

Manchuria; and moreover, it seemed that if she now abandoned the great prize, an opportunity to recover it would not easily present itself. Just two months previously England and Japan had formed an alliance having for objects the preservation of the integrity of China and Korea, and the belligerent co-operation of the two high contracting parties, in the event of either being confronted by more than one hostile Power. Russia, therefore, for all future purposes of imperial expansion in the Far East, saw herself obliged to choose between isolation or the purchase of assistance at the cost of facing England and Japan. It redounded greatly to her credit that, in spite of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, she signed the Manchurian Convention. But little credit is given to her. And perhaps no one has any right to be sanguine. Still, that the Russian Government honestly intends to implement its promises if events permit, cannot justly be doubted. But even after the military evacuation, there will remain in Russia's possession the Liaotung Peninsula; and there will remain also in her possession long lines of railway traversing the very heart of Manchuria, and demanding protection which may at any moment become a pretext for the massing of new columns. On every page of history the lesson is written that the march of empire is never arrested except by collision with *force majeure*. The Far East, then, is the storm-centre of the world to-day.

Appendix

Appendix

NOTE 1. — That was the view taken by the United States Government in a complication of a precisely analogous character which took place a month after Admiral Seymour's fruitless operation. The Chinese fired twice from their forts on American boats, killing one man. Two U. S. ships thereupon bombarded the forts, captured them, and destroyed their armament, consisting of 176 guns. The Viceroy treated this incident with marked *nonchalance*. He wrote to say that there was no subject of strife between the two countries, but that it would be advisable to furnish his people with some clear means of identifying the American flag. The U. S. Representative at once resumed friendly relations. He considered that the penalty inflicted was an ample punishment, and that there need not be any talk of apologies or guarantees.

NOTE 2. — The singular difficulty experienced by some Europeans in seeing any stand-point but their own is illustrated by a statement emanating from Mr. Consul Parkes. Writing two months after the first entry into Canton he said: "As yet there is no war with China, but simply at Canton, and that because the Commissioner chose to *declare* it." Now, what had happened was this. According to a previous letter from the same pen, "on the 23d and 24th of August the Admiral entered and dismantled various forts in the vicinity of Canton; on the 27th and 28th he fired slowly on the residence of the Commissioner;" and on the 28th the Commissioner, sitting under a storm of British shell, penned a proclamation calling on his nationals to "exterminate the English barbarians." Such was the sequence of events that seemed to Mr. Parkes to justify him in ascribing the existence of a state of war to the Commissioner's declaration!

NOTE 3. — Mr. A. Michie in "The Englishman in China."

NOTE 4. — Baron Gros, writing from Peking on October 21, 1860, to General de Montauban, said: "The evacuation of Chusan is settled in principle by Lord Elgin and me in order to put an end to the differences which have occurred between the allies occupying the island collectively, and because, if our troops are there, it is only to prevent the English from being there alone, and from making another Hongkong before Yangtse." It must be admitted that however high-handed some of England's procedure in the Far East may have been, she has always showed herself free from the unreasoning jealousy displayed in the above extract. "Another Hongkong" would simply have been another trade where men of all nations might engage in commerce on absolutely equal terms, and under the freest system in the world. But the French Envoy's blind jealousy of England rendered him indifferent to the common cause of all the nations. If such men directed the policy of China, when would a reign of liberality and enlightenment be inaugurated in Peking?

NOTE 5. — Vide "Russia on the Pacific" by "Vladimir."

NOTE 6. — "The possession of Shanghai, and the access thus given to foreign supplies, would soon render them a much more formidable body than they have hitherto been." — Sir F. Bruce to Lord J. Russell, August 1, 1860.

NOTE 7. — They are published in the "Life of Sir Harry Parkes," by Messrs. Lane-Pool and Dickens. Sir Harry lamented his own want of literary skill, and believed it, for he never uttered an insincere word. Yet never have abler, more lucid despatches been penned by a British diplomatist in the Far East; and if he had intended that his private letters should be a valuable contribution to the history of his time, he could not have composed them more successfully.

NOTE 8. — It subsequently appeared that one of their most intrepid leaders, the "heroic king," commonly called the "Four-eyed Dog," had, of his own accord, refrained from marching upon Hankow because he had heard that the English were established there. He "readily acquiesced" in the remarkable proposition laid down by Consul Parkes, that "it was impossible for the insurgents to occupy any emporium at which the British were established without seriously interfering with the latter's commerce." After that Mr. Parkes had no hesitation in declaring himself "favourably impressed with the modest manners and the intelligence" of the "Four-eyed Dog." The insurgent leaders at Nanking showed less cordiality in accepting that strange doctrine, but, after five days' hesitation, they promised to leave Shanghai unmolested during the course of the current year. It may have occurred to them that the question between themselves and the Manchu Government, the question whether an usurping dynasty should be driven from the throne of an empire of four hundred million inhabitants, was of more importance than some temporary inconvenience to a handful of British merchants.

NOTE 9. — In the course of the Yangtse expedition Mr. Parkes visited the city of Hwang-chow which had just been captured by the rebels. He saw men foraging in the deserted suburbs, and others pulling down houses in order to use the timber for barricades. He saw these things also: "At the gate by which we entered I observed a proclamation in the name of the Ying-wang (Taiping leader) assuring the people of protection and inviting them to come and trade freely with the troops. Another proclamation addressed to the latter prohibited them from that date from wandering into villages and plundering the people. A third notice, appended to the heads of two rebels (Taipings), made known that these men had been executed for robbing the people of their clothes while engaged in collecting grain for the troops." The Taipings themselves explained that the comparative absence of tradespeople from the walled cities in their occupation was because to admit a large civil population would have exposed them to the danger of giving access to Imperial soldiers in disguise. There can be no doubt, however, that in the concluding years of the struggle the ranks of the Taipings were recruited from the scum of the people, who, joining the insurgents for the sake of plunder, became uncontrollable in the hour of victory.

NOTE 10. — Mr. Consul Meadows, whose "Chinese Rebellions" is spoken of by the Chinese themselves as one of the truest and soundest books that have ever been published about China, wrote a remarkable despatch to Sir J. Russell from

Shanghai, February 19, 1861. In it he argued that there were no proofs whatever of Taiping incompetence to establish a strong and efficient government: said that he "had long ago arrived at the full conviction that the tales of the slaughter committed by them on their own countrymen were not only exaggerated, but very grossly exaggerated;" declared that, with regard to the disposition of the Taipings towards foreigners, there was "a long series of irrefragible proofs that they earnestly desired friendly commercial relations with us," and expressed the firm conviction that the interests of China herself and of Western Powers would be best served by assisting these insurgents.

NOTE 11. — Consul Parkes arrived at Ningpo shortly after its capture, having been sent thither by Admiral Hope. In his official report he wrote: "The Ningpo rebels have shown the utmost desire to be on friendly terms with foreigners. Outside the south gate, which formed the point of attack, stands the establishment of the Sisters of Charity, which, if occupied, would form excellent cover for an assaulting force, as its upper windows commanded the city wall; yet, although they crouched underneath its enclosures as they collected for their rush on the gate, they did not trespass for a moment within the premises. Another large Roman Catholic establishment was one of the first buildings they had to pass as they poured into the city, flushed and excited with their success; but they only stopped to welcome a small knot of foreigners who were standing underneath the porch and to charge their people to offer them no harm. Roman Catholics and Protestants they hailed indiscriminately, as being of the same religion and fraternity as themselves." . . . The house of one of the principal Chinese inhabitants, who is well known at Shanghai for his wealth and the prominent support he has always given to the Government, remains untouched, simply because he has hired a Frenchman to live in it, and give his name temporarily to the premises. Parkes himself was antipathetic to the Taipings. But it was constitutionally impossible for Parkes to be wittingly unjust.

NOTE 12. — On learning (to our surprise) that the locale of the execution ground was neither more nor less than the court-yard of the "twin pagodas" where the unhappy rebels had paid with the forfeit of their lives for trusting in the word of honour of their unprincipled assailants, we determined to pay a trip thither. . . . On entering the court-yard (about half an acre) we found the ground soaked with human blood. The creek, forming its drain, was still (after twenty days of slaughter) reddish with blood. . . . The ground for three feet deep stunk with blood. . . . Our Chinese informants told us that thirty thousand rebels had been led to these shambles and executed. We had proofs enough to know that the number was enormous. We have it on the authority of an European eye-witness that this creek was so full of decapitated rebels that the Mandarins employed boat-men to clear it by pushing the bodies with boat-hooks into the principal streams. ("Narrative of a Journey to Suchow," made shortly after the capture of the city by the Imperialists and Gordon's "ever victorious army.")

NOTE 13. — Address from the Taiping chief at Changchow to the treaty Powers, 10th February, 1865.

NOTE 14. — Her Majesty is now in her sixty-eighth year.

NOTE 15. — Speaking accurately, this decree was issued by the two Empresses Dowager; that is to say, by the principal wife of the deceased Emperor and by the mother of the reigning Emperor. But the latter's influence and ability so greatly overshadowed those of the former, that the dual regency may be regarded as that of Tsai An solely.

NOTE 16. — This Mohammedan revolt helps materially to an appreciation of the Government which the troops of France and England were employed to save from destruction by the Taipings, on the ultimate plea that "the nature of the war waged by the latter was ruthless." The revolt began in 1855, and was not subdued until 1874. Religious antipathy, though it doubtless contributed to create a line of division between the followers of Islam and their Chinese fellow-provincials, had no direct part in causing the trouble. What happened was that the success of the Mussulmans as miners having made them objects of jealous oppression, and they, on their side, having combined for self-defence, there resulted a state of disorder which the Chinese officials, under Manchu leadership, finding themselves unable to control by legitimate means, conceived the project of quelling by a wholesale massacre of the Mohammedan population. On the 19th of May, the scheme was put into execution, but though many of the Mussulmans perished, a large majority escaped, being forewarned; and the Chinese found that, instead of annihilating the followers of Islam, they had driven them to combine for a life-and-death struggle. The story of the long campaign presents three salient features — singular cruelty and treachery on the part of the Imperial commanders, who invariably massacred when they had promised to save; rivalry and dissension among the Mohammedan chiefs, without which their defeat at China's hands must have been greatly deferred if not altogether averted; and wholesale slaughter by the Imperialists in the closing scene of the tragedy. For, after the capture of Tali-fu, the Mohammedan stronghold, the Chinese General and Viceroy invited the Mussulman leaders to a banquet, where, at a given signal, the guests were butchered, preparatory to an universal massacre of the Mohammedans in the town, the finale being that three thousand women, children, and old men were driven into the lake to perish. Such were the merciful methods of officials for whose sake the Taipings, on account of their ruthless mode of warfare, were subdued by the arms of England and France. The record of Chinese doings in the Mohammedan revolt recalls those of the Israelites in the days of Gibeah, of Jabesh-gilead, and of Shiloh.

NOTE 17. — "The Englishman in China."

NOTE 18. — M. Fontanier to the French Representative in Peking, June 19, 1870. All the facts given in the text are taken from French sources.

NOTE 19. — *Vide* Chapter II.

NOTE 20. — It was by the Rev. Dr. Griffith John, one of the most active and respected of the missionaries, that these books were discovered and traced to their source.

NOTE 21. — Excellently translated into English by the Rev. S. I. Woodbridge.

NOTE 22. — An episode of this most cruel time was that, while a number of ladies and some men lay concealed during ten days in a small room of an official building, one of the number died, and it became necessary to dispose of the body or discovery must have ensued. "As a doctor," writes Dr. Stevenson, "I was asked to get rid of the body and I did. Shanghai friends may say this is disagreeable to write about. In the name of high heaven think what it was to bear these trials." Another episode was that in a small boat ladies, children, and men "packed like sardines" for ten days, were all sick with dysentery and two of the children died.

NOTE 23. — The author of "China in Convulsion" writes: "Many of the foreigners employed in the actual work (of railway building) speak no Chinese, and it is unquestionable that multitudes of the workmen have been shamefully maltreated during the progress. This is said to have been the case with the Belgian management of the Lu-Han road (the line from Peking southward and westward *viâ* the capital of Chili), "and in a marked degree with the German work in Shantung, and perhaps still more so with that of the Russians in Manchuria. The aggregate of all these hostile feelings is a formidable total, and when it is discharged in one avalanche the effect may well be to attract the attention of the world."

NOTE 24. — For an excellent account of this extraordinary mania of reform in Peking, see "China in Convulsion," by the Rev. A. H. Smith, and the columns of that well informed journal, the *North-China Daily News*.

NOTE 25. — If Kang Yu-wei seems to be slightingly alluded to in the text, it is because of his unwise precipitancy, not at all because his character or learning deserves disparagement. He appears to be a man of high ability and splendid courage. Wen Ching says of him: "The historical works of Kang Yu-wei are of the highest importance in developing a new notion of the teaching of the ancient classics. Through a series of brilliant commentaries Kang endeavours to show that there is no authority in the Sacred Books to justify the conservatism and retrograde policy either of the Mandarins or of the Government. Kang had a thorough preparation for his work, and he has, besides, the advantage of belonging to a family of rank and position. The conservative scholars resented his interpretation of the classics, and ironically gave him the *soubriquet* of 'The Modern Sage.'" Kang must be pronounced a scholar and a philosopher. His literary labours are extensive and of the highest order. Mention may be made of "Confucius as a Reformer;" "The Study of Fundamental Principles;" "On the Rise and Fall of the Nations of the World;" "The History of the Glory and Downfall of Turkey;" "A History of the Constitutional Changes in England;" "The History of Continental Europe;" "Japanese Literature;" "An Examination into the Customs and Social Usages of the Nations," etc. He was warmly patronised by the great and enlightened Viceroy Chang Chih-tung; and among his most conspicuous efforts in the cause of reform, just before the unhappily rash effort of the Emperor in Peking, was the publication in Shanghai of a periodical called Shi-wa-pao (news of the times). It is stated by Kang's friends that he counselled the Emperor in favour of moderation, but that His Majesty would not hearken.

NOTE 26. — Germany, Russia, England, and France having obtained "leases" of eligible regions in China, Italy seems to have felt chilly in her isolation. She demanded a bay all for her own self on the coast of Chekiang. China declined. The Peking statesmen seem to have thought that the line must be drawn somewhere.

NOTE 27. — The Rev. A. H. Smith describes the expedition to Ts'ang-chou in the following terms: "The Magistrate of the city had always been friendly to the foreigners, who had just removed the station of the London Mission to the vicinity and put up extensive buildings. The Chinese military officer in charge of the Chili troops was General Mei, who was not only on the best of terms with the various foreigners living in that part of the province, but had made it his principal business for the greater part of the previous twelve months to fight the Boxers whenever and wherever they could be found, and had probably done more to defeat, disperse, and discourage them than any other man in China. The Germans made a raid upon Ts'ang-chou, plundered the *Yamên* of the Magistrate and that of General Mei, who prudently retired to a distance upon their approach. They released all the Boxer prisoners whom they found in the city jail, returning to Tientsin in triumph, whence a despatch was sent to Shanghai informing the world of "A Successful Attack," saying that "the Germans have routed General Mei's forces at Ts'angchou, looted his baggage and killed forty-three men."

NOTE 28. — Sir Robert Hart says: "From Taku to Peking the foreigners has marched triumphantly; there have only been a few fights, and every foot of ground has not had to be contested, but yet every hamlet or village or town along the way has the mark of the avenger on it; populations have disappeared, houses and buildings have been burned and destroyed, and crops are rotting all over the country in the absence of reapers. Remembering how these places teemed with happy, contented, industrious people last spring, it is hard to realise that autumn does not find them there — they have all vanished — and that along the one hundred and twenty miles between beach and capital scarcely a sign of life is to be seen, and one cannot help sorrowing over the necessity or the fatality which brought about such woe and desolation. Much of the destruction was doubtless the work of Chinese soldiers and Boxer volunteers, but, according to all accounts, what they left we gleaned; and, if report speaks true, little mercy was felt and less displayed, by some at least, wherever living Chinese of any age or either sex happened to be fallen in with. The days of Taipingdom, when native warred with native, showed nothing worse; and the warriors of this new century can be as brutal, with all their wonderful discipline and up-to-date weapons, as were the savages of earlier times with tomahawk, boomerang, or assegai; and the puzzle is to explain why it should have been so, or forecast the consequences in future. Will brand or sword have produced that wholesome fear which must blossom into peace and good will, or only a gruesome terror to be replaced by nothing but hate and a lust for vengeance?

NOTE 29. — The round figures for 1899 were, British Empire, 286 million taels; Japanese Empire, 53 millions; United States, 44 millions; all the rest, 69 millions.

NOTE 30. — Opium is exempted from this surtax; it remains at the old figure. Great Britain was careful to disavow any intention of restricting China's right to tax native opium. Why indeed should she impose any such restriction, seeing that the more heavily the native article is taxed, the more remote its chance of driving out Indian opium, as it is now doing? But one blow Great Britain did consent to strike at this pernicious vice. Of late years the Chinese have begun to consume morphia in ever increasing quantities. It is cheaper and handier than the ordinary form of the drug; and these qualities commend it so that, in 1901, the import reached 138,567 ounces. By the Shanghai Convention the general importation of morphia is prohibited, and precautions are adopted for restricting its use to medicinal purposes.

NOTE 31.—The best account of China's foreign trade is contained in Mr. E. H. Parker's "China;" the most attractive, in Mr. A. Michie's "The Englishman in China;" and the most critical in Mr. Byron Benan's "Report of the State of Trade of the Treaty Ports of China."

NOTE 32.—In point of fact the only Powers whose forces loyally accepted the Field-Marshal's direction were those of Great Britain and Japan. The United States declined to recognise a commander whose appointment had been for the purpose of Peking's relief, which preceded his arrival in China. The French General simply ignored German control. Russia marched her troops elsewhere. Thus England and Japan alone remained. Field-Marshal Count von Waldersee emerged with high credit from an ordeal demanding so much tact.

NOTE 33.—It is characteristic of China's international blindness that, at this crisis, when for the sake of preserving Manchuria to Manchu rule, there appeared to be a possibility of Japan's becoming involved in war with Russia, the Peking statesmen decided that their attitude must be one of strict neutrality!

EMPERORS OF CHINA

The mythical Fohi, according to native writers, is the founder of the Empire. The so-called legendary history ends with the founding of the Hia dynasty by Yu the Great (2208), though all the early rulers are more or less uncertain.

HIA DYNASTY

Order	Name	Accession
1.	Yu	2208 B.C.
2.	Tiki	2197 B.C.
3.	Taikang	2188 B.C.
4.	Chungkang	2159 B.C.
5.	Siang	2146 B.C.
6.	Chokang	2118 B.C.
7.	Chou	2057 B.C.
8.	Hoai	2040 B.C.
9.	Mang	2014 B.C.
10.	Lie	1996 B.C.
11.	Poukiang	1980 B.C.
12.	Kiung	1921 B.C.
13.	Kin	1900 B.C.
14.	Kukiang	1879 B.C.
15.	Kao	1848 B.C.
16.	Fa	1837 B.C.
17.	Kia	1818 B.C.

CHANG DYNASTY

18.	Chang	1776 B.C.
19.	Taikia	1753 B.C.
20.	Wouting	1720 B.C.
21.	Taikeng	1691 B.C.
22.	Siaokia	1666 B.C.
23.	Yungki	1649 B.C.
24.	Tai wou	1637 B.C.
25.	Chung ting	1562 B.C.
26.	Waijen	1549 B.C.
27.	Hotankia	1534 B.C.
28.	Tsouy	1525 B.C.
29.	Tsousin	1506 B.C.
30.	Woukai	1490 B.C.
31.	Tsouting	1465 B.C.
32.	Nankeng	1433 B.C.
33.	Yangkia	1408 B.C.
34.	Pankeng	1401 B.C.
35.	Siaosin	1373 B.C.
36.	Siaoy	1352 B.C.
37.	Wouting	1324 B.C.
.	. . . . . .	.[1]
38.	Linsin	1225 B.C.
39.	Kengting	1219 B.C.
40.	Wouy	1198 B.C.
41.	Taiting	1194 B.C.
42.	Tiy	1191 B.C.
43.	Chousin	1154 B.C.

CHAO DYNASTY

44.	Wou-wang	1122 B.C.
45.	Ching Wang	1115 B.C.
46.	Kang Wang	1078 B.C.
47.	Chao Wang	1052 B.C.
48.	Mou Wang	1001 B.C.
49.	Kung Wang	946 B.C.

---

[1] An interregnum, divided power or period of disorder is indicated by the dotted lines occurring in this table.

APPENDIX

Order	Name	Accession	Order	Name	Accession
50.	Y Wang	934 B.C.	65.	Kien Wang	585 B.C.
51.	Hiao Wang	909 B.C.	66.	Ling Wang	571 B.C.
52.	I Wang	894 B.C.	67.	King Wang	544 B.C.
53.	Li Wang	878 B.C.	68.	Keng Wang	519 B.C.
54.	Siuan Wang	827 B.C.	69.	Youan Wang	475 B.C
55.	Yeou Wang	781 B.C.	70.	Chingting Wang	468 B.C.
56.	Ping Wang	770 B.C.	71.	Kao Wang	440 B.C.
57.	Hing Wang.	719 B.C.	72.	Weili Wang	425 B.C.
58.	Chwang Wang	696 B.C.	73.	Gan Wang	401 B.C.
59.	Li Wang	681 B.C.	74.	Lie Wang	375 B.C.
60.	Hwei Wang	676 B.C.	75.	Hien Wang	368 B.C.
61.	Siang Wang	651 B.C.	76.	Chintsen Wang	320 B.C.
62.	King Wang	618 B.C.	77.	Nan Wang	314 B.C.
63.	Kwang Wang	612 B.C.	.	. . . . .	. .
64.	Ting Wang	606 B.C.			

TSIN DYNASTY

78.	Chow Siang	255 B.C.	81.	Ching Wang	246 B.C.
79.	Hiao Wang	250 B.C.	82.	Tsin Chi Hwangti	221 B.C.
80.	Chwang Siang Wang	249 B.C.	83.	Eulchi Hwangti	209 B.C.
			84.	Tsoupa Wang	206 B.C.

HAN DYNASTY

85.	Lew Pang	202 B.C.	92.	Sieunti	73 B.C.
86.	Hiao Hweiti	194 B.C.	93.	Yuenti	48 B.C.
87.	Kaohwang	187 B.C.	94.	Chingti	32 B.C.
88.	Wenti	179 B.C.	95.	Gaiti	6 B.C.
89.	Kingti	156 B.C.	96.	Pingti	1 A.D.
90.	Vouti	140 B.C.	97.	Wang Mang	6
.	. . . . .	. .	98.	Ti Yuen	23
91.	Chaoti	86 B.C.			

EASTERN HAN DYNASTY

99.	Kwang Vouti	25 A.D.	109.	Lingti	168 A.D.
100.	Mingti	58	110.	Hienti	190
101.	Changti	76		The Empire divided into three kingdoms and ruled by various minor princes	220–265
102.	Hoti	89			
103.	Changti II.	106			
104.	Ganti	107			
105.	Chunti	126			
106.	Chungti	145			
107.	Chiti	146			
108.	Hiuenti	147			

APPENDIX

LATER TSIN DYNASTY

Order	Name	Accession	Order	Name	Accession
111.	Vouti	265 A.D.	119.	Mouti	345 A.D.
112.	Hwaiti	290	120.	Gaiti	362
113.	Hoaiti	307	121.	Tiy	366
114.	Mingti	313	122.	Kian Wenti	371
115.	Yuangti	317	123.	Hiao Vouti	373
116.	Mingti	323	124.	Ganti	397
117.	Chingti	326	125.	Kungti	419
118.	Kangti	343			

SONG DYNASTY

Order	Name	Accession	Order	Name	Accession
126.	Vouti	420	130.	Mingti	465
127.	Ying Wang	423	131.	Gou Wang	473
128.	Wenti	424	132.	Chunti	477
129.	Vouti	454			

TSI DYNASTY

Order	Name	Accession	Order	Name	Accession
133.	Koti	479	136.	Paokwen	499
134.	Vouti	483	137.	Hoti	501
135.	Mingti	494			

LEANG DYNASTY

Order	Name	Accession	Order	Name	Accession
138.	Vouti	502	140.	Yuenti	552
139.	Wenti	550	141.	Kingti	555

CHIN DYNASTY

Order	Name	Accession	Order	Name	Accession
142.	Vouti	556	144.	Petsong	567
143.	Wenti	564	145.	Suenti	569

SOUI DYNASTY

Order	Name	Accession	Order	Name	Accession
146.	Yang Keen	580	148.	Yangti	605
147.	Vouti	601	149.	Kungti	617

TANG DYNASTY

Order	Name	Accession	Order	Name	Accession
150.	Li yuen	618	155.	Yuen Tsung	712
151.	Taitsong	627	156.	Soutsong	756
152.	Kaotsong	650	157.	Taitsong II.	763
153.	*Woo How*	683	158.	Tetsong	780
154.	Jouitsong	710	159.	Chuntsong	805

APPENDIX

Order	Name	Accession	Order	Name	Accession
160.	Hientsong	806 A.D.	165.	Hiuentsong	847 A.D.
161.	Moutsong	821	166.	Ytsong	860
162.	Kingtsong	825	167.	Hitsong	874
163.	Wentsong	827	168.	Chaotsong	889
164.	Woutsong	841	169.	Chao Hiuenti	905

FIVE SMALL AND WEAK DYNASTIES

170.	Taitsou	907	177.	Kaotsou	936
171.	Chouching	913	178.	Tsi Wang	943
172.	Ching	915	179.	Kaotsou	947
173.	Chwangtsong	923	180.	Ynti	948
174.	Mingtsong	926	181.	Taitsou	951
175.	Minti	934	182.	Chitsong	954
176.	Lou Wang	934			

SUNG DYNASTY

183.	Taitsou	960	187.	Yngtsong	1064
184.	Taitsong	976	188.	Chintsong II.	1068
185.	Chintsong I.	998	189.	Chutsong	1086
186.	Jintsong	1023	190.	Hweitsong	1101

KIN DYNASTY (NORTH)

191.	Taitsou	1115	199.	Changtsong	1190
192.	Taitsong	1123	200.	Ningtsong	1195
193.	Kingtsong	1126	201.	Choo Yungki	1209
194.	Kaotsong	1127	202.	Hiuentsong	1213
195.	Hitsong	1135	203.	Gaitsong	1224
196.	Chuliang	1149	204.	Litsong	1225
197.	Chitsong	1161	. . .	. . . . .	. .
198.	Hiaotsong	1163			

MONGOL OR YUEN DYNASTY

205.	Kublai Khan	1260	213.	Jintsong	1312
206.	Toutsong	1265	. . .	. . . . .	. .
207.	Tihien	1275	214.	Yngtsong	1321
208.	Towantsong	1276	215.	Taitingti	1322
209.	Tiping	1278	216.	Wentsong	1328
210.	Yuen Ching	1294	217.	Chunti	1333
211.	Chingtsong	1295	. . .	. . . . .	. .
212.	Woutsong	1308			

APPENDIX

MING DYNASTY

Order	Name	Accession
218.	Hongwou	1368 A.D.
219.	Kien Wenti	1398
220.	Yong Lo	1403
221.	Gintsong	1425
222.	Suentsong	1426
223.	Yugtsong	1435
224.	Hientsong	1465
225.	Hiaotsong	1488
226.	Woutsong	1506
227.	Chitsong	1522 A.D.
228.	Moutsong	1567
229.	Wanleh	1573
230.	Kwantsong	1620
231.	Teen-ke	1621
232.	Chiti	1621
233.	Hitsong	1624
234.	Hoaitsong	1628

MANCHU OR TATSING DYNASTY

235.	Chuntche	1644
236.	Kang-hi	1661
237.	Yung Ching	1722
238.	Keen Lung	1735
239.	Kaiking	1796
240.	Taokwang	1821
241.	Tien-te (Hien fung)	1850
242.	Tungche	1861
243.	Kwangsu (present ruler)	1875

TABLE OF DATES

2700 B.C.	Chinese date their first cycle.
550 B.C.	Supposed Age of Confucius.
211 B.C.	Great Wall completed.
206 B.C.	Dynasty of Han.
68–81 A.D.	Buddhism introduced.
420	Nankin becomes the capital.
635	Christians permitted to preach.
845	Christians proscribed.
1260	Pekin becomes the seat of government.
1275	Marco Polo brings missionaries.
1275	Mongol dynasty.
1517	Europeans visit Canton.
1575	Jesuits come from Rome.
1616–1644	Conquest by the Tartars.
1660	Tea carried to England.
1662	Great earthquake disaster.
1680	Traffic with East India Company begins.
1719–1727	Beginnings of commerce with Russia.
1724–1732	Jesuits expelled.
1793	Earl Macartney received by the Emperor.
1812	Edict against Christianity.
1816	Lord Amherst's embassy fails.
1834	Opium dispute begins.
1837	British commissioner settled at Canton.
1839, August 23	Hong-Kong taken by the English.
1839	British trade with China ceases.
1840, Jan. 5	Emperor's edict against England.
1841, May 1	*Hong-Kong Gazette* first published.
1841, May 31	Canton ransomed : hostilities cease.
1841, July 16	British trade reopened.
1841, Sept. 14	Bogue forts destroyed.
1842, August 29	Treaty of Peace signed.
1843, July 27	Canton opened to the British.
1848, Oct.	Destructive typhoon at Hong-Kong.
1850	Rebellion in Quang-si.
1851, March	Pretender Tien-te appears.

APPENDIX

1853	Rebels take important cities.
1857	English troops arrive ; Lord Elgin appointed envoy.
1859, July 29	Ward arrives as United States envoy.
1859, Nov. 24	Commercial treaty with the United States.
1860, Nov. 5	Allies leave Pekin.
1860, Nov. 14	Treaty with Russia.
1861, Oct. 21	Canton restored to the Chinese.
1863	Imperialists under Gordon victorious.
1864	Gordon crushes the rebels.
1864, July 18	Rebellion practically terminates.
1866, June	Chinese commissioners visit London.
1868, June 5	Chinese Embassy received at Washington.
1868, July 4	Burlingame Treaty signed.
1869, Jan. 24	Embassy received at Paris.
1870, June 21	Massacre at Tien-tsin.
1873, June 29	Foreign ministers received by the Emperor.
1874	Dispute with Japan ; settled.
1876, June 30	First railway opened.
1877, Jan 21	Decree of equal rights to Chinese Christians.
1880, Nov. 17	New treaties with the United States signed.
1883	Trouble with French at Tonquin.
1884, May 11	Treaty with France signed.
1884, August 21	War resumed.
1885, August 28	Li Hung-Chang deprived of his high offices.
1885, June 9	Treaty of peace signed.
1886	Decanville railway opened.
1887, Jan.	Proclamation for protection of Christians.
1887, August	Commercial treaty with France.
1888	Chinese Exclusion Act in the United States.
1888	Catholic Cathedral at Pekin consecrated.
1891	Kolao Hui active.
1891	Various risings against foreigners.
1899	Boxers become active.
1900	Great rising of Boxers crushed by foreign troops.
1901	Li Hung-Chang dies.

CELEBRATED CHARACTERS IN CHINESE HISTORY

A-lu-t'ai, died A.D. 1434, was a chief of the Tartars, who gave great trouble to the Emperor Yung Lo. In 1409 he set up the heir of the Yüan dynasty at Bishbalik. At first he was successful, but later suffered utter defeat.

Bôdidharma, died A.D. 535, was the last of the Eastern Patriarchs of Buddhism. Summoned to Nankin by the Emperor Wu-Ti, he offended that monarch by declaring that genuine merit lay in works, not solely in purity and wisdom. He taught that religion was not to be learned from books, but that man should seek and find the Buddha in his own heart.

Chang Ch'ang, died B.C. 48, was a distinguished scholar and official, who flourished under the Emperor Yüan-Ti of the Han dynasty. He became Governor of Shan-Yang, and later was promoted to the Governorship of the Metropolitan district. He ruled with such vigilance and wisdom that it was said of him that "the alarm drum was not struck for nine years."

Chen Li, 1252–1333, was able, at three years of age, to repeat the whole of the *Canon of Filial Piety* and the *Analects* of Confucius. At seven Chen qualified for his *chin shih* degree, and at fifteen he was recognized as the greatest literary authority of his neighbourhood.

Cheng Miao, in the third century B.C., invented the Lesser Seal character, and later brought forward the Li script from which the modern clerkly style was developed.

Chi Chang was a famous archer of old, who began his practice by lying three years under his wife's loom, that he might learn to keep from blinking.

Chi Pu, in the second and third centuries B.C., rose to be Governor of Ho-tung. It was a saying of the people that Chi's word was better than a hundred ounces of gold.

Ch'in Hiu-tien, who lived 1697–1759, earned a great reputation for piety and an extraordinary knowledge of precedent. He was famous as a writer on ceremonial observances.

Chou Ya-fu was a Chinese general of unusual prominence who died B.C. 152. Most of his victories were against the invading Hsiung-nu. It is said of him that when the Emperor himself came to his stronghold, he was unable to gain admittance until Chou had given the necessary orders. This action, with many others of similar independence of spirit, was justified by success, and the Emperor advanced him to the highest posts. While under the passing displeasure of his monarch, Chou starved himself to death.

Chu Hsi, 1130–1200, the famous commentator, was a native of Fuhkien. Much against his will, he was induced to take office; but he was deprived of his honours through the violent and persistent attacks of his enemies. He passed his last days in retirement. Chu Hsi was a voluminous writer, and the foremost of all commentators on the Confucian *Canon.*

Chu Shou-chang, 1031–1102, was one of the twenty-four great examples of filial piety. Chu was sent to the capital as a child, leaving his mother, who was a concubine. When he had grown to manhood, he determined to find her. He resigned his high office and took upon himself the severest tasks in the effort to succeed in his search. After a separation of fifty years the quest was successful, and Chu was at once restored to his high position at Court.

Chun-yu Kun was a famous wit, and contemporary of Mencius.

Confucius [K'ung Ch'iu], B.C. 551–479, was the great philosopher of China. At an early age he was raised to be Minister of Justice of Lu. The State prospered under his guidance; but in 495, because of the dissoluteness of his Prince, he resigned, and thereafter wandered from State to State, giving such advice and aid as the rulers would accept. In addition to teaching, he collected and edited the old national lyrics, now known as the *Odes,* and wrote and edited much. His *Discourses,* probably written by his disciples, contain the sayings and philosophy of the Sage.

Feng-Tao, 881–954, was a native of Ying Chou, who has been credited by some with the invention of block printing. An official high in the government, he was called by a sobriquet which would correspond with the "Vicar of Bray." Through his time-serving he is said to have held office under no less than ten different rulers.

Han Po-yu was a "filial son" of the Han dynasty. In early life he never cried when his mother beat him; but later, he always wept on such occasions. When asked by his mother for the reason of his altered attitude, he replied: "Formerly your blows hurt me, and I knew you were strong and well. Now they do not, and I know from that that your strength is failing; therefore I weep."

Hsi Chih, who lived in the fifth century B.C., was one of the most famous of Chinese beauties. Hsi was made the instrument, by the Prince of Yuen, of the destruction of his dreaded rival, the Prince of Wu.

APPENDIX

Hsiang Hsin was one of the famous seven sages of the Bamboo Grove. He was a very versatile man and of a sympathetic, kindly disposition. His amiability was so great that he often suffered severely at the hands of those calling themselves his friends.

Hsiao T'ung, who lived A.D. 501–531, was the eldest son of Hsiao Yen, the founder of the Liang dynasty. Before he was five years old, he was said to have learned the classics. Universally beloved by his people, he was exceptionally able in the conduct of government, and always inclined to the side of mercy. When the price of grain rose, he lived on the most frugal fare and conducted very large secret charities.

Hsieh Ling-yu'n distinguished himself in the fourth century B.C. by his extraordinary eccentricity.

Huang Tao-chen, about A.D. 280, is said to have discovered a creek which led him to an unknown region inhabited by the descendants of fugitives from the troublous times of the Chin dynasty. Huang Tao-chen returned home after a sojourn with them, but was never able to find the creek again.

Kao Yün was one of the most distinguished of the scholars and statesmen of the Northern Wei dynasty. For fifty years he laboured with diligence and integrity in the cause of his country.

Kuan Yu, died 219, spent all his life in fighting. After his death he received regular worship as the god of War, and temples were built all over China in his honour.

Kumarajiva, who died in 412, is known as one of the Four Suns of Buddhism. He is reported to have been in the habit of repeating each day one thousand hymns.

Kung, the sixth son of the Emperor Tao Kuang, is commonly known as Prince Kung. In 1860 he was plenipotentiary for the conclusion of peace with the Europeans. The tact and resource of Kung won the admiration of his opponents, but the circumstances made it impossible for him to obtain any concessions. He was the first President of the Tsung-li Yamen, and dealt vigorously with the dynastic crisis which arose at the death of his brother Hsien Feng. In 1865 he was for a short time removed from his high positions, and he suffered brief temporary degradations at various subsequent periods. In 1894 Kung co-operated with Li Hung-chang in taking measures against the Japanese.

Kuo Tzu-i, 697–781, was a renowned Chinese general who rose to the highest command. He repulsed a number of dangerous invasions, and for his services was made a Prince and later canonised.

Lao Tse, a contemporary of Confucius, stands next to that philosopher in fame and importance. He is popularly regarded as the founder of the Taoist sect, and he is one of the three images in the Taoist Trinity. Naturalism is the essence of Lao Tse's doctrines. He taught men to return good for evil and to look forward to a higher life. But it is upon the strange and wonderful doctrine of Inaction that his chief claim to immortality is founded. "Do nothing and all things will be done" is its maxim.

Li-Chi, who lived 584–669, was a labourer who turned bandit, and later rose to power, conducting a successful campaign against the Turkic tribes and conquering Korea. Li-Chi was noted for sharing the credit of victory with his officers and dividing the booty.

Li Hung-chang, 1822–1901, was the most famous Chinese of modern times and the best known to Europeans. He was a native of Ho-fei, in Anhui. After taking his degree in 1847 he entered the Han-lin College. In 1853 he attracted notice by his brave fighting against the Taiping rebels. For his successes Li was made Governor of Kiangsu, but his character was stained by his base act of treachery in allowing the captured rebel princes to be slain. But after the end of the rebellion Li was made an Earl, and in 1867 he became Viceroy of Hu-Kuang. Three years later he was made Viceroy of Chih-li, and in 1874, when the Emperor Tungche was dying and the succession was endangered, Li came to the rescue and by vigorous measures put an end to the conspiracy. The next year Li was made Senior Grand Secretary, and held office through many crises until the Japanese war of 1894. In the disasters which rushed upon China at that time he lost his honours and was sent to Japan to sue for peace. In 1896, as Special Commissioner, Li attended the coronation of the Czar of Russia, later making an extended tour through Europe and the United States. On his return to China he continued to hold a great amount of power, and was a prominent figure at the time of the Boxer troubles in 1899 and 1900. Li Hung-chang died in 1901.

Li-Pi, who was born in 722, was able to compose at seven years of age, and became, on account of his precocity, a great favourite at Court. He was once obliged to flee from it because of a plot against him, but returned to greater power than before. Li-Pi was a student of Taoism, and devoted himself to breathing in the fashion which that sect believes will bring immortality. He had an immense library which filled 30,000 shelves.

Lien Hsi-hsien, 1234–1280, sometimes known as "Mencius," was one of the most famous of Chinese *literati* and statesmen. He was minister of state at twenty-nine and a powerful upholder of Confucianism.

Lin Ling went up for his degree in 265, but was "plucked" for an essay extolling the doctrine of Inaction. Lin was one of the seven poets of the famous club known as the Bamboo Grove.

Ling Lun was one of the Assistants of the Yellow Emperor and the reputed inventor of the art of music.

Liu Chin, who died in 1510, was a Eunuch who under the Tsung and Ming dynasties rose to be the virtual head of the government. He and his seven intimate colleagues were so much dreaded that they were known as the "Eight Tigers."

Ma Hou, the virtuous Empress Ma, died in 79. She would wear only the coarsest dresses which could be dyed, and did many other things of like nature, to set her subjects an example of thrift.

Ma Jung, a man of profound learning, who was known as the "Universal Scholar," was born 79 and died 166.

Meng Ko, B.C. 372–289, known to foreigners as Mencius, studied under Kung Chi, the grandson of Confucius. Having attained to a perfect comprehension of the Tao of Confucius, Mencius became, at forty-five, Minister of the Chi State. But the ruler would not carry out his principles, and Mencius threw up his post. He then wandered away to several States, giving what advice and aid he could, much in the manner of Confucius himself. At length he returned to Chi and for a time resumed his old position. He soon retired to private life, however, and spent the remainder of his days in teaching and in preparing the philosophical treatises which bear his name. His criterion was that of Confucius; but his teachings were on a somewhat lower plane. He was justly nominated the "Second Prophet."

Min Sun was one of the disciples of Confucius, by whom he was regarded as the "perfect man." Min was also one of the twenty-four examples of Piety.

P'an Fei, a favourite concubine of Hsiao Pao-chuan, is said to have been the one to introduce the practice of cramping the feet.

Seng-ko-lin-sin was the famous Mongol general who opposed the advance of the British and French armies upon Pekin in the war of 1860. He was popularly known to the Europeans as "Sam Collinson."

Su Wei-tao was a high official of the seventh century, who became famous because of his purposely vacillating policy. His favourite saying was: "If you definitely take one side, you may repent it; by taking neither you may always take either."

Sun Ch'ang-ju, a scholar of the Sung dynasty, was noted for his vast collection of books.

Sun Kang, a native of Lo-yang in the fourth century, in youth was so poor that he could afford no light by which to read. He pursued his studies by the reflected light of the snow.

APPENDIX

Sun Shih-i, 1720–1796, was, even among Chinese youths, remarkable for his studiousness. He is said to have kept drowsiness from interfering with his studies by knocking his head against the wall. In 1788 he became Viceroy of the Two Kuang. He was made a Duke, and, at his death, canonised. Sun Shih-i was famous, in addition to the characteristics marked above, for his extraordinary physical powers.

Sun Shu Ao, in the sixth century B.C., three times became Prime Minister without joy, and three times was expelled from the office with no feelings of resentment, as he was conscious that the promotions were due to his own merit and the degradations to the faults of others.

Tan-tai Mieh-ming was a disciple of Confucius. He was extremely ugly, but possessed extraordinary mental endowments.

Tao Chih, a famous brigand of the Robin Hood type, was a contemporary of Confucius.

INDEX

INDEX

ABU ZAID, Arab traveller, on the sack of Kanpu, x. 141.

Administration. *See* Government.

Agriculture, area of cultivated land in China, x. 9, 10; staple products, 9; area of cultivated land in Japan, 10, 271; sufficiency of its resources in China, 10–12, xii. 219.

Aiguebille, P. A. d', French officer in the Taiping rebellion, xii. 100.

Alceste, British frigate, fight at Canton, x. 214.

Alcock, Sir Rutherford, on attitude toward foreigners at Shanghai, xi. 193, 200; demonstration on Shanghai, 195, 196; on Prince Ch'un, xii. 107; on the restitution of Catholic property, 112; on the position of foreigners in China, 217.

Amherst, Lord, British ambassador to China, x. 212–214.

Amoy, blockaded in Opium War, xi. 17; captured, 28; opened to foreign commerce, 37; captured by the Triads, 250; massacre by imperial troops, 251.

Amur River, Russia gains control, xii. 45–49.

Analects of Confucius, extracts from, xi. 67–81; character, 214.

Ancestral worship, introduction, xi. 46; Confucius' contribution, 58; character in the original religion, 58–61; Confucius on, 78; principle of selection of site of tomb, 108; mortuary customs, 111–116; perverted by Taoism, 116; Catholic attitude, 120, 127–129, 134, xii. 123; Protestant attitude, xi. 151.

Anchoritism, development from Laotsu's philosophy, xi. 93, 283.

Andrade, Perez de, Portuguese commander, voyage to China, x. 171.

Andrade, Simon de, Portuguese commander, conduct in China, x. 172; expelled, 172.

Anglo-French War, causes, xi. 274–279, xii. 1–10, 239; capture of Canton, 10, 11; Elgin's policy, 11; reasons for the French war, 11; demands on China, 12; first treaty, 13; interest of Russia and America, 13; question of diplomatic representation, 14–17, 34, 56; renewal over question of exchange of ratifications, 17–21; preparation for advance, 25; further demands refused, 25; capture of the Peiho forts, 26, 27; advance on Peking, 27–30; conduct of the allied troops, 32–34; cession of Kowloon,

Anglo-French War (*continued*): 37; real and forged cession to France concerning Catholic property, 41–44, 111–115, 117; occupation of Canton, 51–55; treaty provisions on commerce and intercourse, 56; expected effect on China, 91; treaty provisions on religious freedom, 115–117.
Anhwei province, statistics, x. 31.
Annam. *See* Tonquin.
Anson, George, British commodore, disregards Chinese neutral rights, x. 202.
Arabs, trade with China, x. 137, 143; attacks on Canton, 138; factories in Canton, 140.
Area, of Chinese Empire, x. 4, 5; of cultivated land, 9; of the provinces, 29–31.
Aristocracy, xi. 202–204; imperial clan, xii. 106.
Army, independence of provincial, x. 41; composition, 57–60; changes under Occidental influence, 60, 64–68, xii. 97; efficiency, x. 60–69; imperial policy on, 64, xii. 98, 109, 110; certain reasons for late failures considered, x. 69–74; character of the officers, 73, xi. 24; no medical staff, x. 73; hope for better conditions, 74; supply of munitions, 77, 78, xii. 99; decline of the military class, x. 133; Russian mercenaries, 184; reform left to local initiative, xii. 104, 108. *See also* Warfare.
Arrow episode at Canton, xi. 274–279, xii. 1–3, 7. *See also* Anglo-French War.
Art, Confucius on, xi. 81.
Astronomy, Chinese knowledge, xi. 130–132.

BALANCE OF POWER in China, beginning and illustration of the doctrine, xii. 35–50, 240.
Banqueting Court, x. 82.
"Barbarian" not proper interpretation of the Chinese term, x. 220, 273.
Belloney, Henry de, acting French minister, announces the fall of Korea, xii. 166.
"Belly-band" of Chinese official, x. 45.
Benevolences in China, x. 119.
Bible, translation, x. 154, xi. 152.
Black Flags in Tonquin, xii. 157.
Bonham, Sir George, Governor of Hongkong, and the Taipings, xi. 246–248.
Book of Mencius, character, xi. 214.
Boundaries of China, x. 12.
Bourboulon, M. de, French envoy in Anglo-French War, xii. 19.
Bowring, Sir John, Governor of Hongkong, and the City Question at Canton, xi. 265–270, xii. 2–10.
Boxer rising, foreign indemnity, x. 122, xii. 217; object of the organisation, 198–200; cause of the outbreak, 200–202; outrages on Christians, 202–204; in Peking, 204; Seymour's attempt to relieve Peking, 204; and the foreign legations, 205, 207; foreign attack on the Taku forts, 205, 206; motive of the

INDEX

Boxer rising (*continued*) :
attack, 207; responsibility for the foreign war, 208; events of the foreign war, 209; question of punishment of leaders, 210–213; as a patriotic movement, 211, 227; massacre by Russians, 213; conduct of the allied forces, 213–215, 246, 247; treaty measures to prevent future outbreaks, 215; military measures of the treaty, 215–217.

Brown, Horace, British officer, explorations in southern China, xii. 154.

Bruce, Sir Frederick, British envoy in Anglo-French War, xii. 19, 25, 34; and the Taipings, 60, 71–74, 89; introduces the "joint-note" system, 163.

Buddhism, introduction, x. 147, xi. 99; imperial patronage and growth, x. 148; liberality, 148; collision with Christianity, 154; resemblance to Catholicism, 155, xi. 142–147; and Taoism, 99, 118; as a state creed, 117; imperial denunciation, 147.

Buffer states, Chinese policy, x. 170, 172.

Burgevine, H. A., American adventurer, in the Taiping rebellion, xii. 59.

Burmah, trade route with China, x. 22.

Cabinet, imperial, composition, x. 51; duties, 52; premier, 52; efficiency, 53.

Canon of Filial Piety, Chinese textbook, xi. 207.

Canton, climate, x. 30, 33; capital of Kwangtung, 31; rainfall, 34; viceroyal capital, 39; Arab factory at, 137, 140; early customs inspectorate at, 137; attacked by Arabs, 138; tradal conditions in eighteenth century, x. 194–209; conditions in the foreign factories, 222; blockaded in Opium War, xi. 17; attacks on, during Opium War, 20, 22; ransomed, 23; becomes a treaty port, 37; City Question after the Opium War, 178–192, 263–270, 278, xii. 3–9; anti-foreign spirit, xi. 182; conduct toward foreigners becomes model for other treaty ports, 197–200; attacked by rebels, 267–269; *Arrow* episode, 274–279, xii. 1–3, 7; attacked at beginning of Anglo-French War, xi. 278; captured, xii. 10; occupation of the allies, 51–55. *See also* Opium, Trade (foreign, preconventional).

Capitals of the provinces, x. 31.

Caricatures, influence on foreign affairs, x. 203, xi. 219.

Carpini, John of Plano, friar, sent to China, x. 158, 160.

Cassini Convention, xii. 188, 193.

Caste lacking in China, xi. 52.

Celestial Kingdom, origin of term, x. 3.

Cemeteries and arable lands, x. 10, 271. *See also* Ancestral worship.

Censorate, duties, x. 78–81.

Century of Surnames, Chinese textbook, xi. 206.

Ceremonial Court, x. 82.

INDEX

Chah-ho, name for the Grand Canal, x. 24.

Chang, hero, xi. 224.

Chang Chih-tung, viceroy, army reorganisation, x. 63, 64; on the opium trade, xii. 175.

Chang Taoling, ancestor of the Taoistic popes, xi. 104.

Chang-kiang, name for the Yangtse, x. 18.

Changsha, capital of Hunan, x. 31.

Changtsu, expounder of Laotsu's philosophy, xi. 92.

Chapdelaine, Auguste, Catholic missionary, killed, xii. 11.

Character, Chinese, founded on Confucian ethics, xi. 83.

Charity, of the foreign residents, xi. 156, 159, xii. 170; Chinese, xi. 157.

Chekiang province, statistics, x. 31.

Chen, female leader of the Triads, xi. 227.

Chengtu, viceroyal capital, x. 39.

Chi, terrestrial spirits of original Chinese religion, xi. 44.

Chieh, early ruler of China, xi. 50.

Chienlung, Emperor, conquests, x. 152; antipathy to Mohammedanism, 152; trade edicts, 197, 207; and Christianity, xi. 137; measures against secret societies, 225.

Chih-fu, fu magistrate, x. 38.

Chih-hien, hien magistrate, x. 38.

Children, purchase of, by Catholic and Buddhist priests, x. 161, xi. 145, xii. 124; Catholic secret baptism of moribund, xi. 145–147; kidnapping, xii. 124.

Chili province, statistics, x. 31; rainfall, 34; viceroyalty, 39.

Chin dynasty, xi. 98.

China, origin of name, x. 2; various names for, 2–4; strategic points on boundary, 13; statistics of the provinces, 29–31.

Chinese, specific race, courage, x. 60.

Chingtu, capital of Szechuan, x. 31.

Chinkiang, defence in the Opium War, x. 62, xi. 30–33.

Chou, Duke, collects the *Shih-king* xi. 48.

Chou Han, writer of anti-Christian brochures, xii. 174.

Chou, administrative unit, x. 37, 272.

Chou dynasty, xi. 50.

Christianity, early toleration in China, x. 138; responsible for Chinese foreign troubles, 144, xii. 111; Dutch check propagandism in Formosa, x. 182; and Confucianism, xi. 84; of the Taipings, 229–239, 247, 250, 284, xii. 89; official toleration forced, 115; and ancestral worship, 123; missions and extraterritoriality, 123, 135–145; outrages on the missions, 148, 173, 176, 189, 244; hostility to, 172; literature against, 173; outrages on missionaries made ground for territorial aggression, 190; heroism during the Boxer rising, 202–204; movement for a Chinese-foreign commission on the missions, 221. *See also* Greek Church, Nestorians, Protestant, Roman Catholic.

INDEX

Chu Tsun, memorial against opium, xi. 4.

Chu-kiang. *See* Pearl River.

Ch'un, Prince, father of the present Emperor, president of the Naval Board, x. 75; position at Court, xii. 94, 105; policy, 107.

Chung Hou, Imperial Commissioner of Trade, and the massacre at Tientsin, xii. 125–128, 131.

Chung-king, commercial importance, x. 17.

Chung-kwok, name for China, x. 2, 4.

Chung-wang. *See* Li.

Chung-Yung, Theory of Morals, xi. 215.

Chunhai, captured in Opium War, xi. 28.

Chusan Island, British base in Opium War, xi. 17.

Cities, inadequate police control, xi. 181.

Civil Office, Board of, x. 54.

Civil service, duties of the Board of Civil Office, x. 54; restrictions on officials, 85; triennial catalogue of official conduct, 85; vicissitudes in, 85; punishments, 86; license, 86; character, 86–89; and education, xi. 202; preparation for, 208–218; purchase of admission, 212; waiting list, 218, 220; condition of those who fail to pass, 219. *See also* Government.

Civilisation, self-centred, x. 1; self-esteem, 3; lack of public spirit, 28; courage, 60–62, 71; capacity for organisation and failure in practice, 77, 78; passion for exchange, 128; influence of Confucianism, xi. 83–85; not hostile to Western secular learning, 141; charity, 157.

Clans in China, xi. 222; imperial, xii. 106.

Classes in China, x. 131–134, xi. 52, 202–204.

Clemency, liable to misrepresentation in China, xi. 24.

Climate of China, x. 30–36.

Cochin China, early trade with China, x. 143.

Cojat, Nestorian monk, x. 157.

Colledge, Dr. T. R., medical mission, xi. 156.

Colonial Department, organisation and duties, x. 81.

Commerce. *See* Trade.

Comprador, functions and character, x. 126–128.

Confucianism, and Buddhism, x. 148; basis of character of all educated Chinese, xi. 83; as a state religion, 84, 117, 118; and Christianity, 84; and Laotsu's philosophy, 91, 95; ethics rather than religion, 93; democratic tendencies, 95–97; Shih attempts to overthrow, 97. *See also* Confucius.

Confucius, on the *Shu-king,* xi. 47; contribution to ancestral worship, 58; on man, 62; on immortality, 64; relation to the original religion of China, 65; life, 66; misinterpreted, 66; selection of his sayings, 67–81; edits the *Shu-king* and *Shih-king,* 215; author of *Spring and Autumn,* 216; nobility of descendants, 203. *See also* Confucianism.

INDEX

Cook, Wingrove, on the Portuguese pirates, xi. 274.

Co-operation in China, xi. 221–223.

Copper Steeds Society, xi. 224.

Cordier, Henri, on the restitution of Catholic property, xii. 113.

Corruption, official, x. 46–48, 90; military, 69, 72.

Corvino, John of Monte, begins Catholic propagandism in China, x. 161; buys children, 161; success, 162; translates the New Testament, xi. 152.

Cosmogony, of original Chinese religion, xi. 53–58; Taoistic, 105.

Courage, Chinese, x. 60–62, 71.

Courbet, A. A. P., French admiral, attack on Foochow, xii. 159–162.

Court of Errors, formal duties, x. 76.

Creation. *See* Cosmogony.

Customs duties, supervised by foreigners, x. 114, xi. 260; controlled by imperial government, x. 115, 116; used for payment of foreign debt, 116, xii. 218; native, x. 117; beginnings, 137; regulation after the Opium War, xi. 170; smuggling, 258–260; and the Taipings, 261, xii. 61.

D'Aguilar, Sir G. C., British general, expedition against Canton, xi. 188.

Davis, Sir J. F., on Portuguese tradal policy, x. 175, 192; on the attempt to extend the tradal area, 216; and the opium trade,

Davis, Sir J. F. (*continued*): xi. 176; and the Canton trouble, 187, 188, 190.

Debt. *See* Finance.

Delavay, J. F. J. Catholic missionary, injured by a mob, xi. 121.

Dent, Mr., British merchant at Canton, and the opium trouble, x. 261, 263, 264.

Desfléches, Bishop Eugène, and the attack on Catholic missions, xii. 121.

"Devoted men," feature of village co-operation, xi. 223.

Diplomatic representation at Peking, question of establishing, xii. 14–17, 34, 56; and the Boxers, 205, 207, 216.

Divination in original Chinese religion, xi. 44, 57. *See also* Superstitions.

Dominicans in China, xi. 123, 127.

Doudart de Lagrée, Ernest, explorations in southern China, xii. 153.

Dutch, first intercourse with China, x. 179; religious policy in Formosa, 181; tradal policy, 181–183.

Earth, worship of, xi. 50.

East India Company, first relations with China, x. 189, 192–194; attempt to establish consular representatives at Canton, 195; character of intercourse at Canton, 195, 206, 210; attempt to extend tradal area, 216; fall, 217; opium trade, 237, 240.

East River, x. 21.

INDEX

Eclipse, rites concerning, x. 57.

Edkins, Joseph, *Poppy in China*, x. 233.

Education, missionary schools, xi. 159; and the anti-foreign sentiment, 161, 162, 219; and aristocracy, 202–204; primary, 204–208; preparation for the civil service, 208–218; condition of those who fail, 219, 228; students sent to Europe, xii. 101; reforms, 230.

Elders of the imperial Cabinet, x. 51.

Elgin, Earl of, policy in Anglo-French War, xii. 11, 13, 15.

Elliot, Charles, British superintendent of trade at Canton, and the opium trade, x. 242, 247, 252, 257–260, 263–267, xi. 7–9; policy, x. 247–249; in the Opium War, xi. 17, 23.

Emperor, divine right, x. 50; succession, 50; not a despot, 50; responsible for disasters, 51, 88, xi. 25; and the Cabinet, 52; and the Privy Council, 53; subject to censure, 79; his legates, 84; status in the original Chinese religion, xi. 51–53, 62.

Empress Dowager. *See* Tsai An.

England, beginning of intercourse with China, x. 187–190, 192–194; first embassy, 207–209; second embassy and attack on Chinese forts, 212–215; sailors attacked, 215; establishment of an official trade superintendent at Canton, 218–222; importance of Chinese trade, 232, xii. 247; attitude in intercourse with China, x. 245; commercial liberality in China, xi. 173, xii. 240; temper of its communities in the East, xi. 185; and the Taipings, 245–248, 254, 261, xii. 60–62, 64–86, 240; leases Kowloon peninsula, 37, 194; Margary episode, 151–155; sphere of influence, 184, 193; leases Wei-hai-wei, 193; and the overthrow of the reform movement, 197; alliance with Japan, 236; recent trade and intercourse convention, 218–221. *See also* Anglo-French War, Canton, East India Company, Hongkong, Opium, Trade (foreign, especially preconventional).

Epic poetry unknown in China and Japan, xi. 48.

Ethics. *See* Confucius, Laotsu.

Etiquette, importance and control, x. 56.

Expediency, Confucius on, xi. 82.

Expenditures. *See* Finance.

Extraterritoriality, first recognition, x. 189; crux in the opium trouble, xi. 169; and the *Arrow* episode, 275; and the missions, xii. 123, 135–145; movement toward abolition, 221; abolition essential, 224–226, 228.

FABER, Catholic missionary, miracles, xi. 144.

Fahhien, Buddhist monk, travels, x. 139.

Falls, F. J., director of the Kiangnan arsenal, xii. 99.

Family group, influence, x. 28, 49; character, xi. 222.

Famines in China, xii. 171.

INDEX

Filial piety, Confucius on, xi. 77. *See also* Ancestral worship.

Finances, revenue of the provinces, x. 30, 31; provincial autonomy, 41, 94, 95; amount of the revenue, 92; metallic unit, 93; estimation and apportionment of the imperial assessment, 94, 95; collection of the revenue, 95; lack of an auditing system, 95, 97; sources and amount of revenue, 97, 101, 106, 113–120; relation of revenue to amount of tax paid, 98–101, 106, 113, 114, 117; imperial control of customs, 114–116; customs duties and the foreign debt, 116; share of Peking in the revenue, 120; transmission of revenue, 121, 124; expenditures, 121; foreign loans and indemnity, 122; rotten condition, 123. *See also* Taxation.

Five Classics, character, xi. 46–50, 54, 214–217.

Flint, Mr., journey to Peking, x. 204.

Fontanier, H. V., French consul, and the massacre at Tientsin, xii. 125–128.

Foochow, capital of Fuhkien, x. 31; viceroyal capital, 39; opened to foreign trade, xi. 37; arsenal or ship-building yard at, xii. 99–101; French attack in 1884, 159–162.

Food, staples, x. 9; sufficiency of supply, 10–12.

Foreign relations, control, x. 41; High Commissioners, 42; organisation of department, 81; circumlocution, 82; foreign demands for reform in department, 82; early liberalism toward foreigners, 138, 139, 143, 164, 165; early illiberal actions of local officials, 144, 151; correspondence of Innocent IV. and the Grand Khan, 158; mutual tone of intolerance and superiority, 159, 190, 217–221, 242, 245, xi. 13, 160–162; Ming policy of securing tributary states, x. 167; meaning of the tribute-bearing missions, 168–170; policy of buffer states, 170, 172; first contact with modern Europe, 170–172; Portuguese outrages and expulsion from the mainland, 172–174; effect of Portuguese action on Chinese opinion of foreigners, 175–177, 192; change in Portuguese policy, 174; first contact with the Spaniards, 177–179; first contact with the Dutch, 179; Dutch policy, 181–183; early relations with Russia, 183–186; first foreign treaty, 184; early relations with France, 187; early English attempts to establish intercourse, 187; disregard of Chinese national rights, 202, 203, 209–212, 214; first British embassy, 207–209; second British embassy, 212–215; reception of foreigners in the interior, 224–228; conduct of foreigners responsible for anti-foreign sentiment, 228–231, xi. 13, 140–142, 164, 192, xii. 150; Chinese diplomacy not based on duplicity, xi. 18; policy of playing off nations

Foreign relations (*continued*): against each other, 22; charity of the foreign residents, 156, xii. 170; anti-foreign sentiment of the literati, xi. 161, 162, 219–221; present and future aspects, 165, xii. 221–236; importance of considering the impression made on China by, xi. 166; Chinese misconceptions of Occidental Powers, 167; beginning and character of American relations, 173–175, xii. 21–25, 239; City Question at Canton, xi. 178–192, 263–270,278, xii. 3–9; conditions in Shanghai as a treaty port, xi. 192–197; doctrine that China is amenable only to force considered, 189, 193, 196; England and the Taipings, 245–248, 254, 261–263, xii. 60–62, 64–86; France and the Taipings, xi. 255–257; joint-note system, xii. 12, 163; Russian policy in China, 14, 46, 234; question of diplomatic representation at Peking, 14–17, 34, 56; illustration of the doctrine of balance of power in China, 35–50, 240; students sent abroad, 101; China deemed formidable before the Japanese War, 108; Chinese policy toward preparedness for war, 109; Margary episode, 151–155; services of Sir Robert Hart, 155; France and Korea, 165–167; "spheres of influence," 183–185; interference of Russia in Japanese War, 186–188; Cassini Convention, 188, 193; recent

Foreign relations (*continued*): foreign acquisitions in China, 190–194, 199, 246; fuel for anti-foreign sentiment, 194, 197; and the overthrow of the reform movement, 197. *See also* Anglo-French War, Boxer, Christianity, Extraterritoriality, Opium, Tonquin, Trade (foreign).

Formosa, Dutch occupy, x. 181; East India Company's treaty, 189.

Four Books, Chinese classics, xi. 213–215.

France, early relations with China, x. 187; settlement at Shanghai, xi. 252, 255, xii. 62; and the Taiping rebellion, xi. 255–257; policy as "protector of religion," xii. 39–44, 111–115, 117–120, 149, 199; and the massacre at Tientsin, 132; responsibility for anti-foreign outrages, 150; rupture with Korea over missionaries, 166; sphere of influence, 184; lease of Kwangchow, 194; as a hindrance to foreign intercourse in China, 231. *See also* Anglo-French War, Tonquin.

Franciscans in China, xi. 123, 127.

Friendship, Confucius on, xi. 70.

Fu, administrative unit, x. 37, 272; magistrate, 38.

Fu Ko, Duke, banished, xii. 212.

Fuchou. *See* Foochow.

Fu-hsi, Chinese ruler, originates conception of antinomic principles, xi. 55.

INDEX

Fu-tai, governor, x. 38.
Fuhkien province, statistics, x. 31.
Fung-shui, principle and practice, xi. 106–112.

GENTLEMAN, Confucius on, xi. 73–75, 82.
Geography of China, natural boundaries, x. 12; Desert of Gobi, 13; the three great valleys of China proper, 14–22; southern slopes, 22; lakes, 23, 24; physical character of the outlying portions of the Empire, 29; climate, 30–36; changes in Chinese Turkestan, 138; of Yunnan, xii. 152.
Geomancy. *See Fung-shui.*
Gérard, A., French minister, demands on behalf of Catholic land purchases, xii. 119.
Gerbillon, J. F., Catholic missionary, x. 184.
Germany, sphere of influence, xii. 184, 193; motive of interference in Japanese War, 188; captures Kiaochow, 190; demand for territory and concessions granted, 190–192; conduct in China, 232.
Giles, H. A., on strength of Chinese superstitions, xi. 283.
Gilles, P. E. A., Catholic missionary, killed, xii. 122.
Giquel, Prosper, director of Foochow navy yard, xii. 100; in the Taiping rebellion, 100.
Gobi, Desert of, x. 13; post road, 14; geology, 14.
Gough, Sir Hugh, in the Opium War, xi. 16, 29.
Gordon, C. G., Chinese Gordon, in the Taiping rebellion, x. 64, xi. 231, xii. 87–89; in charge of camp of instruction, 97.
Government, administrative units, x. 37; magistrates of the units, 38; origin and order of importance of the viceroyalties, 38; provincial treasurer and judge, 40; elements of provincial government, 40; relation of governor and viceroy, 40; provincial independence, 41, 43; control of the navy and foreign relations, 41, 42; position and duties of the *hien* magistrate, 44–48; character of officials, 45; purchase of office, 45; irregular gains of magistrates, 46–48; transmission of imperial orders, 49; restrictions on officials, 49, 85; position of the Emperor, 50; Cabinet, 51; Privy Council, 52; efficiency of Cabinet and Council, 53; Six Boards and their duties, 54–57, 75–78; theory and practice of administration, 77, 78; Censorate, 78–81; Colonial Department, 81; Foreign Office, 81; minor organisations, 82; racial balance of power, 83; principle of mutual surveillance, 83–85; imperial commissioners, 84; conditions of official life, 85–91; publication and character of edicts, 89; Confucius on, xi. 70–73; control of the Empress Dowager, xii. 92–96; drastic reforms in 1898, 194–196; resumption of control of the Empress Dowager, 196; present reform movement, 229.

Government (*continued*):
  See also Civil service, Finance, Foreign relations, Justice, Religion, Trade.
Governor, Chinese provincial magistrate, x. 38; duties, 40, 41; and the viceroy, 40; origin of office, 41.
Governor-general. *See* Viceroy.
Gozani, J. P., Catholic missionary, on Jews in China, x. 146.
Grand Canal, construction, x. 24–26; now useless, 26; as an engineering feat, 26; decay, 28.
Great Learning, character, xi. 214.
Great Wall, built, xi. 97.
Great Wizard of Taoism, xi. 104.
Greek Church in Peking, x. 185.
Green Banners, number, x. 58; pay, 59; uniform, 59; cost, 59; officers, 59; inefficiency, 63, 67; policy of inefficiency, 64. *See also* Army.
Gros, Baron J. B. L., French representative in the Anglo-French War, xii. 11; fears to establish himself in Peking, 34; demand for restitution of Catholic property, 39, 41–43, 113; on the balance of power in China, 41, 240.
Guilds in China, xi. 221.
Gutzlaff, Charles, Protestant missionary, expedition into Chinese interior, x. 225, 228; conduct, xi. 154–156.

HADES, Taoistic, xi. 103.
Haichun Yamên, Naval Board, x. 75.
Hailing, Tartar general, at fall of Chinkiang, xi. 32.
Han dynasty, xi. 98.
Hangchou, capital of Chekiang, x. 31; early customs inspectorate at, 141.
Harem, selection of the imperial, x. 56.
Hart, Sir Robert, service to China, xii. 155; on foreign trade and Chinese industries, 181; on the origin of the Boxers, 198–200; on the abolition of extraterritoriality, 223–226; on future trouble, 227; reception of his views, 227; on the conduct of the allied troops, 248.
Havret, Père, researches on the Nestorian Stone, xi. 153.
Heaven, worship of, xi. 50.
Hien, administrative unit, x. 37, 272; magistrate, 38; position and duties of magistrate, 44–48.
Hing-po, Board of Punishments, x. 76.
Honan province, statistics, x. 31.
Hong Merchants, functions, x. 125, 130; establishment and character, 202–203; foreign complaints against, 203; attempt to ignore, 219; revival, 248; and the illegal opium trade, 252, 254, 258, 261; meaning of the word, 273; discontinuance demanded, xi. 34.
Hongkong, climate, x. 33; rainfall, 34; retirement of British traders to, xi. 8, 11; cession demanded, 20; ceded, 37, 171; and the opium trade, 176; question of Chinese licences to trade with, 270–272; piratical headquarters, 272, 273.

Hope, Sir James, British admiral, and the Taipings, xii. 64–71, 74–78, 81–85.
House, principle of selection of site, xi. 106–110.
Hsia dynasty, xi. 150.
Hsian, capital of Kansu, x. 31.
Hsü Tung, sympathy with Boxer movement, xii. 199; death, 212.
Hsüan, ancient ruler, xi. 64.
Hu-kuang, viceroyalty, x. 39.
Hu-po, Board of Revenue, x. 55.
Hüanchwang, Buddhist monk, travels, x. 140.
Huc, Abbé E. R., on resemblance between Christianity and Buddhism, xi. 142.
Hunan province, statistics, x. 31.
Hung Hsiu-chuan, leader of the Taiping rebellion, xi. 228; visions and conversion, 230; becomes a monarch, 246. *See also* Taipings.
Hupeh province, statistics, x. 31.
Hwa-hia, name for China, x. 4.
Hwang-ho. *See* Yellow River.

I-HO-CHUAN. *See* Boxer.
I-king, Chinese classic, xi. 54.
Ibn Wahab, Arab traveller, on early foreign intercourse of China, x. 141, 144.
Ideographs as evidences of nature of original Chinese religion, xi. 46.
Ides, Ysbrandt, Russian envoy to China, x. 185.
Idols, Buddhism introduces, xi. 99.
Ignafieff, N. P., Russian minister at Peking, xii. 21, 35; treaty of 1860, 49, 50.
Ignatius, Martin, unsuccessful Spanish envoy to China, x. 178.
Ili, area and population, x. 5.
Immortality, in original Chinese religion, xi. 63–65; Taoistic belief, 100–104.
Imperial High Trade Commissioners, x. 42.
Imperial Steed Court, x. 82.
Indemnity, of Opium War, xi. 37; for attacks on missionaries, xii. 121; to Germany in 1897, 190; Boxer, 217.
India, beginning of Chinese trade, x. 136; Governor-General declares war on China, xi. 12.
Industry, official salt monopoly, x. 101–106; effect of foreign trade on, xii. 178–181. *See also* Agriculture, Trade.
Innocent IV., Pope, correspondence with the Grand Khan, x. 158.
Innocent X., Pope, denounces Jesuit methods in China, xi. 134.
Intercourse. *See* Trade, Travel.
Iron Shins Society, xi. 224.
Ismailoff, Russian envoy to China, x. 185.
Italy, attempt to acquire territory in China, xii. 199, 246.

JAMESON, George, on Chinese taxation, x. 98–101, 106, 117.
Japan, area and ratio of cultivated land, x. 10, 271; character of military officers, 73; yield of taxation, 120, 272; classes, 133; early trade with China, 143; piratical descents on China, 171; relation to foreign-

Japan, (*continued*):
ers, 229–231 ; administrative units, 271 ; interdicts opium, xi. 7 ; becomes model for China, xii. 229; alliance with England, 236 ; value of trade with China, 247.
Jebb, Major F. W., in charge of camp of instruction, xii. 98.
Jehō, plan to make it the capital, xii. 92.
Jesuits. *See* Roman Catholic.
Jews in China, x. 145 ; decline, 146.
John, Griffith, Protestant missionary, on Taiping Christianity, xi. 234 ; unearths Chou Han, xii. 174, 244.
Judge, provincial, character of office, x. 41.
Justice, *bien* magistrate as judge, x. 45 ; character of local, 47 ; duties of imperial Board of Punishments, 76 ; court of criminal revision, 76, 78 ; defects in its practice, 76, 77 ; Lin's demand for power over foreign opium smugglers, 264, 267 ; character, xii. 143 ; movement to improve, 221. *See also* Extraterritoriality.
Juvenile Instructor, Chinese textbook, xi. 207.

Kaifêng. *See* Kaifung.
Kaifung, capital of Honan, x. 31 ; Jews in, 145.
Kan River, x. 24.
Kang I, sympathy with the Boxer movement, xii. 199, 201 ; death, 212.
Kang Yu-wei, reformer, fugitive, xii. 196 ; character and ability, 245.
Kanghsi, Emperor, and Christianity, xi. 129, 133, 135, 136.
Kanpu, early customs inspectorate at, x. 141 ; sacked in 877, 141.
Kansu province, statistics, x. 31.
Kelung, capture by the French, xii. 160.
Kiaking, Emperor, censured, x. 80 ; and Lord Amherst's embassy, 212 ; conspiracy against, xi. 226.
Kiangming, capital of Kiangsu, x. 31.
Kiangnan, arsenal at, xii. 99.
Kiangsi province, statistics, x. 31.
Kiangsu province, statistics, x. 31.
Kiaochow, supposed lease to Russia, xii. 189 ; captured and retained by Germany, 190–192.
Kinchai, imperial commissioner, x. 84.
Kinsha-kiang, name for the Yangtse, x. 17.
Kishen, Chinese commissioner in Opium War, xi. 17, 20.
Kiun-tsu. *See* Gentleman.
Kiunki-chi, imperial Privy Council, x. 53.
Kiying as ruler of Canton, xi. 184, 188, 191.
Ko-lao-hui, secret society, xi. 228.
Koh-lao, elders of the imperial Cabinet, x. 51.
Korea, rupture with France over missionaries, xii. 166.
Kowloon peninsula, leased to the British, xii, 37, 194.
Kowtowing, international disputes over, x. 182, 184, 185, 191, 199, 273 ; nature, 273.
Koxinga, pirate, x. 179 ; ruler of Formosa, treaty with East India Company, 189 ; nobility of descendants, xi. 203.

Ku Hungming, interpreter of Confucius, xi. 66.
Kublai Khan, reception of Catholic missionaries, x. 161.
Kung, Prince, *coup a’état*, xii. 92 ; and the Empress Dowager, 95 ; attempts to form a navy, 102–104 ; on the restitution of Catholic property, 112, 114 ; official note on Catholic missions, 134–140 ; views considered, 142–145 ; reception of the note, 145–148.
Kuyuk Khan, correspondence with Pope Innocent, x. 158.
Kwan, hero, deified, xi. 224.
Kwan Chung originates official monopolies, x. 101.
Kwang Hsü, present Emperor, proclaimed, xii. 94 ; character, 95 ; drastic reforms, 194–196 ; overthrown by the Dowager Empress, 196.
Kwangchow, leased to the French, xii. 194.
Kwangsi province, statistics, x. 31 ; climate, 33.
Kwangtung province, statistics, x. 31 ; climate, 33.
Kweichou province, statistics, x. 31.
Kweilin, capital of Kwangsi, x. 31.
Kweiyang, capital of Kweichou, x. 31.
Kwoh Chou-king, engineer of Grand Canal, x. 25.
Kwok-sing-yu. *See* Koxinga.

LAKES in China, x. 23, 24.
Lampaçao. *See* Lang-peh-kao.
Lanchou, capital of Shensi, x. 31 ; viceroyal capital, 39.
Land. *See* Agriculture, Taxation.
Lane-Poole, Stanley, error on Ward’s visit to Peking, xii. 22–24.
Lang-peh-kao, Portuguese settlement, x. 174.
Laotsu, philosophy, xi. 86–91 ; and Confucianism, 91, 95 ; religion not prominent in the system, 93 ; and Taoism, 93–95.
Laws, publication and character, x. 89.
Lay, H. N., inspector of customs, xi. 261 ; and the Chinese navy, xii. 102–104.
Legge, James, researches on the *Shih-king*, xi. 48 ; on original Chinese religion, 52 ; on ancient ancestral worship, 60.
Li, Taiping leader, march on Peking, xi. 248–250 ; successes in the Yangtse Valley, xii. 57 ; repulsed before Shanghai, 60–63. *See also* Taipings.
Li Hung-chang, High Trade Commissioner, x. 42 ; viceroy, army reorganisation, 63, 64, xii. 108 ; leader of reform, 97 ; on the foreign merchants, 169.
Li Hwei originates transit dues, x. 107.
Li Ping-hêng, Governor of Shantung, effect upon, of Germany’s aggression, xii. 191, 199 ; death, 212.
Li-po, Board of Civil Office, x. 54.
Lifan-yuen, Colonial Office, x. 81.
Likin, transit dues, x. 106 ; derivation, 272.
Lin, imperial commissioner at Canton, actions against the opium

Lin (*continued*):
trade, x. 259–267, xi. 1; discomfiture through withdrawal of British merchants, 8–10; isolates the Factories, 10; demands, 11, interdicts British trade, 12; relations with Peking, 19, 21, 22; recommendation on foreign policy, 21.

Lintin Island, opium smugglers' headquarters, x. 239, 241; residence of British trade superintendent at, 246; inoperative orders against the smugglers at, 252.

Literary class, x. 131; rise, 133. *See also* Education.

Literature. *Five Classics*, xi. 46–49, 54, 214–217; *Four Books*, 213–215.

Little, A. J., on the Yangtse, x. 19.

Liu, hero, xi. 224.

Liu Kun-yi, viceroy, army reorganisation, x. 63, 64.

Livingstone, Dr., medical mission, xi. 156.

Loch, G. G., on the opium trade and the treaty, xi. 35.

Lok-po, Six Boards, x. 54.

Low, F. F., American minister, and Prince Kung's letter on the missionaries, xii. 146.

Lun Yu, *Analects of Confucius*, xi. 214.

MABILEAU, François, Catholic missionary, killed, xii. 121.

Macao, climate, x. 33; establishment of Portuguese settlement at, 174; commercial importance, 174; conduct of the community, 176, 209; Dutch attack, 180; British garrisons, 209; British traders retire to, xi. 8; piratical headquarters, 273, 274.

Macartney, Earl of, British ambassador to China, x. 207.

McClary, exploits at Canton, x. 206.

Magaillans, Gabriel, Catholic missionary, miracles, xi. 144.

Magistrates. *See* Government.

Maigrot, Charles, Catholic bishop in China, mandate against the Jesuits, xi. 132.

Man, in the original Chinese religion, xi. 62; Confucius on the gentleman and ideal, 73–76.

Manchuria, area and population, x. 5; Russian designs on, xii. 189, 193, 234–236.

Manchus, garrisons of, in cities x. 58; rank of general, 58; courage, 61; custom of self-immolation, xi. 29.

Mandarin, origin of the title, x. 272.

Mang-tsu. *See* Mencius.

Margary, A. R., British consul, killed, xii. 151, 154; resulting diplomatic trouble, 154.

Marignoli, John of, mission destroyed, x. 163.

Martin, W. A. P., on the Jews in China, x. 146.

Maxims of Confucius, xi. 78.

Meadows, T. T., British consul, on the Taipings, xi. 235, xii. 241.

Medhurst, W. H., Protestant missionary, on conditions in the Canton Factory, x. 222–224; and of foreigners elsewhere in

Medhurst (*continued*):
  China, 224–228; conduct, xi. 155; on the Christianity of the Taipings, 235, 236, 284.
Medicine, medical staff lacking in Chinese army, x. 73; missions, introduction and service, xi. 156–159.
Meikong River as a trade route, x. 22.
Melo, Alfonso de, Portuguese commander, repulsed from Chinese coast, x. 173.
Mencius, on man and his duties, xi. 62, 63; elaborates Confucianism, 96.
Method of Higher Education, character, xi. 214.
Michie, Alexander, on the customs duties, x. 115; on Chinese tradal instinct, 128–131; on Portuguese methods at Macao, 176; on smuggling, xi. 258.
Mih Teh, expounder of Chinese socialism, xi. 95.
Military class in ancient China, x. 132; decline, 133. *See also* Army.
Millenary Classic, Chinese textbook, xi. 206.
Milne, W. C., Protestant missionary, on conduct of Catholic missionaries, xi, 149.
Min-cheh, viceroyalty, x. 39.
Ming dynasty, foreign policy, x. 167; Catholic missionaries aid, against the Manchus, xi. 125; origin of name, 242.
Ming Ti, Emperor, and Buddhism, x. 147.
Mint, control, x. 78.
Missions. *See* Christianity, Protestant, Roman Catholic.
Mohammedanism, introduction in China, and early commercial interest, x. 149; stock of present Chinese Mohammedans, 150; failure in propagandism, 150; unmolested by central government, 150, 152; character of the mosques, 151; number of followers, 151; persecuted by local officials, 151; revolt, xii. 243.
Money, silver basis, x. 93; confusion of currencies, 123.
Mongolia, area and population, x. 5.
Mongols, courage, x. 61.
Morrison, Robert, Protestant missionary, methods, xi. 150; translation of the Bible, 152; lack of success, 153; medical mission, 154.
Mortuary customs, xi. 111–116. *See also* Ancestral worship.
Muravioff, Nicolas, Governor-General of Eastern Siberia, obtains control of the Amur for Russia, xii. 45–49; founds Vladivostok, 49.
Music, duties of Board of, x. 57; Confucius on, xi. 81.
Mysticism in Laotsu's philosophy, xi. 92.

NAMES for China, x. 2.
Nan Lu, x. 13.
Nanchang, capital of Kiangsi, x. 31.
Nanking, climate, x. 32; viceroyal capital, 39; taken by the Taipings, xi. 242.
Nanning, opened to foreign trade, x. 22.
Nanyang Squadron, organisation, x. 65.

INDEX

Napier, Lord, British superintendent of trade at Canton, x. 218; refused recognition, 219; conduct, 220; retires to Macao, 222, 243.

Navy, imperial control, x. 41, 42; former control of Board of War, 57; establishment and duties of the Naval Board, 65, 75; established, 65, xii. 107; naval bases, x. 66; present condition, 75; first attempt to form, xii. 102–104.

Nepotism in the army, x. 70.

Nestorian Stone, x. 137, 153.

Nestorians, arrival in China, x. 137, 152; imperial favours, 154–156; collision with Buddhism, 154, 156; prosperity and disappearance, 157, xi. 39.

Nether world. *See* Hades.

Newspapers, effect of vernacular, xii. 185.

Nganking, capital of Anhwei, x. 31.

Nicholas, Catholic Archbishop of China, x. 162.

Nienfei rebellion, xii. 97, 243.

Ningpo, early customs inspectorate at, x. 141; Portuguese factory at, 172; Portuguese outrages and expulsion, 173; blockaded in Opium War, xi. 17; ransomed, 25; captured, 28; opened to foreign trade, 37; British attitude toward threatened Taiping attack on, xii. 68–71; captured by Taipings, 79; recaptured, 85.

Nobility, titles in China, xi. 202.

North River, x. 21.

Nui-kob, imperial Cabinet, x. 51.

ODES FOR CHILDREN, Chinese text-book, xi. 207.

Officers. *See* Government.

Official Gazette, x. 89.

Olopen, Nestorian monk, reception in China, x. 153.

Opium, tax on native and imported, x. 118, xii. 247; cultivation in China, x. 234; development of the vice of smoking, 234; edicts against, 235, 238, 250, 251; continued importation and official connivance at smuggling, 236–242; interest of East India Company in the trade, 240; increase in the illegal trade, 242, 247; aspects of the illegal trade, 249; foreign traders ignore the edicts against, 252–257; sincerity of imperial measures against, doubted, 255, xi. 2, 5; British official measures against, x. 257, 258; temporary suspension of foreign trade in, 258, 259; demands of Commissioner Lin concerning, 259; enforcement of his demands, 261, 263–267, xi. 11; moral character of the trade, x. 261–263, xi. 2–7; surrendered to Lin, x. 265, xi. 1; destroyed, 1; banishment of foreign traders in, 2; no attempt to check cultivation in China, 3–5; withdrawal of British traders from Canton, 7–9; isolation of the Canton Factories, 10; renewal of smuggling, 10; naval engagement, 11; interdiction of British trade, 12; war, 12–33; responsibility for the war, 12–15, 26, 27, 163, 164, 168; size of the

Opium (*continued*):
  British force, 15; British programme, 16; progress of the war, 17, 22–26, 28–33; negotiations at Canton, 17–21; British demands, 19, 20, 33; final negotiations, 33; treaty, 37, 170; question of opium in the peace negotiations, 35–37; conditions of the trade after the war, 175, 178; trade legalised, xii. 175; desolation wrought by, 175; possible means of checking, 176.
Osborn, Sherard, and the Chinese navy, xii. 102-104.
Ouchterlony, John, on the capture on Chinkiang, xi. 31; on General Hailing, 32; on the arrival of Catholic missionaries, 38.

Pah-kwa, eight trigrams, origin, xi. 55.
Palmerston, Lord, Chinese policy, xi. 184, 191.
Panku, Taoistic god, xi. 99, 105.
Paoting, capital of Chili, x. 31.
Parker, E. H., on the *hien* magistrate, x. 44–48; on Chinese courage, 60; on the salt industry, 103; on Chinese finances, 123; on the early position of the trading class, 132; on Chinese trade in the thirteenth century, 142.
Parker, Dr. Peter, medical mission, xi. 156, 157.
Parkes, Sir Harry, and the *Arrow* episode, xi. 276–278, xii. 2; capture, 29; on allied control of Canton, 53; on the Taipings, 65, 75, 240–242.
Parthia, control of ancient trade with China, x. 134–136.
Pascal, Spanish friar, killed, x. 163.
Pearl River, drainage basin, x. 15, 21; length, 21; diplomatic and commercial importance, 21.
Peiyang Squadron, organisation, x. 65.
Peking, climate, x. 30–32; first Catholic establishment in, 161; march of Anglo-French troops against, xii. 27–34; plan to remove capital from, 92; Boxer control, 204, 205, 207–209; return of the Court to, 216.
Perestrello, Rafael, Portuguese commander, voyage to China, x. 170.
Persians, attack on Canton, x. 138; trade with Canton, 140.
Pescadores Islands, Dutch occupy, x. 180; Dutch driven from, 181.
Philippine Islands, treatment of Chinese, x. 178.
Philosophy. *See* Confucius, Laotsu.
Pigs, families required to keep, x. 9.
Pinto, Mendez, Portuguese commander, outrages on the Chinese, x. 173.
Pirates, Japanese, x. 171; methods of Chinese, xi. 271, 273; measures against, 272, 274.
Pirez, Thomas, Portuguese envoy, imprisoned, x. 172.
Po-yang Lake, x. 24.
Police, useless, xi. 181.
Pope, Taoistic, xi. 104.
Population of the Empire, x. 4–6; uncertainty and fluctuation, 6–

Population (*continued*): 8; density, 8; and agricultural resources, 10–12; incentives to increase, 11, 271; in the provinces, 29–31.

Port Arthur, naval base, x. 66; stormed, 68; leased to Russia, xii. 192.

Portuguese, arrival in China, x. 170; establish factories, 172; depredations of, result in expulsion from the mainland, 172–174; adopt policy of compliance, 174; effect on Chinese opinion of Europeans, 175–177, 192; efforts to prevent establishment of British intercourse, 187, 192–194; hostile to missionaries, xi. 39; and the pirates, 273, 274.

Posthumous honours, reason for, x. 55.

Pottinger, Sir Henry, British envoy in Opium War, xi. 33, 35; and the opium trade, 175.

Prefect. *See* Governor.

Priesthood lacking in original Chinese religion, xi. 51–53.

Privy Council, imperial, x. 52; selection, 53; duties, 53; bureaux, 53; efficiency, 53.

Protestant missions, beginning, xi. 150; method of propagandism, 150–154; lack of early success, 153, 160; suspected of political motives, 154; illegal conduct of missionaries, 155; medical missions, 156–159; schools, 159; attitude toward the Chinese, 160; attitude of educated Chinese toward, 161; growth after official toleration, xii. 120; attacked, 123, 128; not distinguished by the Chinese from Catholics, 123, 135; British panacæa for attacks on, 123; and the frauds in the French treaty of 1860, 141. *See also* Christianity.

Provinces, statistics, x. 31; governor, 38; other officers, 41; government, 41; independence, 41, 43; interdependence, 42; and the imperial metropolis, 43; financial autonomy, 94.

Public opinion, inoperative, x. 28; expression, 87; growth, xii. 185.

Public order, inadequate control of the people, xi. 181, xii. 111; terror of unlawful bodies of men, xi. 194; administrative guilds, 221.

Punishment, future, not a feature of original Chinese religion, xi. 63–65; Taoistic belief, 101.

Punishments, Board of, duties, x. 76.

Purchase of office, x. 45.

Purgatory, Taoistic, xi. 102.

RAILROADS, basis of Chinese objections, xi. 110, xii. 182, 245; completed and proposed, 181.

Rainfall in the maritime provinces, x. 34.

Red Eyebrows Society, xi. 223.

Red River. *See* Sonka.

Religion, toleration, x. 38, 164; duties of Board of Rites, 56; Sacrificial Court, 82; original Chinese, xi. 42–46, 50–65; evidences of nature of this creed, 46, 49; relation of Confucius

Religion (*continued*):
to this creed, 65; Confucius on, 80; state creeds, 117; intermixture of Chinese creeds, 118, 121. *See also* Buddhism, Christianity, Confucianism, Jews, Laotsu, Mohammedanism, Taoism.

Revenue, Board of, duties, x. 55; annual estimates and apportionment of assessment, 94; relation with local expenditures, 95; incompetence, 123. *See also* Finances.

Ricci, Matthew, Jesuit missionary, arrival, xi. 40, 42; methods, 119–122; in Peking, 122.

Rice tax, x. 100.

Rigauld, J. F., Catholic missionary, killed, xii. 121.

Ripa, Matteo, Jesuit priest, on conduct of the missionaries, xi. 148.

Rites, Board of, duties, x. 56, xi. 131.

Roads. *See* Travel.

Robinson, Sir George, British trade superintendent, at Lintin, x. 246.

Rochechouart, Julien, Comte de, French chargé d'affaires, and the Tientsin massacre, xii. 133; reply to Prince Kung's note on the missions, 146–148.

Rogier. *See* Ruggiero.

Roman Catholic missions, resemblance to Buddhism, x. 155, xi. 142–147; first contact with China, x. 158–161; beginning of propagandism, 161; practice of buying children, 161, xi. 145, xii. 124; early growth, x. 162; disappearance, 163, xi. 39; missionaries enter China during Opium War, 38; beginning, method, and success of Jesuit propagandism, 39–42, 119–123, 125, 129, 132; Jesuits on ancestral worship, 120; introduction of rival orders causes trouble, 123, 129, 132; temporary proscription, 124; aid the Mings, 125–127; papal decrees on the Jesuit methods and sanction of ancestral worship, 127, 134; persecution, 128; missionaries decide to sanction ancestral worship, 128; renewal of imperial favour, 131, 132; priests in imperial service as scientists, 131, 132, 139, 141; Jesuits appeal to the Emperor and are upheld, 132–135; conflict of papal and imperial authority, 134–136; withdrawal of imperial protection, 136; proscription, 137–139; imperial forbearance, 138; unmolested illegal propagandism, 138–140; missionaries responsible for the proscription, 140–142; claim of miracles, 144; secret baptism of moribund children, 145–147; conduct of the missionaries, 148–150; number of converts in 1835, 160; France as protector, xii. 39–41, 149, 199; restitution of property, 41–44, 111–115, 141; fraudulent additions to passports, 118, 141; trouble over land purchases, 119; growth after toleration, 120; outrages on, 120–123; exac-

INDEX

Roman Catholic missions (*continued*):
tion of money payments for outrages, 121; Tientsin massacre, 123–128; disregard of Chinese feelings in building its cathedrals, 128–130; action of Chinese government on the massacre, 130–133; Prince Kung's official note on their conduct, 134–140; Kung's indictment considered, 142–145; its reception, 145–148; in Korea, 166. *See also* Christianity.

Roman Empire, trade with China, x. 134–136.

Roze, P. G., French admiral, expedition against Korea, xii. 167.

Rubruk, William, friar, with the Tartars, x. 157, 160.

Ruggiero, Michael, Jesuit missionary, xi. 40.

Russell, Lord John, and the Taipings, xii. 70, 74.

Russia, first contact with China, x. 183; mercenaries in Chinese employ, 184; first treaties with China, 184–186; Greek Church in Peking, 185; overland trade, 186; policy in China, xii. 14, 46, 234; acquisition and importance to, of the Amur and region south of its mouth, 44–50; sphere of influence, 183, 193; reason for interference in the Japanese War, 186–188; Cassini Convention, 188, 193; lease of Port Arthur, 192; massacre of Chinese in Boxer rising, 213; and Manchuria, 234–236.

SACRIFICE, nature of, in original Chinese religion, xi. 51.

Sacrificial Court, x. 82.

St. Francis Xavier in China, xi. 39.

St. John Island. *See* Shang-chuan.

Salt, official monopoly, x. 101; production, 102; cost, 103; distribution, 104–106; amount of the gabelle, 106.

Salween River as a trade route, x. 22.

San-fuh-sz, Three Law Chambers, x. 76.

Scepticism and mysticism, xi. 92.

Schaal, J. A., Jesuit missionary, favour at Court, xi. 125, 126, 129; death, 129.

Schereschewsky, Bishop S. I. J., on the Jews in China, x. 146.

Secret societies in China, xi. 223–228. *See also* Boxer.

Seymour, Admiral Sir Michael, and the beginning of the Anglo-French War, xii. 4–6, 239.

Seymour, Vice-Admiral Sir E. H., attempt to reach Peking, xii. 204.

Shan, celestial spirits in original Chinese religion, xi. 44.

Shang dynasty, xi. 50.

Shang-chuan Island, Portuguese colony, x. 172, 174.

Shanghai, commercial importance, x. 17; becoming an inland city, 19; climate, 30, 32; rainfall, 34; commercial potentialities recognised, xi. 29; captured in Opium War, 32; opened to foreign commerce, 37; conditions of foreign intercourse, 192–197; growth of anti-foreign sentiment, 199;

Shanghai (*continued*):
  captured by the Triads, 250; character of the foreign settlements, 251–253, 257, xii. 62, 150; collision of imperial troops and the Anglo-Saxons, xi. 254; French aid the imperial troops, 255; massacre of Triads by the imperial troops, 256; Taiping attack and repulse through foreign interference, 59–62; second Taiping movement on, 80, 81.

Shangti. *See Ti.*

Shansi province, statistics, x. 31.

Shantung province, statistics, x. 31.

Shektsing, expedition of allied troops against, xii. 53.

Shen-kan, viceroyalty, x. 39.

Shensi province, statistics, x. 31.

Shih, Emperor, action on religion, xi. 94; consolidates China, 97.

Shih-king, Chinese classic, character, xi. 46, 216.

Shih-pah-sung, name for China, x. 4.

Shou, early ruler of China, xi. 50.

Shu-king, Chinese classic, character, xi. 46, 215.

Shun, early ruler of China, xi. 47.

Si-kiang, name for Pearl River, x. 21.

Siam, trade route with China, x. 22.

Siang River, x. 23.

Silk, growth of trade in, xi. 245.

Sin-chou, opened to foreign commerce, x. 22.

Six Boards, imperial, x. 54–57, 75–78.

Sladen, E. B., explorations in southern China, xii. 153.

Smith, A. H., on Chinese tradal instinct, x. 131; on foreign trade and Chinese industry, xii. 178–180; on foreign treatment of Chinese labour, 245; on the conduct of the allied troops in 1900, 246.

Smuggling, xi. 258–260. *See also* Opium.

Social condition, incentives to increase of population, x. 11, 271; influence of the family group, 28, 49; classes, 131–134, xi. 52, 202–204; instinct of co-operation, 221; families and clans, 222. *See also* Education.

Socialism, Mih Teh's teachings, xi. 95.

Sonka River as a trade route, x. 22.

Spaniards, first intercourse with China, x. 177; treatment of Chinese in the Philippines, 178.

Spheres of influence in China, xii. 183–185.

Spirits, worship of, in original Chinese religion, xi. 43–45, 51. *See also* Superstitions.

Spring and Autumn, Chinese classic, xi. 216.

Stanley, Lord, on British policy in China, xi. 186.

Stanton, W., on the Triad Society, xi. 227.

Statistics, correctness of Chinese, x. 12; of the provinces, 31.

Sü, Paul, service to Christian propagandism, xi. 123, 124; deified, 123.

INDEX

Suchow, captured by the Taipings, xii. 58, 59.
Suicide, Tartar practice in defeat xi. 29–32; principle of Chinese, 115.
Sumatra, early trade with China, x. 143.
Summer Palace, destroyed, xii. 31–34.
Sung, censor, censures the Emperor, x. 79.
Sung, Chinese official, gifts from England, x. 208.
Superintendents of Trade, establishment of British, at Canton, x. 218–222.
Superstitions, growth in Chinese religion, xi. 94, 98; in Taoism, 105; *fung-shui*, 106–110; influence of Taoistic, 110; mortuary, 111–115; concerning unquiet spirits, 115.
Surveillance, principle in Chinese administration, x. 83–85.
Syndicates, concession-hunting, introduction, xii. 165.
Syria, ancient trade with China, x. 134.
Sz-hai, name for China, x. 2–4.
Szchuan province, communication with the coast, x. 20; statistics, 31; viceroyalty, 39.

TA-HSÜEH, Method of Higher Education, xi. 214.
Ta-kiang, name for the Yangtse, x. 18.
Tael, depreciation, x. 93; meaning of term, 272.
Taipings, efficiency of imperial troops in contest with, x. 64; controversies over, xi. 228–230; Christianity of, 230–239, 247, 250, 284, xii. 89; growth of the movement, xi. 239–242; origin of the name, 241; moral vetoes, 242; capture Nanking, 242; military conduct compared with that of imperial troops, 242–244, 251, 256, xii. 79, 80, 241, 242; conduct toward the foreigners, xi. 244, xii. 63, 77, 79, 81, 86, 90, 242; and the British, xi. 245–248, 261, xii. 60–62, 64–86, 240; unsuccessful movement on Peking, xi. 248–250; Triad movement, 250–257; effect on, of foreign supervision of the customs, 261–263, xii. 61; effect on, of Anglo-French treaty, 57, 64–67, 76; successes in the Yangtse valley, 58, 59; repulsed before Shanghai through foreign interference, 59–63; capture Ningpo, 79; second movement on Shanghai 80, 81; foreigners take the field against, 81–85; conduct of the foreign troops, 82, 84; Ningpo recaptured from, 85; share of Ward and Gordon in their suppression, 86–89; results of suppression, 89; extermination, 90, 242.
Taiyuen, capital of Shansi, x. 31.
Talien, naval base, x. 66; stormed, 68; leased to Russia, xii. 192.
Talisz, Supreme Court, x. 79.
Tan, Chinese ruler, cosmogonal conceptions, xi. 55.
Tang, early ruler of China, xi. 50; on man, 62.

INDEX

Tann, convert-priest, accused of inciting violence, xii. 122.

Tao, administrative unit, x. 37; magistrate, 38.

Tao-teh-king, Laotsu's treatise, xi. 86; authenticity, 89.

Taoism, and ancestral worship, xi. 61; origin, 93–99; and Buddhism, 99, 118; belief, 100–106; *fung-shui*, 106–110; influence of its superstitions, 110; mortuary customs, 111–115; unquiet spirits and their appeasement, 115; as a state creed, 117.

Taoukwang, Emperor, on duty of censors, x. 80; and the opium trade, 251; Tyler's letter to, xi. 173.

Tarim River, x. 13.

Tartars. *See* Manchus.

Taxation, collection and remission of the land tax, x. 46; duties of imperial Board of Revenue, 55; amount of the land tax, 97; relation of amount of revenue to tax paid, 98–101, 106, 113, 114, 117; grain tax, 100; salt gabelle, 101, 106; transit dues, 106–114, 141, xii. 218; customs duties, x. 114–118, 137, xi. 170, 258–263, xii. 61, 218; opium tax, x. 118, xii. 175. *See also* Finances.

Tea, beginning of exportation, x. 137.

Theory of Morals, character, xi. 215.

Thibet, area and population, x. 5.

Thomas, Lieut.-Col. J. W., in charge of the camp of instruction, xii. 98.

Three Law Chambers, duties, x. 76, 79.

Three States of Taoism and Buddhism, xi. 102, 283.

Ti, significance of the title, xi. 43.

Tien, significance of the title, xi. 43; Jesuits identify, with God, 120; the Pope denies the identity, 134; Protestant attitude, 151.

Tien-chu, name for Taoistic and Christian deity, xi. 94, 134.

Tien-hia, name for China, x. 2.

Tientsin, viceroyal capital, x. 39; negotiations at, during Anglo-French War, xii. 13; massacre of Christians in 1870, 123–128; action of the government on the massacre, 130–133; captured in the Boxer rising, 209.

Tinghai, captured in the Opium War, xi. 28.

Titles, bureau of distribution, x. 55; sale of, 119.

Tobacco, introduction, x. 234.

Tonquin, trade route with China, x. 22; French acquisitions, xii. 157; Chinese-French rupture, 157–159; resulting "state of reprisals," 159–163; the trade-concession clause in the treaty, 165.

Topography. *See* Geography.

Trade, domestic, importance and character of the Yangtse River, x. 20; and of the Pearl, 21; southerly river routes, 22; Grand Canal, 24–26, 28; transit dues, 106–113, xii. 218, 219; native customs duties, x. 117; tradal instinct, 128–131;

Trade (*continued*):
position of the trading class, 131–134; late development of tradal instinct, 134; control of the coasting trade, xii. 181; railroads and their control, 181–183. *See also* Travel.

Trade, foreign, preconventional: establishment, duties, and character of the Hong Merchants, x. 125, 200–203; and of the comprador, 126; integrity of merchants, 125, 129; ancient overland route with the Mediterranean nations, 134–137; beginning of oversea trade, 136; with Turks, Arabs, and Persians, 137, 140; first customs duties and foreign factories, 137; careful regulation of early, 141; early liberality toward, 142, 143; overland routes, 142; relation of tribute-bearing missions, 142, 169, 182; conditions in the thirteenth century, 142; early coercion by local officials, 144; early Mohammedan interests, 149; changes due to substitution of foreign state or corporate supervision in place of individual enterprise, 165; period of non-intercourse with Europeans, 166–168; beginning of modern, 170–190; attitude of the Manchu dynasty toward, 190–192; unsettled conditions at Canton at end of seventeenth century, 194–200; complaints of foreign traders, 204; officially limited to Canton, 203–205, 207; violence at Canton, 205–207, 221; paradoxical

Trade (*continued*):
conditions, 209–211; increased restrictions, 215; futile attempt to extend beyond Canton, 216; effect of introduction of an official element on the foreigners' side, 217–222; conditions in the Canton Factory, 222; termination not desired by China, 232; unsatisfactory official conditions, 233; severance of official relations, 243, 246; edict to establish old system of control, 244; which is ignored, 245; revival of the Hong Merchants, 248; balance, 249, xi. 14, 245; character of the foreign merchants, xi. 159, 168, xii. 169. *See also* Canton, Foreign relations, Opium.

Conventional: administrative control, x. 41; transit dues as affecting, 109–113, xii. 218–220; treaty ports and regulation after the Opium War, xi. 37, 170–173; conditions in the treaty ports, 197–201; smuggling, 258–260; and the Taiping rebellion, 261–263, xii. 57, 60–62, 64, 72–74; abuses and pirates, xi. 270–274; stipulations in treaty of 1860, xii. 56; introduction of the concession-hunting syndicate, 165; quietness in the treaty ports, 168–172; disastrous effect on Chinese industries, 178–181; attitude of Chinese toward, 180; not essential to China, 219; amount in 1899, 247; bibliography, 248. *See also* Canton, Customs, Foreign relations, Shanghai.

INDEX

Transit dues, on salt, x. 106; origin, 107; operation, 107; obnoxious and inexpedient, 108; question of imposition on foreign trade, 109–112; proposed substitute, 112, xii. 218; amount collected, x. 113; early, 141; probable effect of abolition, xii. 219.

Translation, imperial bureaux, x. 52, 53.

Travel, character of Chinese roads, x. 26–29, 271; safety of early Asiatic, 139; early pilgrimages of Buddhist monks, 139; conditions under the Tang dynasty, 141; reception and conduct of foreigners in the interior, 224–228; freedom of, granted to foreigners, xii. 56. *See also* Trade.

Treasurer, provincial, character of the office, x. 41.

Treaties, and the transit dues, x. 109–112; first, 183; second, 185; Bogue, xi. 20; Opium War, 37, 170; Anglo-French, xii. 56; Tonquin War, 165; Boxer, 210.

Treaty ports, first, xi. 37.

Triad Society, rise and progress, xi. 226; and the Taipings, 241, 250; capture Shanghai and Amoy, 250; military conduct compared with that of the imperial forces, 251, 256; and the foreigners in Shanghai, 253, 255; expelled from Shanghai, 256.

Tribute-bearing missions, meaning, x. 168–170; embassies regarded as, 207.

Triennial catalogue of official conduct, x. 85.

Trigault, Nicolas, estimation of Chinese revenue, x. 92.

Trimetrical Classic, Chinese primer, xi. 205.

Truth, Confucius on, xi. 77, 82.

Tsai An, Empress Dowager, *coup d'état* and control, xii. 92–96; character and policy, 96, 105–107, 210, 229; retirement, 194; resumes control, 196.

Tsinan, capital of Shantung, x. 31.

Tsing dynasty, attitude toward foreign trade, x. 190–192; origin of name, xi. 241.

Tso Chuan, commentary on *Spring and Autumn*, xi. 216.

Tsuan-chou, early customs inspectorate at, x. 141; Portuguese factory at, 172; Portuguese expelled, 173.

Tsungli Yamên, Foreign Office, x. 82.

Tu-chah-yuen, Censorate, x. 78.

Tuan, Prince, head of the Boxer movement, xii. 200–202; banished, 212.

Tung Fuh-hsiang, sympathy with the Boxer movement, xii. 200; banished, 212.

Tung-ting Lake, x. 23.

Tung-tuh, viceroy, x. 38.

Turkestan, former civilisation, x. 138.

Turks, trade with China, x. 137.

Twenty-four Banners, independent of Board of War, x. 57; number, pay, and support, 58.

Two Kiang, viceroyalty, x. 38.

Two Kuang, viceroyalty, x. 39.

Tyler, John, President of the United States, letter to the Emperor, xi. 173.

Typhoons in China, x. 35.

INDEX

UNITED STATES, beginning and character of official intercourse with China, xi. 173–175, xii. 239; reception of treaty envoy at Peking, xi. 21–25; settlement at Shanghai, 251–255; value of trade with China, xii. 247.

VERBIEST, Ferdinand, Jesuit missionary, in imperial service, xi. 129, 131, 132, 145.

Verolles, Catholic missionary, on the secret baptism of moribund children, xi. 146.

Viceroy, origin of office, x. 38; order of importance of the viceroyalties, 38.

Vladislavitch, Count Sara, Russian envoy to China, x. 185.

Vladivostok, founded, xii. 49.

WADE, Sir Thomas, British minister, and Prince Kung's note on the missions, xii. 146.

Wahb-Abi-Kabcha, Mohammedan envoy to China, x. 149.

Waldersee, Count von, in China, xii. 234, 248.

Wan, Chinese ruler, cosmogonal conceptions, xi. 54.

Wan Wang, collector of the *Shih-king*, xi. 48.

Wanlieh, Emperor, reception of Ricci, xi. 122.

War, duties of Board of, x. 57. *See also* Army.

Ward, F. G., aids imperial troops against the Taipings, xii. 59; organises a Chinese corps, 87.

Ward, J. E., American envoy, visit to Peking, xii. 21–25.

Warfare, barbaric and treacherous, xi. 242, xii. 244; terror, 80. *See also* Army, Taipings.

Weddel, John, British commander, voyage to China, x. 187.

Wei-hai-wei, naval base, x. 66; stormed, 68; leased to England, xii. 193.

Wei Yüan, Chinese historian, on the Opium War, xi. 26.

Wei-yuen, provincial commissioner, x. 85.

Wen Ching on the cause of the Boxer movement, xii. 201.

Wen Hsiang in the Dowager Empress' *coup d'état*, xii. 93.

West River, x. 21.

White Feather Society, xi. 226.

White Lotus Society, rise and fall, xi. 224–226.

Williams, S. W., Protestant missionary, on Chinese administration, x. 77, 83; on Chinese estimation of foreigners, 175; on Confucius' "gentleman," xi. 82.

Wood, Benjamin, English envoy to China, lost, x. 187.

Works, Board of, incompetence, x. 28, 78; duties, 77.

Wuchang, capital of Hupeh, x. 31; viceroyal capital, 39.

Wu-ching. See Five Classics.

Wu-chou, commercial importance, x. 22.

Wutsung, Emperor, decree against Christianity and Buddhism, x. 156.

YALUNG RIVER, x. 17.

Yangtse River, drainage basin, x. 14, 15; length, 16; commercial importance, 17, 20; navi-

Yangtse River (*continued*):
  gation, 17, 18, 20; names, 17; character, 18–21; British control in the Opium War, xi. 28; opened to foreign trade, xii. 56, 64–67.

Yao, early ruler of China, xi. 47, 130.

Yeh, viceroy at Canton, and the City Question, xi. 265–270, 278, xii. 6, 9; and the *Arrow* episode, xi. 277–279, xii. 2, 6, 9; captured, 11.

Yellow River, drainage basin, x. 14, 15; length and character, 15; navigation, 16.

Yellow Turbans Society, xi. 224.

Yikking, general in Opium War, perverts facts, xi. 25.

Yin dynasty, xi. 50.

Yu, early ruler of China, xi. 50.

Yü Hsien, Governor of Shansi, executed, xii. 212.

Yuan, governor, army reorganisation, x. 63.

Yuan Shihkai, High Trade Commissioner, x. 42.

Yuen River, x. 23.

Yuen-ming Yuen. *See* Summer Palace.

Yule, Henry, on Carpini's visit to the Grand Khan, x. 160.

Yun-ho, name for the Grand Canal, x. 24.

Yun-kwei, viceroyalty, x. 39.

Yung Lu, leader in anti-foreign sentiment, xii. 201.

Yungching, Emperor, and the treaty with Russia, x. 186; and Christianity, xi. 137; condemns Buddhism and Taoism, 147.

Yunnan, city, capital of Yunnan, x. 31; viceroyal capital, 39.

Yunnan province, statistics, x. 31; climate, 33; trade routes, 142, xii. 151; physical character, 152; project to open to commerce, 153; foreign explorations, 153.

DS
735
B85
1902
v.4

[redacted]

Brinkley, Frank
China, its history, arts, and literature. [Library ed.]

PLEASE DO NOT REMOVE
CARDS OR SLIPS FROM THIS POCKET

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LIBRARY